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PREFACE
Only in recent years have the decades bridging the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries been accorded the attention
their importance in the historical framework merits.

The lnade·

quacy of historical investigation for this period Is particularly
1
evident In the area of Franco-Italian relations.
Yet, a study
of France during the earlier half of her Third Republic reveals
that this aspect of French foreign affairs was far from being insignificant.

The consequences of a political accord the two na·

tlons reached in 1902 were to react favorably for France in the
ensuing years and to culminate In ultimate Italian participation
as a French, and not German, ally in World War I.
Camille Barrere served as French Ambassador to Rome
during the decisive years In which the Franco-Ital Ian rapproche·
ment was realized.

Barrere's diplomatic colleagues have gen·

erally acknowledged that his role was Indispensable In the work
of effecting the rapprochement-·Pau1 and Jules Cambon,
Charles-Roux, Leon Noel, to name but a few.
1

Fran~ols

As surprisingly few

Pierre Renouvln notes the Inadequacy of critical studies
in this area in La Palx arm6e et la Grande-Guerre 18 1-1 1 ,
Vol. II: L'Epoque contempora ne
, ar s,
,
pp. 486-95 •. At the same time, since 1945 a formidable amount
of documentary material has become available to the historian
on both the French Third Republic and post-Rlsorgimento Italy.
II

studies have been devoted to either Barrere or the Franco1tal ian accords he successfully concluded, this dissertation
has examined Franco-Italian rapprochement and the Importance of
Barrere's role In effecting Its achievement.
The pertinent collections of published diplomatic documents have been utilized In the study, principally:

Documents

dielomatlgues francals, I do£uroenti dlelomatlcl, La polltlgue
~terieure

de l'Allemagne, 1870-1914 and British Documents on

the Origins of the War, 1898-1914.

The study draws as well on

unpublished archival material obtained from the Mlnlstere des
Affaires Etrangere In Paris: Paplers Barrere, Paplers Delcasse
and Nouvelle Serie, ltalle. Several articles published by Barrere himself In Revue de Paris and Revue des Deux Mondes have
been invaluable, as has been the research made available In the
publications of the Italian scholar, Enrico Serra.

Serra's

studies, for which he had access to the private Visconti Venosta
and Stucchl·Prlnettl archives, permit the documentation of certain aspects of Franco-Italian relations in this period that
would not otherwise be possible.

III
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CHAPTER I
SETTING THE STAGE
Pierre-Eugene-Cami 1 le Barre re, who would represent France
In the Ital Ian kingdom as Ambassador to Rome from 1897 to 1924,
was born In the town of Charlt6-sur-Lolre on October 10, 1851. 1
A grandson of the French Revolutionary leader Bertrand Barrere,
his father Pierre was originally from the region of the Pyrenees
and had married Agathe Cr6pln.
children.

Camille was the fifth of their six

Until Louis Napol6on's coup d 1 6tat compelled him to

seek exile In England, M. Barrere supported his family as director
of one of the free secondary schools that were quite numerous In
the French provinces In those days.2

Not surprisingly, the

1Barrere left no personal papers that document his private
life. Two volumes by former French diplomats are dedicated to
Barre re and h Is work however: L6on No~l 's Camll 1e Barre re, ambas sadeur de France (Bourges, 1948) and Jules Laroche 1 s Qulnze ans ~
Rome avec Camille Barr~re (Paris, 1943). A distinguished member
of the French diplomatic corps, N~l was elected to the Acad6mle
des Sciences morales et polltlques In 1945. Under de Gaulle he
served on both the Comlt6 consultatlf constltutlonnel and Consell
constltutlonnel. (His study Is referred to hereinafter as Camille
@arrere.) Neither Nol:!I nor Laroche atte'llpted an ane.lysls of
Barr~re's diplomatic activity. The first work of this nature was
undertaken by Enrico Serra In Camille Barrere e 1' Intesa ltalofrancese (Milan, 1950). (It' Is hereinafter referred to as
C. Barr-ire e l'lntesa.) L.B. Atkinson's "Camille Barrere, Ambassador of France: the Fl rst Eight Years of a Miss Ion" (unpubl I shed
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1951) studies
Barrere's diplomatic activities during the first eight years of
his residence In Rome. (Hereinafter referred to as "Ambassador
of France.")
2The coup of December 2, 1851 had aroused a great deal of
opposition among the Nlvernals. Pierre Barrere was one of those

2

Barreres experienced considerable hardship tn England.

To provide

for his family, M. Barrere gave private lessons to the children
of other ~mlqr~s living In London.3
Barrere passed his childhood in England; his early education was essentially British, factors which may well account for
his facility in English which he spoke as fluently as his native
tongue.

It Is Important, too, for an understanding of Barrere's

mature years, to real lze that his philosophical and pol ltical
attitudes were developed In the milieu of French refugees then living in London, a milieu representing all shades of contemporary
republ lean opinion.
When the Empire fell In 1870, Barrere returned to France,
serving for several months as secretary to Martin Nadaud, with whom
he had established contact earlier In London. 4 The passionate convictions of the nineteen-year old republican then led him to ally
himself with the Communards against the Versailles government of
Adolphe Thlers and what he viewed as its policy of submission to
arrested by the authorities In their reaction to the activities of
small lnsurrectionary groups opposing Napo16on's tactics.
3Mme Saint-Ren~ Tatllandler relates that Barr~re himself
told her of his personal ex~rlences of hunger during these years.
Intimate friends of the Barr~res, M. Saint-Ren~ Talllandter had
served with Barrere In his early diplomatic assignments In Cairo
and Munl ch. "S 11 houettes d';mbassadeurs ," Revue d'Hlstol re di plomat I gue, LXV ( 1952), 7-22.
4Nadaud had been a member of the Legislative Assembly
under the Second Empire. He was appointed Prefect of Creuse by
the Government of National Defense. He resigned the post In
March, 1871 and lctter became a member of the Chamber of Deputies
during the Third Republic. Nol!l, Camille Barrere, pp. 13-17.

3
the enemy. 5 He served with the Central Committee of Artillery,
headquartered in the St. Thomas d 1 Aquin quarter of Paris.

At the

same time Barre re embarked on a journal lstic career In his native
)and, becoming affll iated with L'Estafette, La Fronde I 11ustr6e
and La Soclale. 6 His vehement antl·governmental outbursts In
La Soclale resulted In his Inclusion on a list of journalists destined for deportation when the Corrmune was subdued In 1871 .7
In this second exile, Barrere again had recourse to British
hospitality.

Reinstated In London, he supported himself by trans-

lating and writing for a number of papers and reviews, among them:
The Manchester Guardlan,Fortnlghtly Review, Corhlll and Frazer's
Magazine.a

He also represented La R6pub1igue Francaise, founded by

L6on Gambetta in Paris In 1871.9

The topics on which he wrote were

varied, ranging from history and 1 lterature to pol I tics.

Foreign

affairs was apparently of major Interest to him, his contacts with
51n Barrere's obituary, the New York Times Indicates that
he enlisted In the French army when the Franco-Prussian war broke
out. New York Times, October 10, 1940. Barrere was enraged by
the treatment accorded Commune prisoners by the Thlers government
at Versailles. Edouard Do116ans quotes his description of the
inhumane conditions in Hlstolre du mouvement ouvrier, 1830-1871
(Paris, 1936), p. 381.
au
a dally pol I ti cal journal under the di recSee A. Z6vaes, Henri Rochefort le pamph16125, n. 1 •

z~vaes Indicates that Barrere's translations probably Included the English editions of Rochefort's La Lanterne, published
In London In 1874 after Rochefort's escape from New Caledonia.
Ibid., p. 19, n. 1.
8

9paul Deschanel, Gambetta (London, 1920), p. 152.
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both French refugees and English 1 lberals presumably confirming
the attraction.

Among Barrere's contacts In these early days

were Sir Charles Dllke and Louis Blanc.10

Despite his admiration

for Blanc, however, he was sufficiently astute even then to observe to a friend, "Revolutions are made with Ideas but pol I tics
requ I res ski 11 and fores lght •11 11
When the Russo-Turkish war broke out In 1877, the young
journalist was sent to the Balkans.

In Constantinople he became

acquainted with Mlle Irene Damad, the daughter of a well-to-do
Armenian banker.

They were married several years later.12

As a result of the competence he demonstrated In his reports
from the Balkans, Barrere was assigned to cover the proceedings of
the Congress of Berlin.

It was a decisive appointment In the devel-

opment of his career, affording him an opportunity to observe firsthand some of the leading European statesmen of the age:

Otto von

Bismarck, Benjamin Disraeli, Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, Marquess of
Sal lsbury, Alexander Gortschakoff.

France was represented at the

Congress by her Minister of Foreign Affairs William Waddington.
10rhe liberal Dllke, who served as Gladstone's Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs In 1880 and as Minister of
the Interior In 1882, would be a witness at Barr~re's marriage
along with Gabriel Charmes, editor of the Journal des D6bats and
author of numerous studies on the Orient and Egypt.
Blanc, French socialist, had been a member of the Provisional Government from Febru~ry to May, 1848. Blamed for the
failure of the National Workshops, he fled to England In June, remaining there until 1871. After hts return to France he served as
a deputy for Marseilles under the Third Republic.
11 Quoted by Noll, Camll le Barre re, pp. 19-20.
12Mlle Damad was Roman Catholic and had received a completely French education. Her parents eventually settled In France,
where she and Camille were married while he was serving as Consul
General In Cairo.

F
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Impressed as much by the young Barrere's extraordinary grasp of International affairs as by his judgment and reliability, Waddington
took him on as a secretary and subsequently helped arrange for his
return to France, made possible by an act of amnesty of March 4,
1879.
The Berlin assignment may have provided

Barr~re

as well

with international contacts that would prove invaluable in his future diplomatic activities.

Bernhard von BUlow, with whom he would

later deal extensively, was also assigned to the Congress.13

In a

journalistic capacity, Barrere also travelled to Rome In February,
1878, interviewing Italian Minister Agostino Oepretis on the subject of lrredentism.14
In Paris Barrere was profoundly influenced by Gambetta.
He joined the editorial staff of La R6publlgue francaise and appears
to have served as Gambetta•s secretary for a brief perlod.15

The

impact of the republican journal on Barrere was of paramount Importance in the shaping of his lifelong diplomatic activities, particularly by bringing him into contact with a group of men who were
destined to be leading figures on the French political scene in the
13From November, 1879 to July, 1884 von BUlow acted as
Secretary of the German Embassr In Paris. He was named German Ambassador to Rome in 1894, Fore gn Minister in 1897 and served as
Chancellor from 1900 to 1909. In 1914 he returned to Rome as German Ambassador in an attempt' to prevent Italy with allying herself
with Germany's enemies in World War I.
14see A. Sandona, L'lrreden lsmo nelle lotte
nelle contese di lomatlche
alo-austr1ac e Bologna,
, I, 190.
15stephen Gwynn and Gertrude H. Tuckwell, The Life of the
Right Hon. Sir Charles W. Dllke (London, 1918), I, 299. {Hereinafter referred to as Sir Charles W. Dllke).

p
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period leading up to the First World War.

Eugene Spuller, Paul-

Armand Challemel-Lacour, Paul Bert, Charles Freyclnet and Eugene
Etienne were among the well-known personalities on the paper's editorial staff In these days.

From Its ranks Barrere would form

lasting friendships with Gabriel Hanotaux, the three Charmes brothers and Theophlle Delcasse.

His friendship with Delcasse was un-

wavering and certainly crucial In the development of Franco-Italian
rapprochement that occured between 1898 and 1902.

Of Gambetta's

Influence on him, Barrere wrote many years later, "I experienced
It

myself

to such a degree my whole career has been affected. 11 16
Gambetta, In turn, recognized the worth of his dlsclple. 17 He considered the young editor well qualified to pursue a career In diplomacy, and as his ability to Influence the political futures of
aspiring young men In the Third Republ le was considerable, had him
nominated French Delegate to the European Committee on the Danube
In 1880.

Barrere embarked on the path of diplomatic service with
the rank of Embassy Secretary of the First Class. 18 The Danubian
commission had been created by the Treaty of Paris in 1856; its
political, administrative and technical competence confirmed at the
l6camllle Barrere, "La chute de Delcasse, 11 Revue des Deux
Mondes, 8, X (1932), 603.
17After Gambetta's death Gabriel Charmes wrote Barrere of
the statesman's high regard for him, remarking that "of all those
around him you were certainly the one on whom he counted most.
How many times didn't he tefl me~ How often he spoke of the wonderful future he bel leved was In store for you. 11 Quoted by No~l
from an unedl ted letter written by Charmes to Barre re several days
after Gambetta's death. Nolfl, Camille Barrere, p. 22, n. 2.

lBN~l comments on the preoccupation of republican leaders
of this era with building up a new regime staffed with administra-

tive and diplomatic personnel dedicated to their own Ideals. In
his judgment the Ir cHoi:ces for Implementing this program were often
Inspired by Gambetta. Ibid., p. 27.

r

1

congress of Berlin in 1878.

Barrere profited from the contacts

and experience it provided.

In 1882 he was signatory to an addi-

tional convention to the act which regulated navigation on the
Lower Danube.

The following year he sat as Plenipotentiary at an-

other conference assembled In London to negotiate a treaty dealing
with this same problem.
By 1883 French Foreign Minister Challemel-Lacour had appointed him French Consul General In Cairo with the task of studying the rights of suzerainty over the Khedlve reserved to the
Sultan.

Barrere's task was essentially that of obtaining the prom-

ised evacuation of British garrisons in Egypt maintaining, at the
same time, the positions France still occupied In the area,

Hts

dispatches reveal the extent of his opposition to British pollcy. 19
Barrere's success In grasping the complexities of the situation In
Egypt and promoting France's best interests led to his next assignment as First French Delegate to an International Finance Conference
that was convened in London In the summer of 1884. 20 The following
spring he presided over another conference, this one In Parts,
charged with preparing a treaty relative to the Suez Canal.

As the

result of French initiative the conference successfully drafted a
l9France, Mtntstere des Affalres Etrangeres, Documents dllomatl ues fran als relatlfs aux orl Ines de la uerre
Pars, 1929• Series 1 \ V, Nos.
5,
, 19 , 00,
, 20,
393, 403, 543, 559, 561; VI, No. 23; VII, Nos. 142, 268. (This
French diplomatic correspondence has been divided Into three
series: 1, 1871-1900; 2, 190011911; 3, 1911-1914 (Hereinafter
Series 1 ts referred to as DDF; Series 2, as DDF2 .) Sir Charles
Dllke expressed surprise th~an ex-refugee In London could demonstrate such opposition to English policy. Gwynn and Tuckwell,
SI r Charles W. 0 I 1ke, II, 56.
20ooF1,

v,

No. 317.

F
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convention which guaranteed the Great Powers rights of Intervention In Egyptfon finances.

Barrere's German and English colleagues

testify to his competence In discharging his duties while at the
same time managing to defend the Interests of his own country. 21
In all probability ft was the successful Impression being
created by the young French diplomat that prompted Count Herbert
von Bismarck to arrange for a meeting with Barrere In Koenigstein
that September.

The Chancellor's son was In the habit of under-

taking missions for his father during these years, and Barrere's
future apparently appeared sufficiently promising to warrant his
cultlvatlon. 22
The premature death of Gambetta In 1883 was an Irreparable
loss to Barrere. 2 3 Fortunately, his work In Egypt had already
brought him to the attention of Jules Ferry, then French Minister
of Foreign Affairs.

Ferry encouraged Barrere to write him directly,

and In the course of their correspondence expressed confidence In
21 Prlnce Bernhard von BUlow, Memo I rs (Paris, 1931), 111,
207; IV, 383; Gwynn and Tuckwell, Sir Charles W. Dllke, II, 56.
22 clted by Nol!l from an unedited letter of Baron de Courcel,
then Ambassador to Berlin to Barrere, September 2, 1884. Camille
Barre re, p. 32, n. 2. De Cou rce 1 represented France In Germany from
1881 to 1886 and was Ambassador to London from 1894 to 1898. No@l
suggests that the contact between Barrere and Herbert von Bismarck
may have been established through Bernhard von BUlow, with whom
Barrere was acquainted. Ab?~e, p. 5.
2 31n "La chute de Delcasst!, 11 p. 64, Barrere alluded to the
loss of Gambetta to both friends and country, consoling himself
with the remark that "his teachings had germinated. Young and
ardent men were Impregnated with them. 11 Nol!l also relates that
Barrere always kept a large portrait of Gambetta In his study, which
was framed with a letter Barrere had received from him on the occasion of an older brother's death. Camille Barrere, p. 33.

p
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the manner in which the Cairo consul was conducting French affairs. 24
When Ferry's colonial policy brought him Into disrepute, Barrere
felt deeply what he regarded as the injustice of public opinion towards one who had given France both Tunisia and Tonkin.

Ferry's

death In 1893 was almost as grent a loss to him as Gambetta's.
Both shared in his admiration, and he wrote of "the two ••• so
great In spirit and heart who, each In his own way, lived only for
la patrie. 112 5
In November, 1885 Barrere left Egypt to become French
Minister to Sweden. 26 Three years later he was entrusted with the
Legation to Bavaria where he remained for more than five years.
During this period he was less involved In high politics than he
had been in Cairo; his role consisted more In being a well-informed
observor, an experience that was to contribute to the maturation of
his diplomatic talents.

In 1892 and 1893 Barrere also participated

In the International Sanitation Conferences that were held In Venice,
Paris and Dresden, serving as president of the French Delegation In
1892.

Here, as In Berlin earlier, he made contacts that would be

extremely valuable when he became France's Ambassador to Rome.
24 No!l quotes an unedited personal letter from Ferry to
E!c;r;~re, March 8, 1884:
"I admire your activity and your dll lgence.
You ~re In an extremely difficult situation, everyone In the department ls counting on you ••• I congratulate you also for your
prudence and have enough confidence In your wisdom to dispense with
the need of preaching to yot.1. 11 Ib Id., pp. 33-34.
2 51 b Id., p. 34.

26Apparently one of the reasons for Barrere's transfer
from Cairo was the antagonism created with the English representative Sir Evelyn Baring, the future Lord Cromer, by the antipathy
between their wives. See Atkinson, "Ambassador of France," p. 25,
n. 32.

p
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Among the Ital Ian statesmen with whom he establ I shed cordial relations In the course of this work was Emilio Visconti Venosta.
In these years Barrere was forming judgments on German pol ltlcs that provide Invaluable Insight Into his later attitude towards Italy's participation In the Triple Alliance.

There had been

a brief Interval In which he apparently entertained some possibility for peaceful rapport between France and Germany. 27 Yet his
fundamental attitude towards the German Empire ls more likely that
conveyed during the course of several conversations he had with
Herbert von Bismarck.

The two great obstacles to peace, Barrere

reports saying, were Germany's policy of repression In AlsaceLorratne and the national antipathy towards France that had been
provoked by Prince von Bismarck.

In Barrere's opinion, Bismarck

wanted peace but he wanted It only as a means of gaining time to
consolidate the Gennan kingdom, found a colonial empire and build
up the German navy for war·.2a
As for Kaiser Wit 1 lam II, Barrere wrote French Foreign
Minister Alexandre Ribot In 1891, "If my Instinct doesn't deceive
me, he will be responsible for hastening the hour In which the hegemony and even the greatness of England will be put In questlon. 112 9
By 1892 his distrust of the German sovereign was still more
27ooF1, VII, Nos. 3,5, 453, 484, 500. E. E. Berger In
"Camille Barr~re", Berliner Monatshefte, XVIII (1940), 707 Infers
that the role of peacemaker was assumed by Barrere In an attempt
to be named Berlin's French Ambassador. Serra dismisses the validity of Berger's study for Its lack of objectivity. c. Barrere e
l'lntesa, p. 33, n. 23.
28ooF1, VII, Nos. 375, 453, 484, 500.
291bld. , IX, No. 55.

p
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pronounced.

He described him as one "lured on by the force of

events and h Is own temperament to want to govern Eu rope. n30

Bar-

rere considered that day relatively distant, with sufficient time
for Germany's adversaries to prepare themselves and to weaken her
alliances.
efforts.

At the same time he was concerned lest they relax their
"Time," he warned, "Is our most precious ally. 11 31

There are documents which Indicate that as early as 1892
Barrere had arrived at the fundamental position that was to underlie
his subsequent attitude towards the policy he believed France should
adopt In her relations with Italy.
to France.

The Triple Alliance was a threat

The weak spot In the al I I ance was Italy.

In order to

avol d "disastrous diplomat I c consequences, 11 It was therefore essentl al that the peninsular kingdom be detached from the menacing
coa 1 I ti on. 32
There were obstacles Impeding the achievement of this objective, however, and Barrere was not unaware of them.

While In

Munich he had undertaken a study of Italian public opinion and
concluded that there was a distinction between the dispositions of
the Italian monarch and the nation towards the Trlpllce.

The fi-

delity of King Humbert to the Triple Alliance appeared to be unquestionable; that of public opinion, less certaln.33

Yet despite

widespread Ital Ian disenchantment with her al 1 les, In Barrere 1 s

'

estimation it remained a decided possibility that defection could
provoke Italy's invasion by the belligerent Kaiser.

Nor was the

301bld., No. 246.

3 1 Ibid.

321bld., X, No. 68.

331 bid., V111 , No. 166.

p
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issue a simple one from a strictly Italian viewpoint.

When presi-

dent of the Italian Council in 1888, Antonio Rudlnl had remarked
to Barrere that Italy actually found herself In a vicious circle:
To ameliorate the economic relations of France and Italy,
It's necessary to modify our political relations; and the
amelloratl~Q of those requires the amelioration of economic
relations.
Barrere's reply at the time was to suggest a third solution:

si-

multaneous modification of both the political and economic relations of the two countries.

Yet In 1893, as he observed to French

Foreign Minister Jean Casimir-Perler, that solution was no longer
possible.

It could only be achieved after a long period of pre-

1 lminary detente on the part of the Italian government.35
In April, 1894

Barr~re

was named Ani>assador to Switzerland.

There he successfully negotiated a commercial treaty with the
Confederation that resulted In a notable Increase In French trade.
During these years he was also formulating the program he
was to follow later In Italy.

Fran~ols

Charles-Roux, associated

with Barrere In Rome as Secretary and then Conselller d'Ani>assade
from 1916 to 1924, states explicitly that "Everything he accomplished In Rome he had In the back of his mind before arriving
there.

His work was the realization of a plan he'd formulated
while Ambassador to Switzerland • • • 11 • 36 As Barrere noted towards the close of his own 'diplomatic career, "For thirty years,
34 tbld., X, No. 486.
351bld.
36 F. Charles-Roux, Trots ani>assades francalses a la vellle
de la guerre {Paris, 1928), p. 111. A distinguished diplomat and
author, Charles-Roux was attached to the French embassies In
St. Petersburg, Constantinople and London. From 1932 to 1940 he
served as French Ambassador to the Holy See.

p
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I was convinced Germany could only be subdued by the detachrnent
of Italy from her alliance.
Rome i n 189 7 • " 37

It was In this framework I came to

The major preoccupation of the future French Ambassador to
Italy now became a search for the means by which this objective
could be accomplished.

The first step lay In dissipating the anti-

pathies that existed between the French and Italian governments.
The opportunity for effecting such a rapprochement was afforded
Barrere at the end of December, 1897 when French Foreign Minister
Gabriel Hanoteux appointed him Ambassador to Rome.3 8
Barrere's appointment coincided with a recent thaw in
Franco-Italian relations.

Rapport between the two nations had been

severely strained since 1881 as a result of their conflicting interests in the Mediterranean.

The rivalry was not unexpected,

Bismarck had foreseen It In 1866 and Tunisia was the anticipated
point of contest.39

Despite the traditional ties binding the two

37Quoted by No~l, Camille Barrere, p. 38, from an unedited
note of Barrere's dated August 12, 1919.
38The appointment obviously had been under consideration
for some time. Visconti Venosta was first alerted to Billet's
replacement in a dispatch from his minister In Vienna, Count
Costantino Nlgra, on January 22, 1897. Serra, C. Barrere e 1' lntesa,
p. 62, n. 42, from unedited material In the Archlvlo Visconti
Venosta. Serra's study makes extensive use of material In the
private Visconti Venosta and Stucchl-Prlnettl archives. For complete citations refer to C. 9arr•re e l'intesa.
39The Tunisian question and Its bearing on Franco-Italian
relations are treated by: W. L. Langer, "The European Powers and
the French Occupation of Tunis," American Historical Review, XXXI
(October, 1925), 55-78 and (January, 1926), 251-65· J. Ganlage,
Les orlglnes du protectorat fran~als en Tunlsle, 1~61-1888 (Paris,
1915); Luigi Chlala, Paglne di storla contem1iTranea (2d ed.:
Turin, 1896), (hereinafter referred to as Pa9ne df storia,)
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Latin sisters--affinities of language, culture and religion•-the
Mediterranean interests of both countries made ultimate conflict
in the area almost lnevltable.40
France, of course, was deeply Involved in the events dominating nineteenth century Mediterranean history:

Italian unification,

the opening of the Suez Canal, and North Africa's Europeanization.
The configuration of her coasts and establishment of French rule in
Algeria had led Gambetta to regard the western Mediterranean as
France's particular "scene of action. 1141 There were innumerable
other arguments, however, to support French involvement in the Mediterranean basin.

As well as strategic Importance and economic con-

siderations, France sustained the concept of her role as mlsslonnalre
civilisateur.

In the nineteenth century the view still prevailed

that the civilization and Institutions of Paris could only be a
blessing to the world's underdeveloped regions. 42 In this era
II: Tunis!; T. J. Powers, J. Ferr and the Renaissance of French
Imperial ism (New York, 19'+4 , an E. Serra, La quest one tun s na
da Crlspi a Rudinl (Milan, 1947). (Hereinafter referred to as
La guestione tunisina.)
40As Christopher Seton-Watson noted, the French seizure of
Tunisia "caused an emotional revulsion against France and brought
to the surface, in their most virulent form, all the mutual suspicions that have so persistently divided the two Latin nations."
Italy from Liberalism to Fascism: 1870-1925 (London, 1967) 1 p. 109.
See also Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 190'+·1906
(Chicago, 1930) and Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern History
(Ann Arbor, 1959).
'
41 Quoted by Andr~ Tardleu,
France and the Alliances (New
York, 1908), p. 82. Brace and Brogan both infer that the Tunisian
question was actually opened In 1830 when, on July 5, Algiers fell
to France. See: Richard M. Brace, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), pp. 30-36 and D. W. Brogan, France
Under the Republic (New York, 1940), p. 224.
42Brace, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, p. 41.
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colonialism also afforded France a degree of prestige, providing
certain compensations after the defeat and Isolation that followed
In the aftermath of Sedan's defeat.43

However, any hopes France

entertained of creating a bridge across North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea were thwarted at Fashoda. 44 Yet Morocco
remained to round off the French North African emplre. 4 5

The "pearl

of North Africa" would actually entice Oelcasst! Into acquiescing
In the arrangements Barrere ultimately negotiated with Italy In
1900 and 1902--the Mediterranean and Neutrality Accords, of which
the Franco-Ital Ian rapproachment was Integrally constltuted. 46
It was Inevitable that France's Mediterranean activities
would engender certain difficulties for her In the realm of International relations, particularly with:

Great Britain, entrenched

In Egypt, Gibraltar and Malta; Spain and Italy.

The Anglo-French

problems would be resolved with the conclusion of an African Convention In 1899. 4 7 Differences with Spain, In marked decl lne during this period, were of relatively less significance.

Agreements

with her on the question of Morocco were reached between 1899 and
1904. 48
44Below, pr. 44, 4G, 47.
43 Be 1ow, p • 2 l .
4 SAccordlng to Christopher Andrew, for five years after
Fashoda the main purpose of a section of the Comlt6 de l'Afrlque
f ranc;a lse was to persuade De,,1 cass6 to seek an "agreement wl th
England based on the barter of Egypt for Morocco~' Th6ophlle Oelcass6 and the Entente Cordlale (London, 1968), p. 52.

46see

tudes towards Horocc"). ...,____,......_.._........,---__.,,._.-:..r..,_.,....
La colonisation fran ......._........,.,._..___...._.....__
du Nord: Alg6rle, Tunis e,
•
47 Below, pp. S2 59.

L

48Andrew, Th6ophlle Oelcass6 and the Entente Cordlale,
pp. 147-51; 216-27.
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Italy, now striving to attain the status of European power
and wholly a Mediterranean country, was a different matter.

The

Mediterranean Sea and Its surrounding lands were the sphere of her
major Interest.

Seekl ng a real lzatlon of her pol It I cal unity, the

leaders of the Rlsorglmento had proclaimed the young nation's right
to her national patrimony.
capital of civilization!

Pagan and Christian Rome had been the
In her bid for empire the third Rome re-

claimed domination of the Mediterranean, marking North Africa for
her future expansion.

Tunisia, within sight of Sicily and adjacent

to Algeria, was the object on which Italy's ll11lledlate attention was
focused.
ern

Yet France, In possession of Algeria, dominated the west-

Mediterranean~

Italy saw In Tunisia a guarantee of her Mediterranean security.

She also viewed the region as an outlet for her constant

flow of emlgrants.49

Tunisia had actually been a sphere of Ital Ian

economic activity prior to the young nation's unification.

Since

1869 Italy had exercised joint financial control over the territory
with France and Great Britain.
Theoretically a part of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire,
Tunisia was poorly governed during these years by a native dynasty
that had left It largely uncontrolled, underdeveloped and subject
to Innumerable problems stemming from Irresponsible financial management.

'

The major Powers were acutely aware of the Inherent danger

in a disturbance of European equilibrium.

Due to the ramifications

49By 1881 there were 11,200 Italians in Tunisia. The French,
by comparison, only numbered 700. Brace, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
p. 37.
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of colonialism, danger was Implicit in North African territorial
changes as well.

Tunisia's relationship to the Ottoman Empire

would ordinarily lend a particularly dangerous aspect to an alteration in her status quo.

However, Tunisia had figured unoffi-

cially in the discussions of the Congress of Berlin, where French
Plenipotentiary William Waddington was led to understand by both
Germany and Great Britain that France might enjoy a free hand In
the territory.SO

Bismarck encouraged the French interest, regard-

ing Tunisia as compensation for France's loss of Alsace-Lorraine
and a means of destroying francophllism In Italy.

Great Britain

acquiesced as a concession to French acceptance of the Cyprus Convention.
Ital Ian pretensions In Tunisia apparently moved France to
definitive action.

Dissatisfied with Ital Ian Minister Benedetto

Cai rol 1 's "clean hands" pol Icy In the negotiations that transpl red
In Berlin, Italy had adopted the unalterable position that France's
occupation of Tunisia would be totally unacceptable.51

She pre-

ferred a preservation of the status quo that would have permitted
free play to both French and Italian Interests In the region.
Italy's Tunisian Consul, Signor Hacclo, enjoyed an unlimited exercise of power that permitted him to engage In a war of prestige
and economy with his French colleague M. Roustan.
ities played Into the hands'of French colonialists.

Macclo's activOpinion

SOFor these aspects of the Congress of Berl In see W. N.
Medltcott, Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe (London,
1956), pp. 65-70, 113-34, 197, 306-11.
5 1catroll headed two Italian ministries: the first, HarchDecember, 1878; the second, July, 1879-Hay, 1881.

F

ll

deepened that lt<ily w<:s threztenln9 Frsnce's position.

In 18fO

French Premier Charles F'reyctnet offTclrilly notified lt«'ly that
fr;ince con-» I de red Tunis la her sphere of f nfl uence.

HI s country

wauld not permit another power "to establish its influence in opposition to ours in u territory like Tunisfa v.1hfch Is the nritur;-11
annex and mll ltary key to our Afrlcen holdtngs. 1152 The situation

came to a

he~d

in 1081 when France estobllshed n virtual protec-

torate over the territory.

Italy protested the French

~ctlon

ef-

fected by the Treaty of Bardo, claiming prior rights In Tunisia on

the basis of a treaty of friendship, navigation and c0111nerce she
had concluded with the Bey In 1t:6s.53

Her objections, however,

proved to be of no avail.
R~tlflcatlon

of the Treaty of 80rdo led Sidney Sonntno,

Influential leader of the Italian par1 lamentary center, to appe.nl
for closer ltalfan ties with Germany ns \'#ell as for friendship

with

Austrla-Hung~ry

and England.

Convinced a rapproAchment with

the Central Powers was essentla1 tf Italy were to surmount the

dnnlhllatton of iso1atton, Sonnlno's position was supported by the

King and Queen as well as by Parliament and the Ital tan press.
Thus in 1882 Italy coimtltted herself to Bismarck, becoming party
to the Triple Alliance with her former enemy, Austrla-Hungary.5 4

52ooFI • t 11, No. 214. Btzerta would become a gr?.ve obstnc1e to already embittered Franco-Italian relations In the 1890's.
See below, pp. 27-28.
Tr"'
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treaty see: Italy, HlnJstero esterl,
e no d' Ital la e gl I fl trl sta,tl.,
the elllance hed been
Count Carlo Robllant,
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The Triple Alliance (Triplice) became a fundamental International alignment of the age.

The original treaty of 1882 se-

cured Italy the support of Germany and Austria-Hungary against a
French attack.

When renewed in 1887, Italy won far more advanta-

geous terms than those she obtained when originally orienting her
policy towards the Central Powers.

Supplementary accords with

Germany and Austria-Hungary and a series of Mediterranean agreements
with England, Austria-Hungary and Spain completed the stipulations
of the original treaty of 1882.

Italy received support for her

Mediterranean policy as well as a pledge of German assistance against
France If the latter attempted to modify the status quo In North
Africa.

Her Balkan problems with Austria-Hungary were brought un-

der control and her traditional dependence on England In the Mediterranean was reinforced.SS

With the agreements of 1887 Italy be-

came a connecting link between the German orbit and British Mediterranean power, precisely when France was attempting to force England out of Egypt.

Italy's International position during this

period had been greatly enhanced.56
for one, would have preferred Italy to wait "with calmness and
prudence for the dangers which threaten us to make themselves felt
by others who would then come In search of us." Quoted In Chlala,
~lne di storia, Ill: La Trlpllce e la Dupllce Alleanza, 96-98.
On the Tri pl fee see also A. F. Prlbram, The Secret TreatL~-~-9f
Austria-HungarT, 1879-1914 (Cambridge, 1921), II, 3-43 and
L. Salvatorell , La Trlpllce Alleanza (Milan, 1939). Texts of the
Triple Alliance treaties are Included in Prlbram, I.

'

S5see Medl I cott' s "The Med I te rranean Agreements of 1887",
Slavonic Review, V (June, 1926), 60-80 on the Mediterranean accords and James L. Glanville, Italy's Relations with England, 1896!2Qi (Baltimore, 1934) for Anglo-Ital fan relations.
S6serra attributes the improvement to Robilant's diplomatic
skill in a complex, changing International climate, the Italian
minister successfully transforming a continental alliance Into a
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France viewed the situation with Increasing concern, convinced It constituted a grave threat to her security.

She found

herself subjected to Increased Isolation and surrounded by a coa1 ltlon that was determined to maintain the status quo and prevent
her from Initiating any action that might alter lt.57

Signifi-

cantly, the Franco-German d6tente of 1885 had ended with the fall
of Jules Ferry's ministry.

The departure of Ferry (staunch advocate

of Franco-German colonial accord) from the political arena coin·
clded with the rise of nationalistic, germanophoblc sentiment In
France.

When General Boulanger was appointed French Minister of

War In 1886, the danger of war between the two countries became
acute.5 8 Furthennore, Franco-German estrangement was evolving as
Germany C!!galn began to support British policy.

Disturbed by the

prospect of Russian aid to France with the Increasing possibility
of an outbreak In hostilities, Bismarck sought a defensive alliance
with England.

Count Wlldenburg Hatzfeldt, German Ambassador to

London, was Instructed to convey to Lord Salisbury the Gernlan
chancellor's personal conviction that the surest way to peace lay
conttnental-Hedlterranean one. Bismarck, ;:>ware of Russia's growing
animosity towards her Balkan rival, Austria-Hungary, and of the
spirit of revanche prevailing in France (due to the growth of Boulanger's popularity among the masses), foresaw a confrontation by
France were Germany to Intervene In the event of a Russian attack
on Austria. Thus the chancellor's objective In 1887 was to localize
an eventual Austro-Russlan conflict. In order to do so, he had
first to guarantee Italian t'eutrallty. C, Barcere e l'lntesa,
pp. 38-40.
57Langer sees the acute tension In Franco-Ital Ian relatlons
developing directly from France's discovery that a potentially
hostile coalition existed against her. European Alliances and
Alignments (New York, 1935), p. 236.
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In the conclusion of a treaty binding the respective powers for
a limited period "to combined resistance against a French attack. 11 59
Tunisia and the Triple Alliance were not the only sources
of contention between France and Italy, however.

Italy's annexa-

tion of Rome In the wake of France's defeat at Sedan remained an
act of Infamy to an overwhelming number of Frenchmen.

France's

Ambassador to Rome In 1874, the Marquis de Noailles, would attribute
difficulties between the two countries to Italian ambitions as well-to Italy's desire to replace the defeated France of 1870 as the
great Mediterranean power.60
A fear of French republicanism figured prominently in the
framework of Italian antipathy.

The possibility of a republican

overthrow Initiated and supported by French radicals was regarded
as a threat to Italy's monarchy and the continued existence of her
national unity.

Still a new creation, the Ital fan monarchy lacked

the supports on which other monarchies rested;

ancient loyalties,

an old aristocracy, the clergy, surviving elements of feudalism.61
The alienation of the neighboring Latin sisters became more
59ersmarck'sRe1atlons with England, 1871-1890( German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914; ed. by E.T. S. Dugdale New York,
1928), I, 369-72. Although Germany's proposal was not followed up
at this time, relations between England and Germany continued to
improve. See Langer, Eurofhan All lances and Alfgn~ents, pp. 491-94
and L. Albertini, The Orig s of the War of 1914, trans. by Isabelle
M. Massey (London, 1952), I, 61-64.
60see Enrico Serra's reference to an unpublished "Note sur
les relations entre la France et 1' ltalie" by de Noatlles, Included
among unpublished Carte Hanotaux at the Qual d'Orsay. La questlone
tunlsfna, p. 3, n. 1.
6IB. Croce, A History of ltala, 1871-1915, trans. by
Cecelia M. Ady (London, 1929, pp. 10 -09.
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pronounced after Francesco Crtspi's rise to power In 1887. 62

Given

the Italian minister's tempestuous temperament and widely-known antiFrench attitude, the deterioration was not too surprtstng.63

As

early as 1871 Crtspl had expressed his strong belief that "without
force and grandeur, Ital Ian unity would be useless. 11 64

He resented

what he considered France's appropriation of Nice and Savoy and her
opposition to the Ital tan conquest of Rome, unshakable In his conviction that a natural rivalry existed between France and Italy both
tn the Mediterranean and with the Vatican.

Benedetto Croce has des-

cribed his attitude as that of one, "obsessed by the nightmare of
France In alliance with the papacy, planning an Invasion of Italy
and the destruct ton of Ital tan untty. 1165 Crlspi 1 s anti-French sentiment was augmented by an admiration for the Prussia of Bismarck, a
Prussia the Ital Ian minister regarded as a natural French adversary.
62 A Mazzinlan revolutionary after 1848, Crlspl figured
prominently in Garibaldi's Thousand. Initially a member of the
Italian Parliament's extreme left, he soon became one of the
monarchy's most fervent supporters, seeing In the Crown the best
unifying force for the new kingdom. Crlspl directed Ital tan policy as Prime Minister from 1887 to 1891 and a9aln between 1893 and
1896. See G. Volpe, F. Crisp! (Venice, 1928) and G. Salvemini,
La pol ltlca estera di F. Crfspl (Rome, 1919) for differing Interpretations of Crtspl and his work. Volpe's study, with reservations, Is more positive: Salvemlnl's, substantially negative.
6 31n fairness to the Ital tan minister, It has been noted
that Cris pl 's counterpart In this period, French Foreign Minister
Ren~ Goblet," was hardly less I rasclble and passionate than Crlspl
himself." Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. !1?5.
64Quoted by Serra th La ~uestlone tunlslna, p. 33 from an
article entitled "Italia e Franc ah originally appearing In La
Rlforma, February 21, 1871.
65croce, A HlstorT of ltala, 1871-1915, p. 168. De Noallles
had, tn fact, related ant -Frenchemonstratlons In the 1870's to
Ital Ian resentment over the alleged theft of Nice! attributing the
disturbances to the Instigation of Bismarck. DDF, 11, No. 242.
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The conflict In Franco-Ital ten relations assumed major
proportions tn 1868 when Italy concluded a military convention
with Germany In which the representatives of the Trtpl tee formulated a COf11110n plan to counteract possible French aggresslon. 66
France retaliated by breaking off negotiations for a new tariff
treaty with Italy.

In 1886 the Influence of rising protectionist

sentiment, along with anger over France's rejection of a naval
treaty, had led the ltallan chambers to denounce a French tariff
treaty that had been In effect since 1881.

The rupture of negotia-

tions for a new agreement that had been opened In 1887 Initiated

the equivalent of a tariff war between the two countrles. 67 This
rift In commercial relations had grave consequences for Italy and
was seized upon by the French government as an economic weapon In

Its efforts to wrest Italy from the Triple Alliance.
There were other Nasures than economl c pressure, however,

which France was able to bring to bear on Italy In their contest.
Italy was fully as sensitive to the Romcn question as she
had shown herself to be with regard to Tuntsla.68

France was not

66see Prlbram, The Secret Tr:eatles of Austrla-Hungary
1

1879-1914, II, 81·88.
6 Zsee below, pp. 32-51; A. Billot, ~a Fran~e et l'ftalte
(Parts, 1905), I, 47·56, 77-78 and £. Decleva, Da Adu~_;l__Sara)P..Y2,
(Bi'.lri, 1971) • pp. 61-68.

'

68see William Halperin, ltalx and the Vatican a~ War
(Chicago, 1939); E. L. Woodward, 11 The 6ip1omaey of theatfcan
Under Popes Plus IX and Leo XIII, .. Journal of the British Institute
<>f International Affairs, Ill (1924), 113-39; F'. Salata 1 "La ques·
tlone romana e la Trlp1tce Alleanza," Nuova Antalogla, "• CCXXXI II
(1923), 219-63 and E. Bourgeois, "Les orlglnes de la Triple Altlance et la question romaine." Revue de Parts, CXCll (1926), 37-58.

averse to exploiting this vulnerability.

The young kingdom had

been apprehensive of the threat to her monarchy, Implicit In any
forced restoration of papal temporal power, since fl rst appropriating church territory during the course of Ital Ian unification.

The

conclusion of the Triple Alliance in 1882 relieved much of her anxiety that Bismarck might support such a drlve. 69 Suspicions then
reverted to France as the principal source of support for any movement aimed at restoring Rome to the papacy.
Animosity towards France became more embittered during the
first Crlspl ministry, which coincided with the ralllement and
Pope Leo XII l's efforts to secure an entente with a re-Christianized
France.

In the succeeding decade France's influence at the Vatican

became paramount, Italy's attitude towards the church changing to
one of open hostlllty.70

Leo XII l's conviction he would be forced

to abandon the Vatican aggravated existing tensions still further.
The situation assumed crisis dimensions in 1889 when the erection of
a statue of Glordano Bruno (considered a sixteenth-century victim of
papal Intolerance) resulted In an eruption of anti-papal demonstrations In Rome.

Franco-Ital Ian relations had deteriorated to such

an extent by then that an outbreak of war between the two countries
was believed to be Imminent.

Pope Leo XI 11 seriously considered

leaving Rome, and It was conman knowledge he hoped for Intervention
by the Ca tho 11 c powers If h I~ de pa rtu re was res I sted by the I ta 11 an
691taly's concern over this possibility had Increased
after the chancellor ended his quarrel with the Roman Curia.
70see Alexander Sedgwick, The Ralllement In French Politics,
1890-1898 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).
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government.

Although a major International crisis was averted,

Crlspi contended that considerable pressure had been brought to
bear on the pope by France throughout the eplsode.7 1
Relations between France and Italy were also strained by a
conflict of Interests In the Red Sea during these years.

Italy's

attempts at colonial expansion, under the aegis of England, encountered the vigorous opposition of France, whose government refused
to recognize the protectorate Italy established in Abyssinia or to
conclude an accord regulating the two countries' respective spheres
of Interest .7 2
A number of Incidents took place during this period as well
that contributed In no small measure to steadily-Increasing discord between France and ltaly.73
The first of these occured In December, 1887 when Italy
learned France had concluded an accord with the Porte which extended
the Tunisian frontier thirty kilometres to the east.

ltallan pro-

tests were Ineffective; France proceeded with the territorial
changes Italy debated.
In January, 1888 the extra-territoriality of the French
Consulate in Florence was violated by Italian officials demanding
71The Memoirs of Fr~ncesco Crlspf, ed. by Thomas PalamenghlCrlspi and trans. by Mary Prl chard-Agnettl (London, 1912), 11,
393-407.
72see R. Pinon, L'empf re de la M6dlterran6e {Paris, 1912),
pp. 36-37 and E. Serra, La ?uestlone tunlslna, pp. 177-234. Serra
also accuses the French of netting the hostility of the Abysslnfans against Italy.

....

73For details, see Serra, C. Barrere e l'fntesa, pp. 43-46
and Billot, La France et 1 1 Ital le, I, 75-263 •
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the papers of a deceased Tunisian subject.

France reacted to this

affront by concentrating a fleet of warships at Toulon, a move
Italy regarded as Indicative of France's intent to open hostilities
against her and launch a surprise naval attack at La Spezia.
Alarmed at the possibly dire International repercussions Inherent
In the situation, Gennany requested the dispatch of a British fleet
to the Mediterranean for precautionary measures.

Officially, London

declined to view the affair as serious; yet a British squadron did
arrive In Genoa and its appearance, accidental or Intentional, was
believed to have saved the situation In both Rome and Berlin.
Another dispute arose In June, this clash centering on the
validity of the capitulations tn Hassawa.7 4 Disregarding what
Italy claimed as her rights In the city, France supported a number
of foreign businessmen protesting the authority of Italian municipal officials to tax them.

Austro-Gennan intervention prevented

this disagreement from assuming greater proportions.
Additional difficulties then emerged In September, 1888
when the Bey of Tunis promulgated new legislation effecting education and associations.

Apparently Instigated by France, the decrees

were contrary to the capitulations of Italy's 1868 Tunisian treaty.
Efforts at resolving the conflict were merged with the unsuccessful
negotiations for a Franco·l~allan commercial accord then In progress.75
Despite British and Ital tan protests, France also engaged
74A Red Sea port, Massawa was within the confines of the
territory establ lshed as Eritrea tn 1890.
75eelow, pp. 32-51.
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In the fortification of Blzerta, by Its strategic location destined to be the great port of the French Medlterranean--a Toulon
of Algeria-Tunisla. 76 Italy considered the fortifications an
indication of France's intention of proceeding to Tunisia's outright annexation.

To Crisp!, an extension of French sovereignty

In Tunisia made Italy's occupation of Tripoli mandatory.

In fact,

since the establishment of France's Tunisian protectorate, Italy
had attempted to penetrate Trlpolltanla and Cyrenalca with a
number of scientific expeditions and had expended great effort
developing Ital Ian conmerce.

While Interest In Trlpolltanla was

tied to the Imperialists' program of political and economic expansion in the eastern Mediterranean, it also excited a great deal of
enthusiasm throughout the Italian penlnsula--basically, as a means
of achieving Ital Ian domination of the Mediterranean.
was not superficial.

The Interest

In 1888 Robllant had Informed the French

Embassy in Berlin that a seizure of Tripoli would result In war.77
France had no direct Interest In Tripoli herself.

Yet she

was convinced that the presence of a signer of the Triple Alliance
on the flancs of Algeria-Tunisia constituted a grave danger.

In

76on Blzerta's significance see: G. Hanotaux, La palx latlne
(Paris, 1903), p. 12; Crisp!, Memoirs, II, 441-76 and Pinon, L1 emplre
de la M~dlterran~e, pp. 338-82. Italy regarded the Mediterranean
military base as "a pistol pointed against Sicily." Quoted by Serra,
La guestlone tunlslna, p. 52 from an unedited dispatch of Italy's
Tunisian Consul.General Mach1avelll to Crispi, September 30, 1890.
Nor was Blzerta's Importance under-estimated In France. Pinon quotes
Jules Ferry's remark, "If I took Tunis, It was to have Blzerte. 11
L'emplre de la Medlterranee, p. 343.
77Quoted from a "Very Confidential" telegram of French
Charge d 1 Affalres, M. Ralndre, August 27, 1888 In E. Bourgeois
and G. Pages, Les orl Ines et res nsablllt~s de la Grande Guerre
(2d edition; Paris, 9
3 •
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the event of war, Italy would become an enemy.

France would be

compel led to defend her African frontiers, and Tri pol I afforded
a fonnldable base of operations against Blzerta, Indeed against

the entire Tunisian Regency!
When enlargement of the Tunisian borders continued, accompanied by further French claims to the hinterlands (territory which
Included the caravan routes uniting the Sudan with Tripoli), Crisp!
Initiated negotiations with Paris for a solution to mutual TunlslanTrlpol itan problems.

Yet France was unwilling to reach an accord

while Italy remained In the Triple Alllance.78
An Impasse had been reached.79

The situation remained

substantially the same during the Interim ministries of Italy's
Rudin! (February 1891-May, 1892) and Giovanni Glollttl (May, 1892November, 1893).

In 1892 Rudlnl renewed the Triple Alliance a second

time; Glollttl's term at the Consulta was marked by the explosive
Incident at Algues-Mortes, In which a group of Italian workers were
massacred by French workmen.
With Crlspl's return to office In 1893 prospects for achieving Franco-Italian rapport appeared less promising than ever.

Italy

was experiencing the economic disabilities of tariff war with France
in full.

At the same time, Italian aspirations over Ethiopian

'

78see Crlspl, Polltlca estera {Milan, 1912), pp. 376-86.
The basis of the proposal was Italy's acquiescence In France's
annexation of Tunisia In exchange for French support to Italy's
pacific acquisition of Tripoli.
79For details of the period between 1891 and 1896 see
Billot, La France et l'ltalle, I, 278-484; II, 3-291 and Serra,
C. Barr~re e 11 Intesa, pp. 43-62.
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Harrar collided with French manoeuvres to separate Italy from Great
Britain and gain recognition of the Tunisian protectorate.

Even

more slgntftc2nt was the tennlnatlon of French Isolation In the
5 unmer

of 1892, with the conclusion of a Franco-Russian military

convention that entered Into vigor at the beginning of 1894.80
To complicate matters still further, Germany and Austria-Hungary
were again making overtures to France.

An International situation

of these dimensions left Italy tn an adverse position.Bl

A d~tente

In Franco-Ital tan relations only emerged after Italy's disaster at
Adowa In 1896.
While Italy struggled to regain her equll lbrlum after the
African debacle, France announced her Intention of ending the diplomatic arrangements that had existed tn Tunisia since 1868.

The

move was an obvious demand for formal recognition of the protectorate France had essentially established In 1881.

Although reluc-

tant to abandon the favorable Tunisian capitulations, Italy had
little hope of reversing the decision and attempted to obtain a new
conmerclal accord tn return for the political and economic concessions of a new Tunisian treaty. 82 French Foreign Minister Hanotaux,
BOThe Franco-Russian rapproachment ts treated by Langer
in The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894 (Mass., 1929).
81 As Decleva points out, when Germany sides with France
and Austria-Hungary with Russia, any hope of ltaltan compensation
vanishes. Italy Is Isolate~ with only the Insufficient platonic
friendship of England. Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 49.
82 she learned In July, 1896 that Austria-Hungary had signed
an accord which renounced the capitulations and recognized favorable treatment for France In Tunisia. Simultaneously, England
was negotiating a new treaty In which Egypt would serve as a counterpart for the concessions France sought In Tunisia and Horrocco.
Serra, La questlone tunlstna, pp. 406-15.

however, was unwilling to negotiate on such a basis.

The obstacles

blocking a solution to the Tunisian problem were only surmounted
when Italian foreign policy was given a new direction by Minister
of foreign Affairs Emit lo Visconti Venosta, patriot and eminent
Italian statesman. 8 3
Confronted with the serious economic difficulties the
customs war was infl feting on Italy when he was recalled to active
political life In July, 1896,Vlscontl Venosta made the decision to
salvage as much as possible for Italy in a new Tunisian treaty and
await an opportune moment to negotiate a new commercial accord.
A Tunisian treaty was subsequently concluded September 28, 1896
that held the promise of developing Franco-Ital Ian rapprocrement
In the future.

Included In the Tunisian arrangements were:

a

convention of commerce and navigation, a consular convention and
a convention of extradition.84
In April, negotiations were initiated for a conmerclal
accord between the two countries.

Although little progress was

made towards its completion during the remainder of 1897, one of
83vlscontl Venosta served as minister of Foreign Affairs
under Rudini from July, 1896 to June, 1898 and under General Luigi
Pelloux and Giuseppe Saracco between May, 1899 and February, 1901.
His program is known as one of raccoglimento. Convinced of the
necessity of remaining in the Triple Alliance, he also realized
the Importance of Improving Franco-Italian rapport. To achieve the
latter he accepted a renuncfatlon of the capitulations as stipulated
by France In the terms of a new Tunisian treaty. Decleva, Da Adua
a Sarajevo, pp. 32-60. See also William S. Halperin, Diplomat
under Stress: Visconti Venosta and the Crisis of July, 1870 {Chicago, 1963).
84 The treaties are covered in detail by Billot, La France
1
et 1 Ital le, II, 357-73 and Serra, La guestione tunlslna, pp. 405-53 •
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Ambassador Barrere's first accomplishments In Rome was the successful conclusion of a Franco-Ital Ian commercial treaty In October,
1898--less than a year after he had assumed his new responsibilities
In the Italian kingdom.

32

CHAPTER 11
ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES:
THE COMMERCIAL ACCORD OF 1898
Barrere arrived in Rome on February 3, 1898.
with blonde hair and beard, conwnent was often made

on

Tall, slender,
the resemblance

of the new French ambassador to Henri IV. 1 Despite the Impression
of great dignity his presence conveyed, the poised, elegant Barrere
was in no respect a retiring or self-effacing figure.

Friends and

diplomatic colleagues emphasize equally his vigor, the aura of authority that emanated from his person and an Imperious quality that would
permit him to be "none but chlef. 112
The Farnese Palace, which then served as the French Embassy
In Rome, provided a distinguished setting for Barrere's ambassadorial activities.

The famed Ecole

fran~aise d 1 Arch~ologie

et d 1 Hls-

tolre, then under the direction of the Abb6 Duchesne, was also housed
in the Farnese, adding to French prestige already enjoyed In Rome
1

Mme Sal nt-Ren6 Ta 111 andler, "S 11 houettes d 1 Ambassadeu rs, 11

pp. 7-22.
2Hme Salnt-Ren6 Talflandler, "Avant le sacerdoce. Le
sacerdoce. Le Vlcomte Chaptal dtplomate, 11 Revue des Deux Mondes,
LXXVI (August 15, 1943), 392. Descriptions of Barr~re 1 s appearance
are also given by Charles Benoist, Souvent rs (Parts, 1932-34), 11,
13; No!l, Camille Barrere, p. 77; Laroche, Qutnze ans a Rome avec
Camtl le Barr~re, p. 11.

,,
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that of the highest scholarshlp.3

Barrere's own personal interests,

however, ran less to the academic than the arts: painting, literature, and muslc--whlch was his first love. 4 He was also an ardent
spcrtsman. 5 Despite these varied Interests, the new ambassador
soon acquired the reputation of being an indefatigable worker.
What were the objectives of the newly-assigned minister
as he embarked on the mission that would occupy him for a quarter
of a century?

Ultimately, Barrere hoped to effect a corrosion of

Italy's ties to the Triple Alliance, to empty the Trlpllce of its
substance. 6 His Immediate concern, however, was to suppress a11
sources of discord between France and ltaly.7
was to clarify this position.

Many years later he

He regarded the state of France's

relations with Italy at that time, Barrere wrote, as the equivalent
of a demi-rupture whose effects were being felt more and more acutely.
French occupation of Tunisia had unleashed so violent a reaction
beyond the Alps It had led Italy to enter Into her German alliances,
3Among the lnstltute's students were: Andre Chaumelx,
Jerome Carcoplno, Lucien Rornler, Paul Hazard, Masslgll, Cavet and
Zelller. Laroche, Qulnze ans a Rome avec Camille Barrere, p. 23.

4sarrere began to study the violin while assigned to

Stockholm. Mme Saint-Rene Talllandler refers to his obvious enjoyment In performing duets while In Munich. "Silhouettes d'Ambassadeu rs," pp. 7-22. Acco rd i ng to the New York TImes, Barre re was the
author of an article on Stradivarius that appeared In the Revue de
Paris. One of his most prized possessions was a genuine Guarnerfus
violin. April 9, 1922.

•

Ssenolst describes Barrere as a passionate chasseur. Souven I rs, ff, 131. He a 1so enjoyed horseback rid Ing. N~l re 1ates
that embassy business was often conducted during the course of his
morning ride. Von BUlow, who lived In Rome after his retirement,
was a frequent riding companion. Camille Barrere, pp. 80-81.
6ooF2, I, Nos. 118, 185, 201, 235, 238; ff, Nos. 76, 99,
218.
7ooF1, XIV. No. 512.
h
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a policy Barrere feared had grave consequences for France.

The

paris Bourse was also closed to Italian securities, and commercial
exchange between the two nations was broken.

Assuming his new

responsibilities, Barrere was resolved to end a state of affairs
he considered extremely prejudicial to the Interests of the two
neighboring countrles. 8 To this end he attached a palltlcal
Importance "of the first order" to reaching a co11111erclal arrangement--on even an lnfonnal basls.9

For as he wrote Hanotaux In

February, 1898, the key to Ital Ian foreign pol Icy lay In a resumption of Franco-Italian economic rapport.lo
Not that Barrere underestimated the difficulties Inherent
In the goal he proposed; nor did he believe France could expect
any outside assistance in achieving It.

English policy accomodated

Itself well to Franco-Italian dissidence; It assured her own preponderance In the Mediterranean.

Russia, France's new ally, re-

mained Indifferent to the problems Inherent In the Franco-Italian
situation.

The Holy See clearly had no Interest In seeing a Franco-

1tali an rapproachment; the Ge nnan I c powers we re open 1y host I 1e.11
"Effacing the prejudices and griefs In the minds of our
neighbors," the first step towards achieving the more lrrmediate
aspect of Barrere's program for Italy, was actually embarked on
8cami11e Barrere, "L'ettres
XVIV (1937), 721-22.

a Delcasse,

Revue de Paris,

11

9ooF1, XIV, Nos. 120, 253, 512.
l OI b Id . , No • 52 •

11 camllle Barrere, "Lettres

a Delcasse,

11

pp. 721-22 •
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before he arrived In Rome. 12

He began to lay a favorable ground-

work for his new assignment while still In Berne, confiding to
Italian Minister Plenipotentiary Alessandro Riva his own loyalty
to Italy's dynasty. 13 It may well have been an attempt to offset any prejudicial opinion a Communard past might arouse against
him.

Barrere Informed Riva he didn't consider Italian constitu-

tionalists good patriots or true Italians and that It was his belief
dynastic sentiment not only cemented Italian unity but the very
existence of Italy as a nation.

He also indicated to the Ital Ian

minister that France's ambassadors to Rome were the target of
repeated enticements by representatives of radical and clerical
parties, mistakenly hoping through them to achieve their objectives.
These contacts could not be evaded, Barrere added, but should
occasion no concern once the probity and loyalty of the head of
the French mission was known. 14
This attitude accorded with fundamental principles Barrere
had long upheld.

As far back as 1887 he had advocated the pursuit

of a policy that was not only in opposition to the monarchical
right within France but the extreme left as well . 15 Barrere also
understood how essential It was to the success of her foreign policy
that France renounce any attempts to export her own Institutional
12ooF2, 1, No. 118.,
l3Quoted by Decleva, Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 81, from unedited
documents of the Archivto storlco del Minlstero degl I Affari Ester!.
14 oec1eva, Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 81.
lSFrancel Archives du Mlnistere des Affalres Etrangeres,
Paris. Barrere a Delcasse, Paplers Delcasse, February 6, 1887, I.
(Hereinafter cited as AAE, rn.)

p
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form of government. 16

A few months after his arrival in Rome he

confirmed this position during the course of a conversation with
King Humbert.

Assuring the Ital Ian monarch that French democracy

was essentially conservative, he made the remark that France's
government "as much as a monarchy

• looked with disfavor on the

attempts of extremist parties and was In complete accord with the
countries surrounding her on the need for maintaining order. 111 7
There were concrete steps, however, which If taken Barrere
believed would provide the keystone for effecting a Franco-Italian
reconciliation.

They were to be found In the resumption of economic

rapport, the "principal object of concern on the part of officialdom" In Rome.

Barrere considered the conclusion of a commercial

accord a question of life or death for the moderate Rudin! ministry
then in power in the Italian government.

Rudin! himself, his

Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta, and the francophiltc Minister of
the Treasury, Luigi Luzzattl, all agreed on the des I rabll tty of
concluding the accord and concluding it quickly.

Barrere warned

Hanotaux, however, that nothing was more uncertain than the dispositions of the men who could succeed the Rudin! ministry In power.
The issue was crucial since the general consensus of Ital tan opinion
was that economic rapproachment between France and Italy would
begin a new chapter In Ital Ian political life.

Barrere was convinced

that Ital Ian hatred of Fran'ce, rooted as It was In economics, was
actually artlflclal--created by men who dreamt of rebuilding the
l6Decleva, Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 82.
l7Barrere a Hanotaux, May 31, 1898, AAE, Nouvelle S~rle,
ltalle, XIII, D. n. 77. (Hereinafter cited as AAE, NSI).

,.
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grc•ndeur of Italy on the spoils of France's ruin.

Their work

could be undone by dealing with the immediate problem at hand:
seizing the opportunity of an opening and through It reaching a
more satisfactory economic arrangement.18
When appointed Ital Ian Foreign Minister In July, 1896,
Visconti Venosta had unsuccessfully attempted to link a commercial
accord with negotiations for the Tunisian treaty.

However French

Foreign Minister Hanotaux refused to join a study of the commercial question to that regulating Tunisian affalrs. 19 Once the
Tunisian accords were signed on October 1, 1896, the Rudini ministry
again pressed for a treaty of corrmerce on the basis of reciprocal
concession of the French minimum and Italian conventional tariffs. 20
The overtures drew no positive response from Hanotaux and Billot,
Hanotaux conceding only to a continuation of secret discussions
directed towards the negotiation of a commercial treaty. 2 1
In early 1897 Franco-Italian relations were aggravated
further by a massing of French troops along the Tunisian frontier
bordering on Tripoli.

Italian Ambassador to Paris, Count Giuseppe

Tornle111, expressed concern that France was contemplating military
action in Tripolltania, forestalling an Italian move should the
18ooF1, XIV, No. 52.
19Bi11ot, La France'et l'ltalle, II, 433.
20 The convention of commerce replacing the ltalo-Tunlslan
treaty of 1868 was signed on September 28; the navigation convention on October 1. See above, pp. 29, 30.
21 ital y, Mlnlstero degl I affarl ester!, I document I diplomatici ltallani. Third Serles: 1896-1907. (Hereinafter referred
to as 0013.) I, Nos. 382, 385, 386, 389, 396, 403, 409. See also
below, pp. 39-51.
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Sep<'irate negotiations for a commercial accord did continue,
however.

Nevertheless, French reservations regarding their ultimate

success, together with extensive economic concessions demanded of
Italy, resulted in a series of misunderstandings and stalemates between October, 1896 and December, 1897.

At that time, Luigi Luzzatti

formally requested a resumption of Franco-Ital Ian commercial negotiations.

Billot, In the interim, had submitted his resignation, and

on December 24 announcement was made of Barrere's nomination as
French Ambassador to Rome.27
Arriving in the Italian capital on February 3, 1898, one
of Barrere's first moves, February 14, was to request of Hanotaux
the list of tariff reductions France demanded of Italy in exchange
for commercial rapproachment.

As France's ambassador In Rome,

Barrere considered It essential he be involved in a mvtter he regarded as vital to the development of improved Franco-Italian rapport.

A knowledge of the French demands obviously was indispensable

for any participation In the negotiations.

Barrere believed his

involvement to be all the more necessary In view of his conviction
that a more conciliatory attitude towards these demands prevailed
in Rome than in Parls.28
Barrere's own relationship with Italian Ambassador to Paris,
Tornlelli, had never been felicitous.

•

nomination fiercely.

Tornlelll had opposed Barrere's

Totally reactionary, the aristocratic Italian

27ooF1 XIV, No. 151; Billot, La France et l'ltalle, II,
412-420; Luigi Luzzatti, Opere (Bologna, 1926), II, 526.
28ooF1, XIV, No. 52.
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diplomat was un2lterably opposed to the

ide~

of de2l ing with 2n

heretlc2l ex-commun2rd 2nd, recognizing the inevlte"blllty of

s 2 rrere's

<"ppolntment, had requested his own tr<lnsfer from Pcris.

rornlell I justified his request on the basis of hostility he felt
he had encountered In the French city, Intolerably manifested, In
his mind:

with Barrere's nomination, made "behind my back," 2s

well as with abuse of the Schwartzkoppen-Panlzzardl correspondence
In the Dreyfus affalr.29
B<>rrere, in turn, repeatedly voiced his suspicions of
Tornlelll, not only finding a dlvergency between the

~mbassador's

attitude and that of his government but ?ccuslng him as well of
111 will towards the successful conclusion of the negotl2tlons In

which both France 2nd Italy were engaged.30

This was not the case

with respect to B2rrere's relationships on the ministerial level
In Rome.3 1 He had no doubt of Rudlni's desire to conclude an economic accord with France.3 2 His judgment had been reinforced,
Barrere wrote Hanotaux, with both Visconti Venosta and Luzzatti's
assurances of Rudinl 1 s wish to modify Ital Ian policy.

Luzzattl

29rornie11 I considered the letters Introduced In the ZolaDreyfus trial to be arocryphal. SerrR, C. B2rrere e 1' Intesa,
p. 63. For Tornlelll s position with regard to Panlzzardl, see
H. Wickham Steed, Throu~h Thirty Years (London, 1924), I, 147.
According to Decleva, t e Dreyfus Affair not only raised International uncertalnty--and the corresponding danger France would be
thrown Into European lsolatlon--ltaly also feared France might
become militaristic again a~d threaten peace. Da Adua a Sara)evo,
p. 101.
30ooF 1 , XIV, Nos. 52, 120.
31Barrere

D. n. 25.

a Hanoteux, Februery 12, 1898,

32 ooF1, XIV, Nos. 52, 120; Barrere
189 8, AA E, NS I , XI I I , D• n • 2 5 •

AAE, NSI, XIII,

a Hanotaux, February 12,
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had also affirmed the sincerity of Rudlni's desire to do so In 1892
during his preceding ministry.

At that time however, the financier

reminded him, there was Insufficient understanding on the part of
France to help Rudlnl achieve his objectlve--an objective for which
an opportunity was once again presenting itself .33
As regards Visconti Venosta, Barrere considered him Italy's
foremost statesman, whose eminent qualities had gained respectability and prestige for his country.

Barrere also attributed to the

Italian foreign r;ilnister the Intention of making Franco-Ital Ian
rapport the base of diplomacy in the Italian kingdom.3 4 Visconti
Venosta had told him he regarded the source of division between
their respective countries to have had Its origin in the Mediterranean--responslble, in turn, for the alliances subsequently imposed on Italy.

To change Italian orientation, liquidation of the

Tunisian question was fundamental.

Visconti Venosta had undertaken

the serious rapprochement of the two nations on the terrain of Interest, he added, "and policy Inexorably follows Interests;

po1it-

lc;:il rapprochement Inevitably results from material rapprochement. 11 35
Barrere also regarded Visconti Venosta's Independence of action
significant for Franco-Italian relations, finding him devoid of
servitude to anyone:

King, Court or a111es.36

In Barrere's opinion,

33ooF1, XIV, No. 120. In 1891 Rudlnl had attempted to
improve relations with Frarfce. His efforts were unsuccessful,
France refusing to engage In any negotiations until Italy evidenced her non-aggressive Intentions by disclosing the terms of
the Triple Alliance.
34!bld., No. 168.
351 b Id., No. 219 .
361bld., No. 168.
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this quality w2s further enhanced by the opposition various
political parties In the kingdom voiced towards Fr2nco-ltallan
r 2 pproachment 2s well as by a degree of uncertainty with respect
to King Humbert's attitude towards lt.37
2

This attitude expl2lns

great deal of Barrere's Insistence on concluding an economic

2 ccord

without any necessary delays.38
Luzzatti, of course, was the most ardent champion In the

cause of resuming economic relations between the two countries.
An eminent Italian economist, he had long sought a policy of friendship with France within the framework of Italy's existing alliances.
When Visconti Venosta resigned from the Rudin! Cabinet In May, 1898,
Barre re was not hesitant In writing Hanotaux that the former Ital Ian
foreign minister had told him everything pertaining to the commercial talks would have had to be begun anew If Luzzattl had left
the ministry with him.39
The conmercial discussions showed signs of decided progress
during Barrere's first months In Rome.

In May Visconti Venosta

was able to speak of his elation on learning Paris would raise no
political objections to a resolution of the economic question.
That day, he remarked, he glimpsed the future realization of everything towards which he had directed his efforts and desires.

For

371bld., Nos. 52, f20. See Decleva's Da Adua a Sarajevo
for a receii't"analysls of Italy's Internal political groupings during this period. Most hostile to the Idea of Franco-Italian rapproachment were the Crlsplans and Sonnlnlans.
38 1bid., No. 52.
391bld., No. 219. Visconti Venosta resigned over a law
regarding ~withdrawal of the exeguator to bishops which was
proposed by Zanardelll. The foreign minister deemed It Inopportune
and dangerous. Ibid., n. 3.
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in Visconti Venost2 1 s judgment, Frr>nce's persistence in subordin.::>ting the resumption of economic and fin2nclal rel2tlons to the
rupture of past Fr?nco-ltalian all lance had compelled Italy to
perpetuate lt. 40 Nevertheless, June was a crucial month for the
negotiations, with the direction of foreign policy In both France
and Italy changing hands.

Not only was Admiral Felice Canavero

appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs In the Pelloux cabinet,
Th~ophlle Delcass~

replaced French Foreign Minister Hanotaux in

the afte nnath of Fashoda. 41
Delcass~

and Barrere were old friends.

Their association

dated back almost twenty years to the period In which both were
launched on the Ir journal istlc careers as staff members of
Gambetta's La Repub1 lque francalse.

Barre re first encountered

Delcasse when,ln an editorial capacity, he was required to supervise the work of the clever, young provincial lawyer-journalist.
Gambetta's mark on both hls proteges was evident.

Delcasse him-

self testified to the Influence, remarking that all he accomplished
in his career went back to Gambetta's teaching and the precepts
of his more immediate companions and spiritual heirs.

However, the

Idea of Franco-Ital Ian rapproachment cannot be traced directly to
40 .
~·
41oelcasse, in turn, was forced to resign in the aftermath
of the Moroccan Crisis of 1905. From 1911-1913 he served as naval
minister. After a brief period as ambassador in St. Petersburg
he returned as foreign minister in 1914, remaining In office until
October, 1915. For studies of Oelcasse consult: C. W. Porter,
Career of Theophlle Delcasse (Philadelphia, 1936); P. J. V. Role,
Entente Cordiale (London, 1969); and Andrew's Theophlle Delcasse
and the Entente Cordlale.
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the m0ster, although he would

have been aw?re of the
signiflc2nce to Fr2nce of Italian frlendship.4 2
cert.~inly

In July Barrere brought French Foreign Minister Delcasse
up-to-date on developments In Rome after the Pelloux cabinet replaced that of Rudlnl.

His major preoccupation during the prolonged

ministerial crisis, Barrere related, had been to learn whether or
not discussions for a commercial accord could be continued and what
the attitude of the new ministers towards economic rapport actually
was. 4 3 He had also to determine the wisdom of dealing with some
of them--men with whom Barrere was certain transactions of this
nature become "morally lmposslble. 11 44
It was then, Barrere related to Delcasse on July 10, he had
received a visit from Italian Senator Rattazzi, Intimate friend
and

~dvlser

of King Humbert and the most Influential architect of

the new Pelloux cabinet.

Rattazzl told Barrere of Pelloux's desire

to further develop the cordial relations with France that had been
established by Rudin! and Visconti Venosta.

According to Rattazzl,

even the King was genuinely hopeful of uncovering areas of agreement between the two countries.

Barrere reacted to Rattazzl's

words, he reported, by suggesting the sentiments the senator was
expressing might best be put to the test by confiding responsibility
for continuation of the commercial discussions to Luzzattl.

•

His

proposal had been fruitful, Barrere observed, for several days later
42 see below, pp. 143-9 for an evaluation of Delcasse's role
in the Franco-Italian rapproachment.
4 3Barrere a Delcasse, AAE, NSI, XIII, T. n. 224.

L

44ooF1, XIV, No. 253.
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Luzzattl informed him he had been approached by Rattazzl and accepted the mission proposed to him.
lation to the offer, however:

Luzzattl appended one stipu-

that there be no contradiction

between the Intentions of the Italian government and the work of
reconciliation In which he would be engaged.

Luzzattl was shrewd

enough to recognize that the commercial advantages of an eventual
economic accord might not live up to Italian expectations,

Yet,

like Barrere, he viewed Its Importance primarily as a turning point
In Franco-Italian relations, one with serious consequences for the
future.

Above all, he saw In the successful completion of a com-

mercial accord

11

the creation of a new situation, of numerous and

unpredictable common Interests that will make It difficult If not
Impossible to continue in the errors of an unfortunate past. 114 5
Following his conversation with Luzzattl, Barrere continued, both
General Luigi Pel loux and Adml ral Canavero had Informed Barre re of
the role being assigned Luzzattl and assured the French ambassador

of their own amlcal sentiments.

Similar assurances were expressed

by King Humbert, Barrere added, with whom he had requested an
Interview.

On that occasion, Barrere noted, he glimpsed the first

Indication of the strong Interest the King attached to the success
of the negotlatlons.46
Barrere then left Rome on annual leave.

In October Luzzattl

arrived In Paris, having reeelved virtual carte blanche from the
Italian government to conclude the negotiations for the commercial
accord.

In Paris he was put In touch with MM. Bompart and Chandeze,
45 1bld.

46 1bld.

46
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce respectively,

and with M. Bousquet, Director General of Customs.

Barrere and

rornlelll collaborated In these final discussions which were
brought to a successful conclusion on November 21, 1898. 4 7
Ne got I at Ions had resulted In an accord, consisting of two
letters exchanged by the Mf n f s te r of Fore lg n Aff a i rs for France,
Th~ophlle Delcass~,

Tornfel 1 i •48

and Ital fan Ambassador to Paris, GI useppe

Under the terms of the agreement I ta 1 y accorded

France most-favored nation treatment, France extending her minimum
tariffs to Italy In return.49
The last stages of discussion had been complicated by International apprehension over Fashoda.so

Italy was alarmed by the

prospect of naval war between France and England In the Mediterranean.

In such an event, the necessity of protecting her neutrality

would pose grave financial and political problems for Italy.
Yet when he returned to Rome In early November, Barrere
found his Immediate task had assumed a greater dimension than that
of merely calming Ital fan alarm over possible repercussions of the
4 7A1 be rt Bt 11 ot, "Le rapprochement comme ref a 1 ent re 1a
France et l'ftalfe, 11 Revue des Deux Mondes, 4, CLI (1899), 144.
48 see Appendix I for texts of the letters exchanged by
Delcass~ and Tornfellt.
The accord, In Its entirety, Is reproduced
in Basdevant, Tralt~s et cohventlons en vlgueur entre la France et
Jes Pulssances (Parts, 1922), II, 760.
1·9
•See Billot for details of the arrangements. La France
et 1' Ital le, II, 431-33. Silk was excluded from the tariff arrangements and France also maintained Its demand for a modification of
the Italian tarlfft on wines, woolens and materials for upholstery
and blankets. ODF , XIV, No. 529.
s0 ooF 1, XIV, Nos. 497,508, 518.

Anglo-French African conflict.

On October 26, Italian Minister

of Post and Telegraph,Nunzio Nasi, had pronounced a discourse at
Trapani, Sicily that endengered ultimate ratification of the commercial accord then In the final stages of negotiation in Paris.
Referring to the Italian colony In North Africa, particularly that
In Tunisia, Nasl hAd alluded to the land which may not belong to
Italy "but whose soul is ours. 11 51

The Italian government formally

disassociated Itself from the minister's statements.5 2

Yet from

the French viewpoint, the Incident had been poorly reported In the
press.

Barrere considered It essential to convince Italian Foreign

Minister Canavero It was Imperative any future journalistic polemics be prevented that could unfavorably dispose French public
opinion towards economic rapproachment with ltaly.53

In Barrere 1 s

estimation a favorable attitude on the part of the French public
was an Indispensable condition for the success of the commercial
arrangements awaiting ratification by the French Parllament.5 4
The Nast declaration was a specific Instance of attacks against
France by the Ital Ian press.

To Barrere, all obstructed not merely

economic rapport but every other favorable effect that could flow
from friendship between the two peoples.SS

His endeavors were

5 1 I b I d • , No • 51 2 •

5200 I 3, I I I , Nos • 100, 102 •
53Accordlng to Barrere, Nasi's remarks had been unduly
publicized by Crlsplan newspapers opposed to Franco-Italian rapproachment. OOFl, XIV, No. 512.
541bld. Although subslding,protectionist sentiment remained
a significant factor In French political life In 1898.
551bld., No. 526.
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apparently successful for the attacks of the Trlbuna, at least,
ceased Immediately.
Luzzattl had also returned to Rome In early November,
elated over the successful conclusion of the accord In Paris.

In

view of King Humbert's obvious satisfaction, Luzzattl suggested
the Italian monarch, In his next royal discourse, refer specifically to the excellent relations existing between France and Italy.
However the opposition of several Crlsplan ministers, and their
threats to submit their resignations were he to do so, precluded
adoption of Luzzattl's proposal.
Yet general reaction to the treaty was quite favorable.
Barrere heard from Luzzatti that Pelloux looked on the accord as
a point of departure, attaching more political Importance to It
than comnerclal Interest.

Nor, In Pelloux's estimation, did Germany

regard the accord with Indifference.

Although Italy was a guarantee

of Germany's territorial lntegrlty--she herself gained nothing from
Germany now that France was no longer a menace.56

Foreign Minister

Canavero also apprised Barrere of his Interest In the political aspect of the transactlon.57
In effect, Barrere remarked to
duced a veritable thunderbolt.

Delcass~,

the accord pro-

Everyone concurred In finding It

useful, adroit and of great'polltlcal lmport.58

Assessing the

more significant non-economic consequences of the treaty, Barrere
laid great emphasis on the Impossibility It created of Italy's
56 1bld., No. 527, n. 1.
57tbld., No. 527.
58J.!LLQ.., No. 535.

participation In a maritime war.

He stressed as well the Inability

of Italian francophobes to continue forcing the hand of government.
The Crtsptan-Sonntntan offensive,

NS

he expressed it, whose arms

had been deployed against France for ten years had been broken.59
Despite his elation Barrere lost no opportunity of benefiting from the slightest occasions that might further improve
Frenco-ltalian relations.

He would advise

Delcass~,

for Instance,

to encourage the exchange of decorations In which Admiral Canavero
had expressed interest and suggest that Luzzattl be awarded the
Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honor.
tures was always deliberate:

The motive behind these ges-

the more manifestations of good will

with which France surrounds this affair, he wrote the Quat d'Orsay,
the better.60
Although the Impressions created by the Commercial Accord
surpassed all his expectations, Barrere was aware ft was a development no one had actually expected or believed could be achieved.
Public sentiment had attributed Implacable hatred for Italy to
France for too long, along with a desire to reduce her by ruin and
revolution.

The gallophobtc and Crlsplan press had reinforced these

attitudes, presenting France as Italy's enemy and responsible for
?11 her llls.61

The Commercial Accord had not succeeded In trans-

forming Ital tan sentiment.

While he knew It was too early to fully

'

evaluate Its consequences, Barrere was convinced all the same the
accord had created a significant Impact.
591btd.
61 Ibid., No. 552.

60 tbid.

As he remarked to

Delcass~,

so
everyone was now aware that the economic peace achieved should
lead to financial peace.

At the same time they realized financial

peace would never be obtained without compensations and guarantees.
That was precisely why, he explained, he had not wanted to attach
any political conditions to the Commercial Accord.

Doing so would

have created an Impossible situation and demanded more of Italy
than she was capable of giving.
also reminded

Delcass~,

Yet from the beginning, Barrere

he had Indicated he would pose the political

question the very day the royal government decided to have recourse
to France and extend the benefits of the conrnerclal rapproachment
to financial ground.62
Barrere predicted approval of the accord by a strong majority
In the Ital Ian Parl lament.

It received an overwhelming majority:

236-34 In the Chamber, 105-16 In the Senate.63

Reporting on the

four-day discussion accompanying the ratification proceedings,
Barrere was obviously Impressed with the care taken during the course
of debate to avoid any remarks that might be received adversely In
France.

While certain aspects of the treaty were criticized, chiefly

those of an agricultural nature, the dominant note of the discussions centered on those aspects "which put an end to a troublesome
tension and reconciled the two countrles. 11 64
Parliamentary sanction left the French ambassador with a

•

sense of security.

Italy had returned!

He held all the reins of

the team In his hand; "It only remained necessary to avoid any ruts,
63 I b Id., XV, No. 5 3, n. 2.

51

not permitting one's self to be overturned. 11 65

The violent, tense

Italy of a year ago, enraged at the first sign of French criticism,
was no longer In evidence.66
6

a Del casst!,
xv, No. 53 •

5Barrere

60 ooF 1 ,

•

January 30, 1899, AAE, PD, I.
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CHAPTER 111
TOWARDS RAPPROCHEMENT:
THE MEDITERRANEAN ACCORD OF 1900

Although the threat of Anglo-French conflict had deeply
dlstrubed Italy during the height of the Fashoda crisis, she was
far more perturbed to learn France and Great Britain had concluded
a convention March 21, 1899 which, In effect, divided North Africa
Into Brl t I sh and French spheres of Influence. 1
Italian Ambassador to London, Francesco de Renzls was
particularly Incensed at Lord Salisbury's attitude in the matter,
Inexplicable to de Renzls In view of England's professed friendship for ltaly. 2

No mention was made In the accord of Italy, who

was concerned not only for Tripoli but for the caravan routes leading from Lake Tchad Into Trlpolltanla as well.

Under the terms of

the agreement France gained control of that region south of Lake
Tchad and Tummo on the Tropic of Cancer.

Thus the hinterland,

still claimed by Turkey and coveted by Italy, from the Ital Ian point
of view appeared to be falilng Into French hands.3

•

1The text of the Convention Is reproduced In DDF 1 , XV,

No. 122, Annex. Delcass~ wrote Barrere of the lmmlneii"t""concluslon
of the treaty he described as being "equally honorable and advantageous to both parties." Delcass4! a Barrere, Paolers Barrere.
March 2, 1899, V. (Hereinafter cited as AAE, PB.)
2DD I 3 , I 11 , No. 20 6 •
31bid., Nos. 209,210; British Documents on the Origins of
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General Ital Ian reaction to news of the convention, as
would be expected, was one of anger.

Italy's Interest In the area

was longstanding, and since the French occupation of Tunis In 1881
she had been particularly sensitive to any change In the Mediterranean status quo.
remained calm.

Officially, however, the governmental attitude

Admiral Canavero Informed the Ital Ian Senate that

both the French and British governments had assured him Italy
need have no fear for Tripoli and Its trade route. 4
Yet Italy regarded the situation In which she found herself as a difficult one.

Friendship with England had long been

the cornerstone of her policy, and she was anxious to maintain
close relations with her traditional al ly.5

Thls--desplte the

obvious deterioration In Anglo-Ital Ian relations that had occured
6
during the course of the 1890's. Even the temperate Visconti
Venosta had remarked rather bitterly that England regarded Italy
as no more than a quantlt6 n6gllgeable, and It was no secret Lord
Salisbury was known to lack confidence in Ital Ian reliability and
had expressed doubt as to her ability to come to terms with France.7
the Warf 1898-1914, ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London,
1926-26, (hereinafter referred to as BO), I, No. 246. According
to Serra, Italy was also concerned because if merely encircled, the
economic value of the Trlpolitan hinterlands declined. c. Barrere
e 1 1 Intesa, p. 79.
4BO, I, No. 247.

•

5Attl farlamentarl della Camera det Oeputatl e del Senato
(Rome, Turln,848-1921), Oeputati, OLll, 3609.

~ee Glanville, Italy's Relations with England, 1896-1905
(Baltimore., 1934), pp. 79-93.
\

7Bo\~ VI, No. 780.
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Canavero was the more distraught for having considered
Tripoli secure in view of discussions he had held on the matter
with British Ambassador to Rome, Lord Currie, the preceding November. 8 Complaining to Germany of the shoddy treatment England had
accorded her, the Ital Ian foreign minister let it be known the only
amends England could make lay In British support of Italian ambitions in China and recognition of her rights In Tripoli.

Accord-

ingly, Canavero proposed to Currie that Italy station a small
military force In Tripoli as a joint garrison with Turkey or, as
an alternative, that England and France issue a declaration disclaiming their Intentions of acquiring territory or political Influence in Tripoli.

The Italian minister Indicated there would be no

difficulty with France In doing so since the French government had
recently stated to Ambassador Tornlelll It would have no objections
If the Ital I ans were to take Trlpol 1.9
proposal was more explicit.

A week later Canavero's

He requested a joint Anglo-French de-

claration that neither country would acquire "territory or political
Influence north of the parallel of latitude touching the southern
extremity of Fezzan • • •

and that there be

full and entire lib-

erty of conmerce for the caravan routes coming from Lake Tchad and
the neighboring regions towards Tri pol I .ulO

Britain refused, In-

forming Ital Ian Ambassador de Renzls that neither Britain or Italy
had any right to discuss the future of a country whose ownership
was not in doubt.

'

Britain had other bases for the refusal.

8 1bid., I, Nos. 236, 246, 247.
9 Ib Id • , No. 24 7 •
10 I b i d • , No • 24 9 •

Such a
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declaration was obviously unilateral.

There was also the possi-

bility of a disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the more serious
In light of Britain's fear of French action In the event this occured. And Italy's own Internal situation was highly unstable. 11
Italy was accurate in assessing her need of International
support.

Her finances were In a precarious state.

Compounding

the problem of dire poverty In rural and southern regions of the
Peninsula was the marked contrast of relative prosperity In the
north.
coming.

Yet the necessary political correctives were not forthA spirit of malaise, of parliamentary lmmaturlty,largely

the result of selfish aristocratic and bourgeois rival rles, precluded any direction of the country along the paths of essential,
constructive programs.

As a result, there was a tendency to suc-

cumb to those feelings of Inferiority which had reached their
peak In 1896 and since then never entirely subsided.

Thus Italy

was nurturing a political policy of maneuvering In these years which
did not always reflect creditably on her.1 2
Barrere had been on leave In Paris when Italy first protested the Anglo-French African Conventlon. 13 The Qual d'Orsay had
11 Ib Id., No. 252 •
12on Italy's Internal
this period see SetonWcitson, Ital from Liberalism
18 0-1925, pp. 41-164.
Conmentlng on Italy s tra I on o "aving as many Irons In the
fire as possible • • • " von BUlow remarked in his Memoirs that anyone familiar with earlier Venetian dispatches or Instructions written
by the Papal Cancellaria cannot be In the least surprised by this
tendency. It rather fills one with "admiration for the political
Intelligence displayed therein." I, 664.
13He was away from Rome between March 24 and April 7.
1
QQ.E., XV, No. 129, n. 1; No. 131, n. 5.
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been advised by the French Embassy In Rome on April lof the Ital Ian
government's "pained surprlse"--not only on learning the terms of
the accord but by the silence with which the two powers had surrounded lt. 14 The reaction was apparently conveyed to Barrere as
well by his friend Luzzattl, then In Paris to improve certain clauses
of the commercial accord. 15 Barrere contacted Oelcass6, at the time
tn Sesses, suggesting a course of action he believed would alleviate
the tension In Franco-Ital Ian relations created by the agreement.
Barrere felt certain benefits would ensue if France were to advise
Italy of her disinterest In Tripoli and Its legitimate hinterlands.
Accordingly, he sought Oelcass6 1 s pennlsslon to offer Italy
a political concession of this nature, warning the French foreign
minister that If he returned without It his credit In Rome would
be rulned. 16 Barrere obviously believed such an admonition to be
necessary since Paul Cambon, aware of Italian Interest In the area
when Initial Anglo-French negotiations were In process, let Delcass6
know he saw no Inconvenience to French possessions In central Africa
If the hinterlands of Tripoli and the Cyrenalca, "In other words
the Libyan desert," were attributed to Italy when cl rcumstances
might permit the realization of her designs In Tri pol itanla.

Delcass~

had rejected the Idea, considering the region of the Libyan desert
to fall within England's sphere of Interest and that area behind
Tripoli to be within

and of decisive Importance for thesecurity of her littoral establishments and the Medlterranean. 17
France'~

14 1b Id., No. 129, n. 3.

15 Ib i d • , No • 17 8, n • 2 ; No • 1 80 •

16 1bld., No. 129.

171btd., No. 42, n. 1.
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oeJcass6 was unwlll Ing to go the extent of his ambassador's request, preferring Barrere to be more
tn which he became involved In Rome.

gener~llzed

In any discussions

The foreign minister was con-

cerned lest the results of the Anglo-French convention be put In
question and felt as well that since Italy had discussed the subject
with England, she should at least have advised France of her posltion.18
The day before he returned to Italy, Barrere heard from his
friend, Russian Ambassador to Rome,Aleksandr Nelldoff, that the
situation In Italy had grown extremely serious and was likely to
Involve the fall of both Canavero and the Italian cabinet. 19 It
was also Nelldoff's considered opinion that a subsequent ministry
would be forced to adopt an anti-French policy.
some vague hope for her African Interests,

By offering Italy

Barr~re

wired Delcass6,

France could not only counter Italian apprehensions but safeguard
the future as well.

He pleaded for permlss Ion to tel 1 Canavero

"the day the Italians become our neighbors in Africa, they will meet
only with our good will in facilitating their legitimate expansion. 1120
However, Delcass6's attitude remained unchanged.

Barrere

was to adhere to generalities in his discussions with the Italian
government. 2 1 He did refer his ambassador, however, to the argument
with which he had allayed Turkish apprehension over the convention •

•

18 I b Id • , No • 129, n • 4 •
19.LJs!.
b
, No . 130 •
201btd. British Ambassador Currie also reported that If
the Italian government was unable to produce some explanation or
assurances that would satisfy public opinion, It would probably
be overthrown. BO, I, No. 247.
2 1DDF1 , XV, No. 130, n. 4; No. 131 •
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In It he conveyed France's Intention of Infringing In no way on the
rights or possessions of the Sultan In Turkey, and although acknowledging the exercise of French control over a portion of the hinterlands, pointed to the fact that French colonies also served as protection for commerce and the caravans--from which the Tri pol itan
interests of the Sultan could only benefit. 22 "Reaffirm on your
return to Rome, 11 Delcass6 Instructed Barrere, "that we have no Intention of harming the Ital Ian government."

He hoped in this way

to convince not only Canavero of France's Intentions but those who
were exploiting the situation as well--exploltlng It against the
Pelloux cabinet as much as against France. 2 3
When Barrere subsequently presented the official French
position, Canavero admitted that France's stand was unattackable
but nevertheless made the same request for a declaration of disinterest that had been proposed to Great Brltaln. 24 Reaffirming
France's known disinterest In Tripoli, Barrere reserved further comment until he had an opportunity of becoming more fully Informed.
Delcass6, In the meanwhile, continued to caution the most prudent
reserve to his ambassador. 25 Barrere •s own opinion was that France
had everything to lose In refusing the declaration while she stood
to gain everything by acceptlng. 26
In his assessment of the situation Barrere reminded Del-

•

cass6 that the Ital Ian foreign minister, and to a lesser degree the
2 31bld., No. 131 •
22 1bld., No. 127.
24 1bld., No. 138, Annexes 1 and 2.
251bld., No. 135.
261bld., No. 137.
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government, were being accused of having lost foreslght--not only
on this Issue but with respect to other matters as well.

While

canavero undoubtedly feared the loss of his portfolio. In

Barr~re•s

judgment a degree of agitation over the African convention did
exist that a gesture on the part of France would do much to dlspell •27
Bar~re

doubted Canavero would succeed In protecting himself against

the attacks of his enemies but at the same time envisioned French
policy as operntlng In

a

far larger fr0mework than that of the per-

son of the lt~l Ian foreign mlnlster. 2 8

A private letter to Delcass6 was far more revealing of
Barr~re 1 1

views on the matter.

c~navero

told

Bar~re

th?t Delcassf

had lnfonned Ambassador Tornlelll Italy could have Tripoli If she
wanted It.

Dumbfounded• Bar,..re asked for a detailed report of

all th<'.'t had transpired to be sent him inwnedlately.

"Pas de deux

langues, 11 he chided the French minister In a frequently quoted admonition, "It can result In serious problems, Inevitable when one's
Instruments aren't hannonlzed~ 112 9

Fronce could no longer avoid e

declar<'tlon of disinterest In Tripoli after Delcass6's remark, the
letter continued, something had to be done.

an Ironic reference to the superfluous

Bar~re

concluded with

recommend~tlon

the foreign minister had urged on his ambassador In

a

of prudence
recent wl re.

Replying to Barrere'f remonstrances, Delca1s6 explained that
his remarks had been Inaccurately reported.

He had merely stated

France planned nothing In Trlpoll-·whlch he was furthermore In no
27 Ibid •• No. 13 8 •

29caml11e Barr•re.

28 1bld

-·
"Lettres lt Delcasst!," pp.

7?. i-26.
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position to offer Italy since It was not his to give.

He had

mollified Tornlelll, Delcass6 continued, by telling him that If
Italy nourished hopes and ambitions for Tripoli she would not find
the French foreign minister standing In her way.30
Delcass~

still opposed Issuing any declaration dealing with

an eventual division of the Ottoman Empire, since a declaration of
that nature would ultimately have to be read In parliament and
made publlc,3 1 He did not object, however, to Canavero's Informing
the Ital Ian parliament of his earlier remarks to the Turkish ambassador regarding the March 21 agreement.3 2 After expressing satisfaction with this arrangement, Canavero made a point of reading
Barrere a telegram from Tornlelll.

It alluded to

Delcass~'s

pur-

ported statement that he would not refuse continued discussions
with the Italian ambassador aimed at reaching a secret accord,
satisfying to Italy with regard to both Trlpolltania and the penetr2tlon of her African routes.33
Despite

Delcass~'s

refusal to give Canavero written assur-

ances that French colonial expansion In the region would stop at
the borders of Trlpol I and Cyrenafca, a later letter of Barrere's
relates that Delcass6 did advise Luzzattl--then In Parls--of his
willingness to do so were Visconti Venosta returned to power. 34
There Is no further documentation of this offer, nor Is there any

•

Indication of the precise moment It was extended.
30oorl

-- '

XV, No. 143.

321 b Id.
34 1b Id., XV I, No. 79.

3llbld., No. 148.
331bld., No. 152.
See below, p. 64.
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All negotiations, however, were interrupted by the ministerial crisis that developed at this time over Italian affairs In
chtn2. 35 When General Pelloux subsequently resigned, Barrere was
alormed lest a reconstitution of the Italian cabinet include Sidney
sonnino, "the man of the German al 1 lances •11 36 Barre re cons Ide red
sonnlno hostile to France.37

However, when a new Pelloux cabinet

was formed May 14, Visconti Venosta was named foreign minister.
earrere wrote

Delcass~

that In terms of Franco-Italian relations

he regarded Visconti Venosta's nomination as Indicative of the Importance France had come to assume In Italy's political life.

He

felt the francophoblc sentiment apparent In the current ministerial
crisis was of a different character than that which had surfaced
following the conclusion of the comnerclal accord In 1898.

In the

latter Instance, Ital Ian antipathies towards France were longstanding
and not unexpected.

In the cabinet crisis of April-May, 1899, how-

ever, Barrere believed a great deal of anti-French feeling had been
stimulated by foreign lnterventlon.3 8
Cagl larl revealed the extent of apprehension aroused by the
Improved Franco-Ital Ian relationship.

In April, during the height

of the cabinet crisis, the French fleet was sent to Cagllarl to
salute King Humbert of Italy, then on his way to Sardlnla.39

Bar-

rere had seized on the occasion In an attempt to create an Impression

•
35w. L. Langcr's The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York, 1935),
II, 677-709, analyzes European involvement In China in this era.
36oecleva, Da Adua a SaraJevo, p. 103.
38 1btd., xv, No. 166, n. 3.
37ooF 1 , XVI, No. 39.
39 Ib Id . , No. 149, n • 1 •

~
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of Latin solidarity.

England subsequently followed suit, dispatch-

Jng the English fleet to pay Its respects to the Ital Ian monarch
in turn.

English Ambassador Currie was well aware of the direction

In which B2rrere's efforts h<-ld been aimed.

In a dlspAtch to Lord

Salisbury he related Canavero 1 s remark to him at the time, that
"B<'lrrere's attempt to coin money with the French fleet was going
too far . • . and that Paris was mistaken if she expected any further results beyond the general friendly feel Ing Italy had for her
powerful nelghbor. 1140

It was precisely this sense of friendship,

of course, that Barrere wanted to strengthen.
Nor had the Implications of the French gesture at Cagl larl
been overlooked by Germany.

Von BUlow subsequently warned Italian

Ambassador Lanza of the dangers accruing to a "new orientation" on
the part of Italy.

Barrere was convinced that the von BUlow-Lanza

confrontation had been responsible for Pelloux's initial attempt
to form a cabinet agreeable to Gennany. 41

Canavero himself told

Barrere of the strong protests he'd received from Germany as a result of "the commercial accord with France and all that's followed.
You wouldn't believe the assaults I've hl'd to submit to . . • ",he
complciined.4 2
Rome's Influential salons had natur211y not remained aloof
during the political upheaval.

•

Barrere attributed the anti-French

stances adopted by many of them to snobbishness, fear of democracy,
love of power, 2nd women who wanted their husbands to be ministers
41
40 BO, I, No. 250.
DDF 1 , XV, No. 196.
42 s;irrere ~ Delcass~, May 12, 1899, AAE, NSI, XV.

~or their sons, ambassadors.43
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In general, Barrere wrote Delcasse, he felt that only the
unceasing efforts of Rattazzl and Luzzattl had blocked the formation of an anti-French ministry during the last governmental
crisis and led Instead to one whose foreign minister was France's
friend, Visconti Venosta.44

A country's customs and policies do

not radically change from one day to another, the ambassador philosophized to Delcasse, convinced as he was at the same time that
the Italy of Hay,1899 differed essentially from what ft had been
earlier.

In the Interim Italian relations with France had become

a factor of the first order.45
Shortly after his return to the Consulta, Visconti Venosta
made a point of telling Barrere he Intended to continue developing
bonds of friendship between their two countries and that with good
will he was certain France and Italy could also come to terms In
the Mediterranean.

The Ir Interests were perfectly compatible In the

area, he remarked, since the base of both French and Italian policy
was the maintenance of the status quo. 46 As for Italian undertakings
In Tripoli, the Ital Ian minister was emphatic In his opposition to
such ventures, noting all the same that France understood how Important It was to avoid upsetting certain Italian sensitivities In that
di rectlon.

With great discretion, Barre re wrote Delcasse, Visconti

•

Venosta made It clear that France--wlthout putting rights In question
or alienating legitimate liberty of possession, could engage In
43 DDF 1 , XV, No. 18O.
451bld., No. 181.
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confidential discussions with Italy that would forestall any mls-

1

'

understanding as to her Intentions and eliminate all suspicions
between the two nations originating In the Medlterranean.47

Visconti

venosta was obviously reopening discussion of the French declaration of disinterest In Tri pol I, offered by Delcasst! In April •4 8
Despite the encouragement extended Barrere, Visconti Venosta
was at the same time lnfonnlng Ambassadors Lanza In Berlin and
Nlgra In Vienna that Italy would continue to regard the Triple Alliance as the fundamental base of her policy. 49
reassurance to Barrere were not mere rhetoric.

Yet the words of
In July Tornlel 11

was advised that Visconti Venosta did not Intend to alter his past
pol Icy with regard to France.

I rratlonal lty and prejudice, he was

told, had already wrought too much destruction!

Still, the achieve-

ment of the goal would be futile, the foreign minister added, If
there were no means of maintaining and consolidating Franco-Ital Ian
rapproachment.

In view of the new International situation, he no

longer saw any Incompatibility with the obligations of Italy's other
alliances in adhering to such a policy.SO

Anglo-French antagonism

had come to an end; that between England and Germany had begun!
Austria and Russia had concluded a Balkan agreement, with Italy of
course regarding any Austro-Russian rapproachment as harmful to her
own aspirations.

•
He had been reluctant to sign a fonnal act with Hanotaux,
Visconti Venosta told Tornlelll, In his concern It might be associated

48see above, p. 60.

471bld.

490013, Ill, No. 257.
SOserra,

c. Barrere e l'intesa, pp. 83-84.
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other exchanges Italy was unwilling to dlscuss.5 1 There had

also been the question of Tripoli's guarantee by Italy's Gennan
allies.

It would have been difficult not to advise them of any

such action she might have taken.

It was a different matter when
there was no longer any question of a true bilateral act.5 2 Vis-

conti Venosta may well have found tt far more significant that since
Hanotaux's earlier overtures, Germany had limited what she considered
her obligations to Italy under the terms of the Triple Alliance,
specifically excluding from them the Trlpolltan hinterlands.
Visconti Venosta therefore Instructed Torntelli to continue
the negotiations, secretly and prudently, cautioning him that when
speaking of Tripoli he was to be certain the Cyrenatca was Included
in the term.

Luzzattl was also to be questioned as to any Informa-

tion he may have uncovered regarding French plans for Morocco.53
In reply to the instructions he received from Rome, Torniel 1 t expressed doubt the French government, then experiencing
grave internal difficulties, would grant a unilateral declaration
on Tripoli when England had refused a similar request. 54
A few weeks later Barrere left on vacation, continuing the
negotiations, however, and entering Into personal discussions with
510013, 111, No. 3\0.
52serra, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, pp. 83-86.
531bld.; ODF 1 , XV, No. 178, n. 2; No. 180.
S4serra, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, p. 86. Torntelll's allusion
was to the Dreyfus Affair. See above, p. 40. French Internal governmental Instability was a constant preoccupation with the Ital Ian
ambassador. See DDFl, XV, No. 298; 0013, Ill, Nos. 336 and 338.
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Tornlell I In Paris.SS

In October he Informed the Ital Ian ambas-

sador of France's readiness to grant a written declaration on
Tripoli and Cyrenalca but that

Delcass~,

In turn, wanted to know
what Italy's reaction would be to French expansion In Morocco.S 6
sarrere himself was not In favor of grafting Morocco onto the
Tripoli questlon.S7
Tornlelll's reaction, as he Indicated to Visconti Venosta,
was that a substantial difference existed between the previously
discussed status quo and element of French expansion the new pro-

He wondered, as well, If the substitution

posal Introduced.SS

was prompted by French plans for llTITllnent action In Morocco or Inspired by Barrere, "who could have found In the archives of the
Farnese Palace something which made him suspect the existence of a
secret Anglo-Ital Ian accord. 11 S9

Visconti Venosta responded to the

French proposal by Instructing Ambassador Lanza to determine Germany's attitude towards the eventuallty of a French move In Morocco.60
Tornlelll, If questioned In the meanwhile, was advised to reply he
was awaiting lnstructlons.61
Both Visconti Venosta and Tornlelll then avoided any further
discussion of the Morocco-Tripoli declaration. 62 Luzzattl confirmed
the foreign minister's hesitation, at the same time acquainting
SSooFl
0013, I I I , No. 336.
_, XV, No. 29 8, n • 1 ; _
S60013
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aorr1' re of Torn I e 11 i's neg at Ive attl tude towards the new di re ct I on

I

'

tn which France appeared to be moving.

Luzzattl cautioned Barrere

to proceed slowly, reminding him that although Italy was in need of
8t

least ten years of peace--lf the question of Morocco were to be

opened, the Ital Ian public would become inflamed and demand compensation.

Tunisia was not

forgotten~

To this Barrere replied that

Italy's share would be precisely Tripoli.

"We h2ve to take things
as they are, not as we'd like them to be!", he reminded Luzzattt. 6 3
When the Ital Ian silence continued, Barrere decided to
sound out Visconti Venosta and attempt to discover his actual attitude to the French proposal.

He learned the Ital Ian minister would

still be happy to receive a written declaration of the verbal assurances Barrere had given Canavero In April.

As for going further,

he preferred to proceed gradually "to the extent events made adjustment necessary •1164
The Boer War, of course, had complicated the situation from
the Italian point of view.

It was generally conceded in the Consulta

that either an enlargement or diminution of the English African
patrimony would result In war, war which in turn could well produce
a grave contrecoup in the Mediterranean. 65

The probability of

France's move to an occupation of Touat at this time had also begun
to alarm Visconti Venosta. 6 ~

He was concerned that a French

64 Ib Id., Annex.
6S1bld., XVI, No. 14. In this regard, while discussing the
possible annexation of Transvaal and Orange, King Humbert told Barrere
he feared the repercussions certain to fol low: "There are too many
Interests Involved for such a development to take place peacefully."
66sarrere a Delcass6, November 13, 1899, AAE, N:S!, XV.
Barrere wrote Delcass~ of Visconti Venosta's preoccupation, adding

68
occupation of Morocco, at a time lt2ly herself was unable to go
Into Tri pol I, might arouse such discontent within Italy the dynasty
Itself would be lmperilled.67
Visconti Venosta's fe2r of the French occupation of Touat
was not ungrounded.

In late 1899 and early 1900 France actually

began the penetr<'1tion of Interior Morocco.

Franco-Moroccan rela-

tions were regulated by a treaty dating back to 1845.

Although the

Algerian-Morocco border was governed by the tre2ty, sections of the
frontiers remained Indefinite.

Border Incidents were frequent, and

possession of the Touat, Gourara and Tldlkelt oases--dlscovered
after the treaty was drawn up--had never been settled. 68 When objections were raised to French occupation of the oases and the
construction of railroads to them,

Oelcass~

merely replied that

France had no Intention of changing the status quo In the Mediterranean.

She was merely exercising the legitimate exp2nslon of her

influence In the reglon.69

Visconti Venosta 1 s apprehension over

that If the Ital Ian minister entertained doubts as to France's
Intentions they were surely lnspl red by Engl lsh sources 11 • • • trying to profit from Engl lsh embarassment and acquire a preponderant
situation In lt?ly • • • ".
6 7PEA, XVI II, No. 4474 []ts[].
68see Anderson, The Fl rst Moroccan Crisis, 1904-06, pp. 5-18.
69 ooF 1 , XVI, Nos. 92, 96. French acquisition of Morocco
was being actively promoted at this time by the Comlt~ de l'Afrlque
fran~alse, organized In 1899 to popularize African questions with
the French people as well as to exert pressure on the government
and carry on an organized campaign for colonial expansion. Its
membership, although small, was Influential and included in its
numbers French deputies, senators, military and naval officers, government officials, newsp?per editors and owners and members of various geographic 2nd colonl2l societies. Delcass~ 1 s own policy,
from the start of his ministry, was associated with the Moroccan
question--whose settlement he believed would both fortify and aggrandize France's situation In Europe. Anderson, The First Moroccan
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passlble French action In Touat eventually led him to express his
concern to Lord Currie.

Yet Currie merely advised the Italian

minister to keep a strict watch and be prepared to avert any Injury
to Italian Interest.

As for British resistance to French Inter-

ference with the Integrity of Morocco, Currie expressed the opinion
that despite traditional English policy to forcibly resist any
attack on the Mediterranean coast, It would be extremely difficult
to prevent a French occupation of Touat.70

This English Indiffer-

ence undoubtedly Influenced Visconti Venosta In his decision to
have Tornlelll reopen the Morocco-Tripoli discussions with Delcass~
a few weeks later.7 1 Yet after Informing the French foreign minister of this decision on December 18, Tornlelll--as well as Visconti
Venosta--again reverted to silence on the subject. 72
In the meanwhile Tornlelll came to believe that England's
current preoccupations made the present a most propitious time for
French expDnslon In Morocco.

Under those circumstances he thought

Italy's silence would be a serious mistake, one which could only
weaken her diplomatically and leave an impression of her complete
disinterest towards France's eventual expanslon--wlthout any opportunity of obtaining compensatlon.73
Crisis, 1904-06, pp. 5-18. On French colonialism, see also
H. Brunschwtg, French Colonialism 18 1-1914. M ths and Realities,
trans. by W. G. Brown London, 19
70Bo, 1, No. 288.

•

71ooF1, XVI, No. 3, n. 1. In May, 1899, Barrere also wrote
tnat Canavero's brother-In-law, the Due de Zoagll, had
confided to him that Italy had nothing to hope for from British cooperation In the Mediterranean. Barrere a Delcass~, May 23, 1899,
AAE, NS!, XV.
72ooF1, XVI, No. 3, n. 1, 2; No. 24.
730013, Ill, No. 352.
Delcass~
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Yet Visconti Venosta was unwilling to take decisive
action.

On January 14, 1900 he wrote Ambassador Lanza of his

concern with the International situation and fear of a possible
alteration In Mediterranean conditions.

Should that be the case,

he told Lanza, he himself would be unwilling to adopt Italy's traditionally negative policy of the past.

In Visconti Venosta's esti-

mation, the solution to which Italy should resort was a state of
calm preparedness.

Diplomatically, the first step In this course

of action would Involve a frank exchange of views with Gennany,
since the Italian minister was convinced It was in Italy's own
best Interests to act In harmony with her Central Ally.74
When approached, however, Germany proved unresponsive.
Von BUlow had high regard for Visconti Venosta, considering him a
wise and prudent statesman In whom Gennany could have full confidence.

Nevertheless, Lanza reported, It was almost certain von

BUiow would avoid any accords or exchange of Ideas on eventual
Ital Ian action In the Mediterranean.

Ostensibly the reluctance

derived from the secretary's fear a less prudent man than Visconti
Venosta might some day provoke a causus foederls which overreached
Germany's understanding of her obl lgatlons to her Ital Ian ally.
Any discussions, consequently, would have to take place on a strictly personal basls.75

•
Von BUlow was less diplomatic when he informed London of
Lanza's overtures.
remark that

He intended to limit himself, he wrote, to the

Oelcass~

had given Gennany precise assurances France

--~~~~~~~~-

74

Ibid., No. 353.

751bid. , No. 361.
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would respect current treaties.

At the same time, he was going to

make It clear that British Indifference with respect to Touat was
such that little hope remained for any protest over the controversial border.

He would avoid any detailed discussions with Italy

on the Moroccan question, von BUlow added, considering It preferable
that Germany approach Italy only after having reached agreement with
Britain on how best to proceed.76
While for all practical purposes, then, an Impasse had been
reached on the Morocco-Tripoli declaration, there had been progress
In resolving another Franco-Ital Ian problem:

that concerning the

borders between Eritrea and French Somallland.

A protocol estab-

lishing the frontiers was signed in Rome on January 24, 1900.77
Barrere had urged

Delcass~

to adopt a conciliatory approach In the

negotiations, regarding the settlement as a deflnltfve conclusion
to a source of much mfsunderstandf ng between France and ltaly.7 8
During a meeting that finalized the Red Sea boundary settlement, Barrere and Visconti Venosta again resumed an exchange of
views on Tripoli and Morocco.

According to Barrere the discussions

were Initiated when he expressed the hope they could also resolve
other problems between the two countries.

Agreeing wholeheartedly

with his sentiments, Vfscontl Venosta had replied that If Barrere
was alluding to the Mediterranean, he would always find him ready
'
76PEA, XVI I I, No. 4476 1}1s_fil.
77 DDF,
1 XVI, No. 24 , 51. Text of the agreement delimiting
the frontlerbetween French Somallland and Eritrea Is reproduced In
Basdevant, Trait6s et conventions en vlgueur entre la France et les
Qulssances ~trang~res, II, 767-68.
78camllle Barrere, "Lettres

a Delcass~, 11

p. 726.

r

·
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to talk "in confidence and as a friend."

Visconti Venosta then

expressed his own Inability to establish a correlation between the
question of Tripoli and that of Morocco.79

In his analysis of

Visconti Venosta's hesitation, Barrere wrote

Delcass~

that although

the Ital Ian minister recognized France's legitimate Interests In
Morocco, he still feared to open the question prematurely since
France was not alone In her Interest In the area.

To this

Delcass~

had retorted that France could well address the same words to Italy
in the face of her desire for a French declaration of disinterest
on T r I po 1 i ! 80
In Visconti Venosta 1 s version of the resumption of talks,
Barrere had requested a confidential discussion, In the course of
which he told the foreign minister that France was ready to renew
Its formal assurances respecting the status quo In Trlpoll-Cyrenalca
and would not oppose eventual action Italy might exercise In order
to extend her Influence In Trlpolltanla.

However France desired to

know, In return, that she would not meet with Italian opposition In
Morocco.

Visconti Venosta's objections to the proposal, he after-

wards wrote Tornlelll, had not derived from the base of the question
but from a certain repugnance he felt In pledging Italy to remote,
Incalculable action. 81 When the Ital Ian minister queried Barrere
as

to the nature of any French action In Morocco, the French ambas-

sador had reserved further elaboration.

A few weeks later Barrere learned Visconti Venosta was In
111 health and not expected to remain long In the cabinet.

80 I b Id., No. 55 •
79ooF 1 , 1, No. 51.
81 serra, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, p. 88.
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therefore began urging

Delcass~

to proceed as quickly as possible

with the negotiation of the declarations, asking as well for specific information with regard to

Delcass~'s

intentions in order to

be prepared for all eventualities that might occur In subsequent
discussions.

Typical of the points on which he wished to be informed:

was Delcass6 asking for a statement on all of Morocco?
was It only mutual assurance that France renounced
Trlpolitan territory and Italy, Moroccan?
did France demand recognition of her superior rights
to interior Morocco as far as the Atlanttc !n exchange
for her recognition of Italy's to Tripoli? 8
By February 10 Barrere reported that there was fundamental
accord on the contents of the declarations.

Once Visconti Venosta

understood the French sphere of influence reserved the question of
Tangier and Spanish possessions on the Mediterranean coast, he was
no

longer concerned that France's Intentions In Morocco were not

peaceful .83

Barrere's repeated assurance of French disinterest in

Tripoli and of non-interference with the caravan routes had also
relieved him of any anxiety over a possible clash between French and
I ta 1 i an t nte res ts • 84

There was then the matter of the form the declarations were
to be given.
by

Barrere rejected the declaration originally proposed

Delcasse, considering it Inopportune and even dangerous. 85

He

or

82 camllle Barrere, "Lettres a Oelcass~, 11 pp. 726-28. Undated, this letter was apparently written in response to Delcasse's
letters to Barrere of January 7 and 20, 1900.
83 OOF 1 , XV I, No. 20 3 •
84camille Barrere, "Lettres

a Delcasse,"

pp. 730-32.

85ooF 1 , XVI, No. 79. The text of this declaration, not tneluded ln "f1ii" French diplomatic documents, Is among the papers of
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pointed out that it was quite probable Viscontl Venosta would
eventually wtsh to communicate the contents of any agreement to
Italy's German allies.
~veritable

Obviously, a paper with the character of

politic2l convention could present difficulties.

Fur-

thermore, Barrere did not consider the problem to actually involve
Morocco.

Yet with regard to Tri pol I, he reminded

Delcass~,

he had

always been of the opinion It would be a grave error not to repeat
France's verbal assurances by way of letters.
place In the Triple Alliance:

Tripoli had its

"It was the object, under cover of

destruction of Mediterranean balance, of a casus belli against
France."

Thus France was In a position, Barrere argued, of sup-

pressing not only the pretext but one of the principal bases of
the treaty.

If France persisted in asking Italy for a Moroccan

guarantee, Barrere then insisted It be under a prudent form.

In

his opinion, this was best provided by an exchange of letters which
had the London Convention of 1899 as their point of departure. 86
Barrere also objected to

Delcass~'s

"acquisition of territory" in the letters.
the De 1cciss~ MSS •

use of the expression
He preferred 1 imiting

It reads:

"Italy engages vis a vis France never to raise territorial
claims in Morocco or oppose in any manner the efforts France might
be led to make in order to establish her Influence there. This
engagement extends neither to the question of Tangier, which remains
open nor to Spain's present possessions on the Rlf coast, which
France excludes from dlscus~ton.
"France engages vis a vis Italy never to raise territorial
claims fn Tripolitanta, as at present defined, or oppose Jn any
manner the efforts Italy might be led to make in order to establish
her influence there." Delcasse, "Projet de declaration," February 4,
1900, AAE, PD.
86 cami 11 e Barre re' "Lett res a De 1cass~, II pp. 7 30-32.
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their phrasing to the effect that Insofar as France was concerned,
the convention had no Intention of cutting the caravan routes of
Trlpoll-Cyrenalca and that France's colonial expansion stopped at
the borders of that reglon.87
As for the Ital tan letter on Morocco,

Barr~re

merely

wanted It to lnfonn France that Italy found nothing Incompatible
with her own Interests were France In a position of power In
Morocco.
Barr~re's

overriding concern at thts stage of the negotia-

tions was to eliminate any reason for a violation of the secrecy
of the correspondence.

He felt, of itself, tt should contain no-

thing that could be construed In any way as being menacing In
character.88

Delcass6 agreed to these requests, Insisting only

that the character of the declarations be that of a response by
France to Italy's request for a statement on Tripoli • 89
According to

Barr~re,

Delcass6 1 s acquiescence left him

with two alternatives:
a response, In letter fonn, to Italy's request for
assurance that France had no Intention of interrupting the caravan communications of Trlpolltanla with
the African Interior and that French colonial expansion would stop at the Tripolltan borders,

If Delcass6 persisted on grafting Morocco onto the
Tripoli affatr, having Italy tnfonn France, In consequence of the above-s'tated letter, that she rftali!
found nothing contrary to her own Interests lnCJefense of France's interests as "Putssance volslne"
of Morocco.
87 1btd.
89ooFl, XVI, No. 72, n. 2.

88

1btd.
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Since the latter formula consisted of assurances to Italy
and contained nothing contrary to Italian Interests, Barrere considered it a less dangerous form than any other for the MoroccoTrfpol f declaratton.90
Barr~re

planned on being In Paris during most of April,

and although another ministerial crisis arose In Italy during
March, Visconti Venosta advised the French ambassador before his
departure of his own desire to carry their exchange of views on
Tripoli and Morocco through to a concluslon.9 1 On Barrere's return, the Ital tan minister then Indicated his Interest in extending
the proposals still farther than had been France's Intent.

The

French government would pledge herself to not occupying Tripoli,
Visconti Venosta observed, but did not authorize Italy to assert
her rights In the region.

In other words, France conserved the

right to formally oppose her eventual Ital Ian expansion In Tripoli.
Barrere Immediately grasped the implications of Visconti
Venosta•s proposal.

His response was to be crucial in the subse·

quent development of Franco-Ital tan relations.

Although

Delcass~

had not expressed his position on the particular point made by the
Italian minister, Barrere unequivocally stated that French approbation of an Ital Ian move In Tripoli would have to carry, as a condition, Italy's non-engagement against France In Europe.9 2 He

'

pointed out that while recognizing the justice of Visconti Venosta's
distinction, Italy could certainly understand France's reserve towards such a hypothetical undertaking.
90 1bid., No. 79.
92 1btd., No. 136.

An Italy free of any

91 Ibid., No. 136 , Annex.
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palftlcal or military obligations against France would make every
difference to France In Afrlca.93
Negotiations continued In this spirit, Visconti Venosta
fully aware of the obstacles the Triple Alliance placed In the way
of French assent to the new Mediterranean orientation of his pollcy.94
Bc-rr~re by

now had no doubt that the direction of Ital Ian foreign

paltcy

centered on Tripoli.

was

His

conviction was strengthened

through observation of the Consulta·lnsplred press as well as by
Visconti Venosta's own overtures to hlm.95
During the course of the discussions that followed, De1cass6
expressed his willingness to accede to Visconti Venosta•s request
for a more pos It Ive 1 fmt tat Ion on the French sphere of Influence•

expressing to

Bcrr~re

at the same time his hope the lt?l tan minister

would recognize the necessity of granting the reciprocal assurances
France was seektng.96 Yet France would enter Into the 1'1.!'.lrger
arrangement Italy sought," Barrere reiterated to Visconti Venosta,
only to the extent Italy was able to extend pacific assurances to
France respect Ing her own treaties with the Germanic powers.

Until

that time conversations would have to remain confined to what
Barr~ re

deft ned as "the pre 1 lml nary stages":

excl udl ng French

recognition of Ital Ian sights on Tripoli and a para11e1 arrangement
for Morocco.97

931bld. 1 No. 136, Annex.

941.!?.U!., Nos. 136, 148.

95tb1d., No. 136. A report to Delcass6 from Ambassador
de Noallles-tn' Berlin also nofed Italy's apparently strong Interest
In Tri pol I at this time. !2f. 1 XVI, No. 156.

96tbld., Nos. 148, 160.

97tbid., No. 171.
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Accordingly, on June 9, Barrere submitted three proposed
letters to Delcasse, urging lnmediate reply since the Ital Ian ministerial crisis was expected to crest within a matter of days.
Basically they remained confined to the negative agreement which
excluded French recognition of ftallan designs on Tripoli and laid
down a parallel arrangement regarding Morocco.9 8 Barrere himself
was satisfied with the letters Insofar as they terminated his concept of the first phase of the current Franco-Italian negotiations:
establishing the existence of friendly discussions

~nd

exchanges

of view which envisioned an entente between France and Italy on the
ground of their former divisions.

His concern for haste centered on

what Barrere believed would be Visconti Venosta's absence In? reconstituted Italian ccblnet.99
Precisely because of this doubt as to Italy's future foreign
minister, however,
letters.

Delcass~

refused to authorize the exchange of

Since Independent operations had already resulted In

France's expansion In the defined areas, he preferred to continue
the negotiations with Italy after her governmental crisis was resolved and he knew with whom he would be dealing In the future. 100
Barrere did not agree with the French minister, maintaining
that the probability of Visconti Venosta's withdrawal only increased
the need for expressing the results of recent Franco-Italian

'

9 8 For texts of the letters of proposal see DDF 1 , XVI, No. 171,

Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

99 I b I d • • No • 171 •
100 Ibid., No. 185.

See Andrew, Th~ophtle Oelcass~ and the
Entente CorcrraTe, pp. 153-57 for French expansion on the Moroccan
border In this period.
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discussions under Visconti Venosta 1 s signature.

In Barrere's

opinion It was more than likely the views of Visconti Venosta 1 s
successor would differ. 101 He objected to Delcasse's point of view
because it appeared to imply a complete entente could only be
reached if Visconti Venosta were
never be the case in I ta 1y!

a

permanent minister, which could

Barre re wou 1d prefer to have taken

advantage of the Italian minister's presence and have Ital Ian policy
so firmly engaged in the path on which France had thrust it his
successors could only reverse Its direction with difficulty.
with Visconti Venosta, he had complained to

Delc~ss6,

Even

we weren't

at all certain the second step would follow! 102

Barrere was convinced it was essential for France to conelude the agreement Oelcasse now held in abeyance.

Urging him to

act, he reminded Oelcasse that if--as Barrere--the foreign minister
viewed the matter as much European as African, he realized there
1

were serious reasons for writing, as well as for having already
given verbal assurance, that France had no intention of going Into
Tripoli.

Neither could he fall to recognize Italy's right to ex-

tend her influence in Tripoli when, In exchange, she left France
free in Morocco.

You know, Barrere told

Delcass~,

Italy will

modify her alliances only If ft becomes politically expedient for
her to do so.

What France then had to do was create that Interest.

Beyond financial and commetcial questions, Barrere felt, Italian
interests lay In the Mediterranean, in Tri pol I; Italy's fear was
precisely that France might first enter this area.

This fear had

been one of the causes leading to Italy's current alliances.
101 ooF 1

-- ,

XVI, No. 187.

l0 2 1btd., No. 190.

Since
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France had no interest In Tripoli, he reasoned, she should suppress
Italy's apprehensions tn writing.

The day Italy asked France to go

farther and recognize her right to extend her influence in Tripoli,
Fr~nce

could

dem~nd

in return--beyond her liberty in Morocco--the

guarantee that Italian alliances were no longer directed

ag~inst

her. 103
Delcass~

was not convinced by Barrere•s argument.

He saw

no fundamental problem, for Instance, were a less prudent foreign
minister than Visconti Venosta to reveal a Morocco-Tripoli declaration.

As for Bcrrere•s preoccupation in snatching Italy from Gennan

domination, he refused to be Impressed with the reasoning that
Tripoli was the object of a casus belli against France, arguing that
because France had no Intention of conquering Tripoli, the casus
foederls could never be Invoked.
did not covet Tripoli,

Delcass~

France could not write Italy she
added, without at the same time

recognizing Italian rights, which merited compensation!

And doing

so, he concluded, would expose France to needless Involvement with
Turkey--a factor Gennany would never hesitate to use against France
in the event of any Ital fan indiscretion.

Delcass~

also felt that

the more generalized phrasing Barrere had proposed In exchange for
France's declaration of disinterest might permit Spain and England
to claim their Mediterranean Interests were being threatened. 104
As events developed, Visconti Venosta maintained his post
In the new Italian cabinet formed on June 24, 1900.

He and Barrere

then contined their efforts to produce a declaration which would

103 1bid.

l0 4 1bld., N0. 203 •
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satisfy all who were party to it.105

By Ju 1y 2 1 Ba r re re f e 1t

sufficient agreement had been reached to propose that Visconti
venosta meet him In Rome to sign the exchange of letters. 106
Visconti Venosta, however, considered the letters• phrasing too
restrictive with respect to Tri pol t.

Leaving shortly on his annual

vacation, Barrere decided to postpone a resumption of negotiations
until his return in November.107

On November 12 he submitted another

letter of proposal to Visconti Venosta. 108
When submitting the November 12 letter-proposal, Barrere
had expressed regret that agreement had not been reached in an overal 1 European sense.

Visconti Venosta remarked In reply that more

was involved than France's Interest in the Triple Alliance; there
was also the question of Italy's surveillance and defense against
one of her allies, the allusion being made of course with reference
to Austrfa. 10 9 A few weeks later, however, the Italian minister
Informed Barrere of his desire to acquaint Victor Emmanuel with the
negotiations, which until then had been carried on in the greatest
secrecy.llO

King Victor Emmanuel Ill expressed his entire

l051bld., No. 190, n. 2; Nos. 226, 230, 232, 236.
1060013
_ , 111, No. 431 •
l O8 1b i d ., No • 375, n. 4.

l07ooF 1 , XVI, No. 251 •
This document has not been found.

l091bld., No. 375. Visconti Venosta was also in the final
stages of negotiating two actords with Austria: the first pledging
both governments to maintain the status quo in the Balkans; the
second, a naval convention providing for the coordination of the
Austrian and Italian fleets In case of war against France and Russia.
The Austrian accords were the more significant In view of a recently
concluded Russo-Austrian treaty.
110

I b i d -. No • 40 1 • The assassination of King Humbert in
July had le~taly with a new monarch. Barr~re was favorably impressed by the young king, flndlng him both Intelligent and well-
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satisfaction with the rvppro2chment the tentative occords implied,
and on December 29 Barrere wired

De1c~ss~

that with only minor

modifications of wording, complete agreement had been reached.
this

Delcass~

To

responded January 2, 1901, authorizing Barrere to

proceed In the signing and exchange of the letters.111
The exchange of notes, pred?ted December 14 and 16, 1900,
took place on Jenuary 4, 1901.

In Barrere's letter to Visconti

Veno!te the French Government ref ter~ted Its Intent of not extending
its frontier or sphere of Influence to the province of Tripoli and
of respecting caravAn conmuntcatlons between Tripoli and French
territory.

It did not, however, without French consent, recognize

lte1y's right to expand In the Trlpolltan province.

Visconti Venosta's

reply recognized the right of FrAnce to extend her Influence In

Morocco, with the reservation

th~t

If such action modified the poli-

tical or territorial Integrity of the Ch6rlften Empire In Morocco

lt~ly was entitled to the development of her Influence In Tripoli • 112
Barrere attrched great

slgnlflc~nce

to this Medtterrane2n

Accord, which he believed "modified profoundly, nnd to France's
~dv~ntage,

his

the position of active forces tn the Mediterranean."

estim~tfon,

In

it resolved one of the most dtff1cu1t rspects of

Informed. Victor Enwnanuel Ill was also reputed to be an crdent
irredentist, Barr~re wrote Delcass4, and had reportedly Informed
his father-In-law, the Grand' Due Pierre Nicolaievltch, that he had
had enough of the Triple A111~nce and Intended to maintain full
liberty of 0ctlon. He would subordinate ltalt~n Independence to
no one. Ibid., No. 374.
111 Ibid., No. 413; No. 413, n. 2.
~re

11 2ooF 2 , I, No. 17.

The Barr~re-Viscontl Venosta letters
reproduced in Appendix I I.
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Franco-Italian relations.

Barrere saw the Medfterrane2n as the

keystone of Italian action, contributing to the formation of her
alliances against France and leading her to establish accords with
England.

Since Tunis, France had been suspected of attempting to

expand her hegemony in the Mediterranean, not only in Morocco but
tn Tripoli.

Yet as much as Italy coveted Trlpolitanfa, she was

unlikely to undertake any direct action for lack of sufficient military and financial resources.

Nor was she likely to secure the

blessings of the Powers on any such venture, particularly her allies.
Even her Internal affairs weighed the scales against any Ital tan
Mediterranean undertaking.

France, on the other hand, gained f2r

more tangibly from the accord.

In a sense, not only had Italy be-

come dependent on France with regard to her Tri pol itan aspirations;
she recognized French rights to Morocco as well.

To Barrere the

Morocco-Tripoli accord had the additional value of greatly reducing
fear and jealousy In ltaly--lessenlng, in turn, the posslbil tty of
a Mediterranean agreement between Italy and England that he felt
would actually have been directed against France. 11 3
Delcass~

also evinced considerable satisfaction with what

had been accomplished, sharing with Barrere an appreciation of the
advantages Inherent In the Franco-Ital Ian Mediterranean accord of
1900.

Despite certain dissimilarities between his own views and

those of

Barr~re

during the course of the negotiations, he had come

to value particularly, he wrote Barrere, the essentially conservative
character thct had ultimately prevailed in the occord.

It excluded

any temptation, on the part of Italy, to precipitate action In
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Tripoli and of obliging France, 2t the sr:ime time, to 2ccelerC'lte her
0 wn

resolutions concerning Morocco.

He was also 2ssured th2t Rome

understood the importance of not disturbing the

Mediterrane~n

equilibrium--unless to reap legitimate compens2tion, were France one
day constrained to renounce the status quo in Morocco and impose her
sovereignty over the African empire. 114

The French minister thanked

Barrere profusely for his skill and patience in the negotiations
and, at Barrere's suggestion, informed Visconti Venosta of his appreciation for the efficacious help the Italian minister had given.
Oelcasse also had Barrere tell Visconti Venosta he considered it
one of the privileges of his political life to have joined his own
efforts to those of Visconti Venosta in the achievement of such

?

felicitious accompl ishment.115
Barrere, however, entertained greater cimbitions for Fre>ncoItalian rapproachment than had resulted with the Mediterranean accord
The core of his over-all policy was the slow corrosion of

of 1900.

Italy's ties to the Triple Alliance.

He

vieWP~

the Tunisian nego-

tiations, conmerctal arrangements, delimitation of the Red Sea boundaries, and Morocco-Tripoli accords as mere stages, stages marking the
road to the vastly more significant political accords of 1902. 116
For It was

Barr~re's

ultimate hope that the Trtpltce could gradually
be emptied of its substance. 11 7 It was towards the achievement of
this objective that his effdrts would henceforth be directed.
114 Ibid., No. 255.

1151bld., Nos. 82, 255.

l l 6 I b id • , No • 1 7

117 Ibid.,
•
2 II, Nos.
Nos. 118, 185, 201, 235, 258; DDF,

76 , 99,

218; BO, I, No. 363; Jules Cambon, The Diplomatist, trans. by
C. T.-:rurner (London, 1931), pp. 67-68; Charles-Roux, Trots ambassades
franc;afses a la veil le de la guerre, p. 12.
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CHAPTER IV
RAPPROCHEMENT ACHIEVED:
THE NEUTRALITY ACCORD OF 1902

A greater degree of cooperation as wel 1 as a noticeable
Increase In the warmth of Franco-lta11an relations followed the
exchange of the Barrere·Vlscontl Venosta letters.

France bestowed

the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honor on Victor Emmanuel Ill
who, In turn, made the first appearance of an Ital Ian monarch at
the French Prix de Rome exhibition In the Villa Medici • 1 Representatives of the two countries met to discuss a railroad project
between

and Cuneo and also reached e modus agendi regarding
the protection of the rights of Christians In Chlna. 2
N~c:e

Barr~re,

however, was acutely

~were

of the need to stlmu·

late still closer collaboration between the two nations In order
to achieve his ultimate objective of corroding Italy's ties to the

Triple Alliance.

One of the first steps he took towards attaining

this goal was a natural one for the former journal 1st; he warned
Delcass6 of the harm he believed various French newspapers were
inflicting on Frcnco·ltallari relations.

He cited journalistic pre-

occupation with Austro-ltallan antagonism as an example.

While

1Atklnson, "Ambassador of France," p. 108 from the Annual
Register { 1901 ) , p. 259 •
2DOF 2 , Nos. 58 , 72.
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the subject was ce rta t nl y a worthwh I 1e one, he remarked to h Is
superior, It was one to be treated with prudence and discretion.
sarrere felt the tactics being employed would only succeed In offending a large number of Italians.

He was convinced many of them

regarded French articles on Ital Ian affairs as essentially aggressive manoeuvres aimed at reducing Italy to isolation.

Rather than

countering France's own interests, Barrere suggested the newspapers
adopt a more positive approach.

He recommended the substttution

of objective, rational articles that were supported by facts, figures and tables.

These articles could demonstrate, for Instance,

the incompatibility of Italian and Austro-Hungarian economic Interests.

Italy's commercial treaty with Austria was due to expire in

two years, Barrere reminded Delcass4, and It seemed doubtful at the
moment Jt would be renewed on the same advantageous terms for Italian
agricultural products.

A suppression of the favorable terms accorded

Ital Ian wines would provoke a severe agricultural crisis In Italy.
Competently exposed, Barrere believed this thesis would have a considerable Impact In Italy, one from which France could very well
benefit!3
Following the same line of reasoning, Barrere protested a
proposed French surtax on wines having an alcoholic content of more
than 12 per cent.

Although a complementary proposal was being in-

troduced to exempt foreign wines from the tax, Barrere expected
the latter proposal to encounter opposition on the part of French
winegrowers.

Were they successful, he felt Ital Ian reaction could

3 I b i d • , No • 12 •
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be sufficiently adverse to lead to demands for a modification of
the recently concluded Franco-Ital tan Conmerctal Accord.

France

should not be destroying the hopes to which the Commercial Accord
gave birth, he argued, further diminishing the advantages of the
accord In the area of Its greatest Interest to ltaly. 4

If Delc2ss4's

Influence In protecting Ital Ian wines from the surtax were ineffectual, Italy would consider the matter a material and moral violation of the commercial arrangements the two countries had contr2cted.

In Barrere's estimation the repercussions on Franco-Ital Ian

pol itlc<'ll relations would be serious .5
Of course, a far broader application of economic assistance
was Implicit In Barrere 1 s approach to achieving the degree of Francoltallan rapprochement he sought.

He deeply regretted the absence

of French capital In the development of Ital tan industrial projects.
French capital was, In Barrere's own words, "a powerful army in the
conquest of foreign markets. 11 6

He considered ft unfortunate It was

so Inexplicably timid at times, not only depriving France of the
customary benefits she might expect from her assistance In this
area but of the appreciable Influence normally accruing to such
coope rat Ion as we 11

.7

In February Barrere took advantage of an opportunity provided
by Oelcass4 1 s Senate budget address to underscore the concept of
If

Franco-Ital Ian rapport he was attempting to develop.

Asked for his

react Ion to the remarks Delcass4 proposed making on France's I ta 11 an
4

1bid., No. 13.

6 Ibid., No. 192.

5 I b Id., No. 73.

71bld. Nos. 192, 579.
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policy, the ambassador showed no hesitation in suggesting revisions
which would make them accord more closely with his own thlnking. 8
Barrere's efforts to Improve the Franco-Ital tan relationship were not confined to the area of economics, however.

To fur-

ther facilitate the achievement of his ultimate objective, he also
repeatedly urged Delcasse to enlist the assistance of Emperor
Nicholas of Russia and the Prince of Montenegro in Influencing the
Quirinal in France's behalf.9

For Barrere was convinced consider-

able pressures would be brought to bear on the Ital Ian King to renew the Germanic all lances.lo

In Barrere's opinion it was therefore

imperative every effort be made to bring Italy's alliances into
harmony wt th re-establ I shed Franco-Ital tan rapport and the moral
obl igatlons that relationship lmposed. 11
As matters developed, relations between the two countries
were affected decisively by the emergence of the Zanardelll Ministry
on February 14, In which the direction of foreign affairs was assumed by Giulio Prlnetti • 12

Prlnettt was a successful businessman

81bld., Nos. 56, 59. Barrere preferred a warmer tone than
Delcasse ~adopted, and one more flattering to Italy. He suggested,
for instance, referring to Italy as "un grand pays volstn."
91btd., Nos. 118, 132, 176, 252, 279, 300. As a natural
rival of Austria-Hungary, Russia was in a position to exert considerable influence on Italy's foreign-policy attitudes. Since Victor
Emmanuel Ill was known to be deeply In love with his Montenegrin
wife, Barrere also hoped the' relatives of the Princess would be
able to develop francophllic tendencies in the Italian court.
l OI b I d • , No • 104 •

l l Ib I d •

12 Pol ltlcally conservative, Giulio Prlnetti was Ital Ian
foreign minister from February, 1901 to March, 1903. He had previously served as Minister of Public Works from July, 1896 to
December, 1897.
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from Milan who assumed office wtth an anti-Triple Alliance reputation.

The reputation had Its origins in remarks Prinettl supposedly

made while a deputy in 1891.

Inexperienced in the role of diplomat

ten years later, the new foreign minister gave immediate evidence

of considerable indiscretion.

The faux pas may well have been occz-

sioned by Prlnetti's attempt to offset any reservations his earlier
pronouncements against the Triple Alliance may have led Italy's
German allies to entertain towards him.

In any event shortly after

his nomination to the Consul ta, Prinetti remarked to Bavarian Minister
Tucker that his earlier apprehensions were actually inspired by
Crispian policy.

However, Prfnettl had continued, since time and

experience had demonstrated both the peaceful character of the
Triplice and advantages afforded Italy by It, he Intended henceforth
to direct all his efforts towards maintaining the alliance.

This

supposedly confidential disclosure appeared in papers In Milan and
Berlin the following day.

Publication of the remarks was believed

to have originated with Prtnetti himself, despite his later denial
to the Ital tan Parliament that any such conversation with Tucker
had taken place.13

Barrere and Prlnettt had been acquainted for several years
and relations between the two were cordial, although Barrere Initially adopted a more reserved tone with Prlnettl than he had with
Visconti Venosta.

The reserve was based on more than the Ital tan

minister's indiscretion to Baron Tucker.
years

th~t

Bcrrere wrote In leter

Prlnettl was at first hesitant end fearful.

Newly arrived

in the diplomatic milieu, with only a secondary standing In
13 DDF,
2 I, Nos. 92, 97, 150.
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parliament and 1 ittle influence with his monarch, he was also subjected to the pressures of the Germans who were fully aware of the
approaching expiration of the tripartite treaty.

Although Barrere

felt Prinettt was in no position to adopt a definitive pro-French
stand--which is where he was convinced the Ital Ian minister's personal sympathies actually lay--he thought Prinetti should at least
have given France some pledge of his good will • 14 As matters stood,
in Barrere's opinion the new Italian minister still had "some way to
go to walk with us in the path of peace and friendship. 11 15
Yet by April relations between the two countries had become
increasingly cordial.

The French government condoned Italy's estab-

1 ishment of postal service In Tripoli, a stgnlflcant gesture to
Barrere who believed Italy viewed France's acquiescence as verification of her own disinterest In Tripoli • 16 Barrere had also encouraged joint discussion by the two countries of a railroad linking
the Adriatic with Constantinople, a project in which Italy had evinced
great interest. 17 In addition, he attempted to draw Italy and France's
ally, Russia, Into a closer relationship, assisting their endeavors
to reach an economic entente.

To this end he brought together his

friend Luzzatti and Russian Ambassador Nelldoff, with whom he was
on the closest of terms • 18
However, more than

~ny

other factor, Barrere regarded the

visit of the Italian fleet to Toulon as indispensable In Improving
14 1bld., No. 92:
II' Annex.
16 1bid., No. 167.
15 1bid., I , No. 92.
18 1btd., No. 191.
l71bid., No. 182.
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Fr0nco-lt~lian

relctions at this time.

He attached such signifi-

ccnce to it, in fact, that in 1912 he referred to the events as the
point of departure for the discussions which resulted tn the secret
Neutrc:l tty Accord of 1902.

"At that moment," he wrote, "F'ranco-

ltal Ian rapprochement was an accomplished fact.

The Tunis tan nego-

tiations, commercial arrangements, delimitation of the two countries'
Red Sea possessions, and finally Morocco-Tripoli accord of 1900,
had been mere stages.19
This visit, which took place In the spring of 1901, brought
together French President Emile Loubet and Italy's royal family;
the Italian fleet was under the command of the young Duke of Genoa.
The festivities surrounding the event were of considerable import
to Italy.

Barr~re

was In close touch with Delcass6 while arrange-

ments were being made amd emphatic in his insistence the occasion
retain a strictly Franco-Ital Ian character. 20

He expressed his

disturbance on learning plans called for Russian participation In
the festivities and laid down conditions of protocol he deemed requisite were Delcass6 unable to arrange diplomatically for the Russian's
deperture. 2 1 When three Russian ships subsequently arrived ln
Toulon, Barrere, In response to Prlnettl's questioning, was able to
inform the Italian minister the vessels were only in port for repairs
and their arrival was entirely unofficial .22
191btd., II, Annex.

20 I b Id., I , Nos • 134 , 170 •

211bid., Nos. 137, 141, 164, 169. The situation developed
out of President Loubet 1 s desire to demonstrate French Interest In
a newly-launched Russian ship constructed by French shipbuilders.
Delcass~ thought the Russian officers, and ~ny other foreign officials at Toulon, might be Invited to the dinner being held In
honor of the Duke of Genoa.
22 I b t d • , No. 170 •
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Despite B2rrere's apprehension, the Toulon visit went
smoothly and more than surpassed his expect~tlons. 2 3

In Barrere's

estimation it created more than an excellent Impression throughout
ftaly.

The popular sentiment engendered also served to reduce much
of the Import attached to the Triple Alliance. 24 The French nmbassador was not alone in ascribing considerable significance to the
Toulon demonstrations.

Ambassador de Noailles informed Delcasse

that the vlsit of the Italian fleet completely absorbed Germany's

attention, where the question was already being raised
or not Italy intended to desert the Triple Alltance.25

as

to whether

The official

German reaction was, of course, one of Indifference, although German diplomatic reports actually began commenting on the forthcoming
event as early as February.26

At that time German Ambassador to

Rome, Charles de Wedel, wrote von BUlow concerning
zezl in consol idattng Franco-Ital tan relations.

Barr~re's

great

German Ambassador

to Pcirls, Hugo de Radol In, also reported Franco-Ital tan rappr10chement
was being credited to

Barr~re,

ltcil ian commercial accords. 112 7

"who had also concluded the FrancoBy March 31 Wedel expressed the fear

Toulon was being exploited tn the press and supporting a widespread
conviction of growing Franco-Ital Ian lntimacy. 28

While Wedel sub-

sequently discounted any Idea of a change In Italy's attitude towards
the renewal of the Triple Alliance, he nevertheless suggested that
a more amical attitude towards
Italy on England's part would
f

231bld., No. 185.

24 I b I d • , Nos • 185 , 201 •

25 I b Id., No. 190.
26 •
;;-i
.!E..!J!.; PEA, XX, No. 4881 l_?83Q_1.

Z7 PEA, XX, No. 4973 15833\.

28

1bid., No. 4950

I 5831J..
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contribute decisively to the future retention of Italy's political
orientation.

Wedel felt England could not only assure Italy of

coastal protection but offer a guarantee as well against her greatest
preoccupation, the displacement of Influence in the Mediterranean. 29
Several days after Wedel's dispatch to Berlin, British
Ambassador Currie sent Lord Lansdowne a report of a conversation he
had

been engaged In by his Austrian and German colleagues.

Discus-

sion had centered on England's attitude towards the renewal of the
Triple Alliance and the reception of the Ital Ian fleet at Toulon.
Currie related that while the Trlplice representatives had expressed
confidence no change In policy was contemplated, both revealed
considerable anxiety as to the effect the Toulon demonstrations
might produce in Italy.

Wedel, Currie added, specifically Indicated

the desirability of greater English Interest In ltallan affalrs.30
As these developments were unfolding,

Barr~re

began a

vigorous drive aimed at bringing Italy's treaty commitments into
harmony with the friendly rapport continuing to develop between the
two countries.

The rapprochement Imposed moral obligations, he

told Delcass6 In February, Informing the French minister It was essential Ambassador Tornielll have a clear understanding of France's
Italian pollcy.31

Increased pressure being brought to bear on

Italy to renew the Triple Al,1 lance made It Imperative there be no
doubt as to France's position:

regardless of the alliances Italy

chose to conclude, they should contain no offensive obligations
against France--even those under a defensive cover.3 2
291 b Id • , No. 4960 lj_83~ •

30so, 1, No. 352.

31 DDF2, I , No. 104.

32 1b Id • , No • 11 8.
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Barrere's pressure on

Delcass~

to engage Torntel 11 tn

discussion on this point intensified after Toulon.33

At the end

of May he submitted a text which would convey the French position
to the Ital tan ambassador and urged

Delcass~

to speak to Tornielll

before the upcoming Italian budgetary discussions scheduled for
June.3 4 Barrere's concern was based on more than his observation
of general Ital Ian preoccupation with renewal or modification of
the Triple Alllance.35

His confidence in Prfnettf had lessened

considerably In the course of the minister's first few months at
the Consulta.

Barrere feared Prlnettl lacked the authority and con-

viction necessary to follow an Independent path and envisioned
Italy's possible reversion to the domination of Trlpllce poltcy.36
To heighten the effect of his pronouncement to Tornlelll, Barrere
suggested that Delcass6 draw the Italian ambassador's attention to
one of the most decisive arguments In favor of Italy's modification
of her political treaties:

the rise in Italian stocks on the French

market, unequal led since the Initial Franco-Ital Ian rupture.
would also be wise, Barrere advised, were

Delcass~

It

to apprise

Torntellt of Prlnetti's prior knowledge of their dlscusston.37
In pressing the Issue as he obviously was, Barrere was not
without the support of certain Influential Italian statesmen.

As

he reminded Oelcass6, Rudlnl, Luzzattl, Visconti Venosta and Sonnino
had also expressed the opln(on that Italy's treaties should be
331btd., Nos. 185, 201, 258, n. 1; Nos. 262, 267, 268.
351bld., No. 118.
34 1btd., No. 258.
371btd., No. 267.
36 1b Id., No. 262.
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modified to accord with current Franco-Italian rapport.38

Premier

Giuseppe Zanardelll himself, In an interview accorded the Parts
edition of the New York Herald a few months earlier, stated openly
that Italy had to resolve questions of commerce as well as of
a 11 i ance.

Zana rde 11 t cons I de red t t "abso 1ute1 y necessary any sug-

gest l ons of animosity towards France be dissipated ••• France
and Italy had to remain friends under any ct rcumstances! 11 39
On June 7 Delcasse notified Barrere that his discussion
with Tornielli had taken place.

The points Barrere had signalled

for inclusion In the conversation had been touched on and Tornielll
was to inform Prlnettl of Delcass4 1 s remarks.40

The effects of the

confrontation Barrere had urged were Immediate.

June 9 Barrere

wired Delcasse that Prlnettl had just given two verbal declarations.
While discussing the imminent Italian budgetary debate, Barrere had
again expressed hope the Impression would not be created that Italy
planned on contracting any obligations directed against France.

In

response, Prinettl assured Barrere that he would not treat the
question of the Triple Alliance.

His discourse stated as well that

if the Triple Alliance had once been aggressive In character, it
was now compatible with the reestablished Franco-Ital fan rapprochement.41

In reporting this conversation to Delcasse Barrere asked

the French minister to be certain to allude to Prfnettl's assurances when next speaking with Tornielli.

He also advised Delcasse

381bld., Nos. 104, 267, 268, 277.
39clted by Serra, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, p. 106.
40 DDF,
2 I, No. 273.
41 Ibid., No. 275.
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to express his great satisfaction with this proof of the Ital tan
government's position towards France.
Prinettl then reassured Barrere further by reading him an
excerpt of his parliamentary address prior to Its actual delivery.
Referring to the compatibility of Italy's Intimate relations with
France and the Triple Alliance, the discourse alluded to the Toulon
visit, In which the two peoples "having put aside reciprocal suspicions no longer recognized the existence of fundamental discord
between their respective interests and yielded to demonstrations
of cordial friendship that were so natural between two nations who
we re s Is te rs by race, s pi rt t and cu 1tu re . 1142
When Barrere thanked the Italian minister for his gracious
words, he wrote

Delcass~,

he could tell he visibly disturbed

Prinetti by asking him if he wasn't afraid his address might leave
the impression the Triple Alliance was about to be renewed.

Prinetti

Insisted Barrere was wrong In drawing such a conclusion, admitting
however that his remarks regarding the Trlplice were the minimum
he was in a position to make.

As Italy's official representative

he could not omit all reference to the alliance.

Barrere interpreted

Prinettl's explanation as a further Indication the renewal of Italy's
alliances was not a simple Italian affair.
and In a large way.
report to

Delcass~

Barrer~

France was Involved,

had not pressed the Issue further, his

continued, when he realized a further remark of

Prlnetti's actually opened discussion on the character of the alliance as it regarded France.
42 I b I d • , No • 29 3 •

Prinettl had cont1nted the conversation
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with the significant observation that "the French press would be
wrong in seeing in his words the intention of again contracting the
same obligations towards the Germanic powers. 1143
Barrere and Prlnetti met several days later, Barrere again
clarified France's position with regard to the possible renewal of
France's treaties.

He ekplicftly advised the Italian minister that

under its actual form, France did not consider the renewal of the
Triple Alliance compatible with the manifestations of Franco-Italian
friendship demonstrated at Toulon or with the recent accords the
two countries had concluded.

It would not be sufficient for Prinetti

to tell him the treaty was not aggressive and Italy only obliged
to provide a third Power with military assistance If the latter
were attacked by France, Barrere continued.

For in response Barrere

would only Inform the Ital Ian minister France held a differing opinion.

"War Is more often brought on," the French ambassador stated,

"by the one who declares it.

Such a disposition would thus constitute an indirect threat to our security. 1144 To this Prlnettl
had replied that he was aware of Barrere's meaning and in response

would offer him two declarations:
--first, the Italian Government would not renew the Triple
Alliance before Its anticipated expiration;
--second, If renewed It would contain, with regard to
Italy, no clause of a nature to arouse France's
suspicions that her security w~s threatened
either directly or Indirectly. ~

'

Barrere considered these formal assurances to be of the
greatest importance, providing French policy with the support it
441bid., No. 311.

45tbid.

-
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lacked and which he had long been seeklng. 46

Delcass~ lnvnedlately

advised Tornlellt of Prlnettl 1 s declarations to Barrere, not only
expressing deep appreciation for them but accepting them formally
In the name of France!47
Other efforts of Barrere now began to reach harbor as wel 1.
As Prlnettl was del lverlng his declarations to Barre re on June 25,
Russian Ambassador Nelldoff was having an Important conversation
with Victor Emmanuel Ill.

Nelidoff advised the Ital Ian monarch

that the Russian Emperor believed Franco-Ital Ian rapport would be
gravely compromised If any clauses remained in ltctly's alliance
treaties which were contradictory to the ties of Interest and frlendshl p between the two peoples.48

Nel idoff later told Barrere his

words appeared to leave a visible impression on the young sovereign.49
The path on which Italy, under Prinettl, now definitively
embarked was a questionable and controversial one.

It Is also one

for which both Prlnettl and Italian foreign policy In general have
been severely criticized.

Italy first became a participant In the

Triple Alliance In 1882, the bitterness permeating her relations
with France in that period contributing significantly to Ital Ian
participation In the Germanic alliance.so

Accordingly, several

articles of the treaty did bear directly on Franco-Italian relations.
Consequently, Barrere 1 s persistent attempts to safeguard France
'f

461bid., No. 311.
471bld., Nos. 302, n. 1 ., 312, 332, 376.
481bld., No. 302 and Annotation du Minlstre, July 30, 1901.
491btd.

50see above, pp. 18-19.
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against the possibility of Italian hostility was a very real problem confronting Prinetti.
Article II of the original Trlpllce pact declared that if
Italy were attacked by France without provocation, Germany and
Austria would come to Italy's assistance.

Italy, in turn, was

obliged to go to the assistance of Germany if the latter were attacked without provocation by France.51

Under the terms of Arti-

cle V, if the peace of any of the contracting parties were threatened, they would counsel together as to military measures to be
taken with a view to eventual cooperation.

In case of war they en-

gaged not to conclude an armistice, peace, or treaty except by
common agreement.5 2
In 1887 the original treaty was renewed, supplemented by
new German-Italian and Austro-ltalian agreements.

Article Ill of

the separate German-Ital Ian treaty stated that if France moved to
extend her occupation, protectorate or sovereignty in North Africa
and Italy considered herself obliged to undertake action In North
Africa to protect her Mediterranean position, the ensuing state of
war between Italy and France would constitute the casus foederis
on Italy's demand with all the effects foreseen by Articles II and
V of the treaty of 1882.53
France had only a gdneral Idea of these treaty stipulations
when Barrere and Prlnettl began the discussions that ultimately
resulted in the Neutrality Accord of 1902.

On the basts of

51Prlbram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914,
I, 66-67.
5 31bld., 112-13.
52 1bld., 67-69.
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confidential infonnation Barrere had man2ged to gather he had prepared a report for

Delcass~ fn

June of 1900 which permitted France

to reconstruct certain clauses apparently contained Jn the Trlplice
treaty.

Barrere had remarked when submitting his findings that "one

of the principal objects of interest to a French ambassador to Rome
should be In piercing the mystery of an alliance pact which concerns
us to such a high degree. 11 54 As a result of his Investigations It
was Barrere's conclusion that
the Triple Alliance was defensive In character In the
sense it only engaged the contractants tf one of the
two was attacked,
an attempt by a third Power to seize Tripoli would
constitute a casus belli. On this basis he reasoned
that the occupation of Tripoli could lend the Triple
Alliance an offensive character,
if Austria-Hungary expanded territorially to the East
she was obliged, In turn, to give Italy territorial
compensat I on,
subject to parliamentary approbation, the contractants
were assured of most-favored nation treatment.
Admitting the Trlpltce's defensive character, Barrere was
nonetheless convinced It was open to extremely broad Interpretation
respecting the allies' obligations.

He thought It doubtful, for

Instance, that Italy would consider herself dispensed from her obligations If France were provoked to a declaration of war.

On the

contrary, he thought nothing would prevent her from going beyond
the text Itself if Italy juJged ft opportune to be associated in an
attack against France.

Barrere was even Inclined to believe the

latter eventuality had been foreseen In the negotiation of annexed
54 DDF 1 , XV I , No. 167 •

IUI

military protocols, in a stipulation granting Italy the right of
intervention in a Franco-German confl let despite the absence of a
. 55
casus f oe deris.
On the basis of considerations such as these Barrere had
concluded the Triple Alliance was essentially offensive in character
and should be modified

i~

.
56
the interests of French security.

views were shared by France's Russian ally.

His

French Ambassador to

St. Petersburg, Adrien Montebello, wrote Oelcasse that Russian
Foreign Minister, Count Vladimir Lamsdorff, also thought Italy
should disassociate herself from all clauses directed against
France.

Information the Russian Government had gathered on the

matter also led him to believe Victor Emmanuel was personally disposed to act accordingly.57
Italy, however, was admittedly In a difficult position.
Great as her need of France's good will and assistance might be,
the Triple Alliance provided security in other areas she considered equally vital to her wellbeing.

Austro-ltal Ian antagonism

probably posed the greatest threat once Franco-Ital Ian animosity
gave way to the rapprochement of recent years.
from various sources:

The tension derived

history, temperament, irredentism, rivalry

for Albanian influence, commercial competition, disagreement over
an

ultimr~e

Balkans settlement.

55
QQ.E2, II, Annex.

58

The antagonism was intensified

f

571bld., I, No. 176.

58see W. C. Askew's "The Austro•ltallan Antagonism," in
Power, Public Opinion and Diplomacy, ed. by Lillian Parker Wallace
TDurham, 1959), pp. 172-227.
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by

strained relations between the ruling families of the two coun-

tries, lc:rgely the result of Emperor Franz Joseph's failure to return King Humbert's visit to Austria-Hungary in 1881.

Here again

the complexity of the still broader international framework was a
major factor.

It had been primarily papal opposition that prevented

the Emperor from journeying to Rome.
In a discussion of the papacy with Barrere In 1901, Prinettl
acknowledged the existence of suspicions still directed against
Frence as a supposed advocate of the re-establishment of papal temporal power.

Prinettl himself felt such allegations could no longer

be taken seriously and should be directed more realistically towards Austria-Hungary.

Franz Joseph was seventy-four, the Ital Ian

minister remarked, and Archduke Francis Ferdlnand--the heir apparent
and an Intense clerlcal--was not as weak-willed as rumour had lt!59
Nor did Prlnettl conceal his anxiety over the fate of the
Ital ian-Austrlan corrmerclal treaty.

Indications pointed to a re-

newal on terms far less advantageous to Italy.

In a discourse be-

fore the Delegations on May 22, Austrian Foreign Minister Agenor
Goluchowskt had opposed the Idea of subordinating political alliances to considerations of a purely commercial order. 60

It was

precisely In this area, of course, that Barrere repeatedly urged
Delcass~

to exert his

tnflu~nce

and enhance France's position

through a more adroit exploitation of the Italian market. 61
59 DDF 2 ,

I,

No. 31 1 •

61 I b i d • , No • 262 •

60 1old., No. 249, n. 1.
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Prtnettl, as his predecessor Visconti Venosta, was also
aware of changes on the International scene.

The Franco-Russian

alliance was ft rm, he reminded Barrere, and France's relations with
Gennany had undergone profound modification.

"We Ital tans also have

great need of peace, 11 he added, "but that is not Incompatible with
the defense of our own Interests •11 62
It was on this twofold basis that Prlnettl was obviously
proceeding.
Tripoli.

For Italian Interests were unmistakably centered around

In July Prinetti suggested that in order to dissipate any

remaining suspicions regarding France's disinterest in Tripoli, the
Barrere-Vlscontt Venosta letters be made pub1 ic. 63
Barrere•s one reservation to the disclosure was the effect
this step might produce within the Ottoman Empire, although he felt
such difficulties might be surmounted beforehand.

The letter accords

could be presented as a means of relieving Italian apprehensions
over French Intentions In Tripoli, he told

Delcass~.

Viewed under

this aspect they could be regarded as a guarantee for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

However

Delcass~

was 1nltla11y opposed

to the Idea of publication confined to the declaration on Tripoli.
He was certain it would raise the question as well of why there had
been no reciprocal assurances concerning Morocco, and in Delcasse's
mind the moment was still inppportune for any Moroccan disclosures.64
Barrere and Delcasse apparently continued their discussions of
Prinettl's proposal tn Paris, where Barrere was expected towards
the end of August.65
631b 1d., No. 334 •
621bld ., No. 311 •
651bid.
64 1bid., Annotation du Ministre.
0
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However, a crisis In Franco-Ital Ian relations developed
at this time over Franco-Turkish conflict.

On August 26, 1901,

France severed diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire.

Turk-

ish failure to comply with the arrangements subsequently agreed on
to resolve their difficulties led to a French naval demonstration
against the Ottoman Empire and ultimate occupation of Mitylene.66
The Franco-Turkish developments were extremely disturbing to Prinetti,
who discussed his concern with Ambassadors Wedel and Passettl.

Ac-

cording to Wedel, Prlnettl queried him as to what action Germany
would be wl 11 ing to take under Article VI of the Triple Al 1 iance
were France to encroach on Turkish territory.
Minister told Wedel, only two alternatives:

He saw, the Italian
the allies could ques-

tion France In a friendly way as to her objectives, or Italy could
demand compensation.67
Barrere's explanation of the Mitylene occupation apparently
satisfied Prinettl, who decided against taking any impulsive action
in the presence of an only temporary French occupation.

He told

Barrere he had advised the Porte to comply with French demands for
satisfaction and postponed a pending courtesy visit of the Italian
fleet to Constantinople until the Incident was settled.

Neverthe-

less, the Ital Ian minister Informed Barrere, if the occupation was
prolonged to the point of becoming permanent, the French government

66 1bid.

Nos. 464, 474, 490; Camille Barrere, "Lettres a
Delcasst§ 11 ,--p:-748. The problem originated with Delcass6's determination to obtain reparations due French citizens for property damage during the 1895-'96 Armenian Massacres. Delcass4 was also
determined to maintain the French religious protectorate in the
Turkish Empire, threatened by the Porte.

67PEA, XXI, No. 5167 lj6sqJ_.
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should not be surprised if Italy were forced to investigate what
action she might have to take to safeguard her own Mediterranean
Interests!

68

Italian apprehensions were actually augmented by the addi69

tional fear of a French occupation of Ghadames. In the pursuit of
brigands operating in Tunisia, French troops had reportedly penetrated almost to the walls of this town located on Trlpol l's
western border.

In reporting Prlnetti's concern over these mil i-

tary operations,

Barr~re

reminded Delcasse that any entry of

French soldiers to Ghadames,accidental or provisional, would provoke a dangerous reaction In Italy.

To preclude the possibll ity

of any Incident, he asked De1casse to issue explicit and rigid
instructions to the military, placating Prinettl In the Interim
with assurances that France "would hardly destroy with one hand
what she ha d un derwritten with the other.

II

70

,

When Barrere con-

veyed Delcasse's confirmation of France's scrupulous respect for
Tripolitan territory, Prlnettl accepted it with obvious appreciation.
,

Delcasse himself had exhibited a certain annoyance with
Italian apprehensions over Tripoli, finding It "superfluous after
so many declarations to repeat that the most precise and formal
..

instructions have been given to avoid any incursion into Ghadames. 11
Barrere reminded him, however, that a segment of the Italian public
68

2

'

.Q.Qf., I, Nos. 474, 506.
69
tbid., Nos. 465, 473, 474, 490.
7olbid., No. 465.

7 1.1!2..Ls!., No. 474, n. 1.
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was still convinced of Italy's obligation to match any undertaking
attempted by other Powers or face dishonor.

France was considered

most suspect In this regard, some Italians convinced the recent
naval demonstrations had not been undertaken to obtain satisfaction
from the Sultan; rather, France was in reality awaiting an opportune occasion to seize Tripolltania.

Barrere observed that news

of a Franco-Turkish settlement came as a great surprise to these
individuals.

Still he felt the diplomatic crisis Indicated the con-

siderable progress that had been made In Franco-Ital Ian relations
In recent years and was of the opinion that before the rapprocre.ment
a similar situation would have created an explosive situation in
ltaly.7 2
Once his alann over Mitylene and Tripoli had subsided,
Prinetti expressed interest in resuming the discussion of a publication of the Barrere-Vtsconti Venosta accords.

Prlnetti now pro-

posed relating the matter directly to Mitylene, Barrere reported
to Delcasse.

The Italian minister remarked to Barrere that It had

been erroneously reported Italy tried to provoke a countermanlfestatfon of the Triple Alliance In the East.

He asked Barrere tf

Delcasse could not have himself interpolated on that allegation.
Prlnettl went on to suggest that the French minister could then
respond with an assurance of the amlcal relations that existed between the two countries, lncflcatlng the concordance of their views.

Prlnettl, in turn, would have himself Interpolated in the Ital tan
Chamber and conflnn Delcasse's words in the same terms.

To enhance

his bargaining power, Prtnettt reminded Barrere the time was fast

72 1btd., No. 490.
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approaching in which Italy would be engaged in treaty discussions
with her allies.

The publicity on Trii:;.)11 "would to a degree

facilitate what Barrere was seeklng. 11 73
Despite his previous reluctance,

Delcass~

agreed In late

November to permit Prinettl to make the declaration.

The pronounce-

ment was to follow an Ital fan parliamentary debate in which the
Italian minister formally commented on the recent Franco-Turkish
conflict.7 4 On this occasion, as in the past, Barrere resolved the
differences of fonn and content both ministers initially proposed
for the decl~ration.75

The final version read as follows:
Proposed Declaration

France's recent naval demonstration cannot arouse any
susceptibility in Italy nor disturb the mutual confidence which
has become the rule In the relations of the two governments.
This confidence is all the firmer on our part since the Government of the Republ le for some time has taken care to inform us
that the Franco-English convention of March 21, 1899 marked for
France, in relation to the countries and regions adjoining the
eastern frontier of Its African possessions (notably the vllayet
of Tripoli) a limit It does not intend to succeed, adding that
neither does it intend to cut the caravan routes from Tri pol i
into Central Africa. Since then the friendly relations of the
two countries have become such that the two governments have
been able to exchange explanations, as clear as satisfying, on
their interests 1n the Mediterranean Sea. And these explanations have led them to become aware of a perfect concordance
ln their views of wbgt is of a nature to interest their respective situations.7

As arrangements were being finalized, Barrere also impressed on
Delcass~

the necessity of the French minister's own official confir-

mation of Prinetti's statement.

Delcass~

agreed to do this on the

occasion of his next budgetary discussion.77
731bid., No. 504.

74 1bid., No. 508.

751bid., Nos. 508, 510, 514, 541, 542, 549.
761 b i s!_ • , No • 549 .

771btd., No. 514.
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The Prlnetti decl.ert,tion, mi''de on December 14, 1901, pro-

duced nn excellent impression In

ft~ly.

According to

B~rrere 1 s

ac•

count of lt•~l 111-n re~ctlon, even the former Crlsplan papers expressed

satisfaction with the evidence of a new Franco·ttallan relatlonshlp.78
Barrere took

advant~ge

of the annual New Year's reception at the

fnrnese Palace to heighten the effect of the declaration and to lend
French support to Its authentlclty.79

The amb•ssador's address to

the French colony on that occasion confirmed the significance of
the rnpport cre~ted by the Berrere•Vlscontl Venosta letters, noting

the perfect accord that had been
ments as well as the absence of

est~blfshed

between the two govern-

conf1 let over Hedlterraneun

~ny

questions.
Oespl te the favorable press his 11ddress recel ved, Bo rr~re

still considered It essential that Delcass6 confirm Prlnettl's
st•:ttement, and prefer~1bly In the French Chamber.so

In vlew of the

hnportanee that was certnfn to att;ich to the French minister's dis·
cotJrse, he o1so suggested several points he hoped Delcass• would

Incorporate In his remarks.

Among others, he wanted confl rmation

of his own New Year's address In order to dlspel 1 any Impression
the French Ambassador to Italy was not In complete

~gre.-nt

with

hls government on the matter.81

781bad •• Mo. s6s, 11. Mo. 57. In his delivery, Prlnettl
altered the eclaratlon slightly. retaining the Intent of the sta·
t.,.nt although In stronger and more definite phraseology.

79tbld., Nos.

-

s,

19, 26, S7.

801bld., Nos. 19, 28.

81 tbfd., No. 57.
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On January 21, 1902
had been seeking.

Delcass~

made the declaration Barrere

Barrere found it less than satisfactory, however,

and told Delcass4 quite bluntly that in the opinion of the Italian
press clrcumstances had called for a warmer and less reserved appreciation of Franco-Italian rapport.
ests well, he added, if

It would serve French inter-

Delcass~

were to again allude to the declaration in the upcoming Senate budget discussions. 82
Barrere's diplomatic endeavors had been compromised in the

meanwhile by a rather serious faux pas on the part of his superior.
Oelcass~

had accorded the Glornale d 1 1talia 1 s Ugo Ojetti an inter-

view which appeared in Le Temps on January 7, 1902.

The interview

touched on Franco-Italian interests In the Mediterranean, including
France's desire for the maintenance of the status quo.

When Ojettl

made the observation that Italy also supported the status quo for
Albania,

Delcass~

had responded with the remark that France and

Italy could only agree In the Balkans as well.

Alluding to the

sharing of friends, he unwisely added, "What Power better than Russia could understand and cooperate with Ital Ian Interests In the
Balkan pentnsula? 11 83
Reverberations were instantaneous,

Ambassador Reverseaux

reporting that Austrian Foreign Minister Goluchowski found the interview so Incredible he could only conclude it was pure invention. 84
f

Barrere immediately requested authorization to make a fonnal denial
of Delcasse's remarks on Albania, advising the French minister at

831bld., No. 10, n. 1.
84 I b I d • , Nos • 8, 9 , 14 , n • 2 ; 15 •
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the same time that any reference to the subject in the French
Chamber would cause Prinetti grave embarrassment.

However, the

denial Delcasse subsequently Issued was apparently satisfactory to
Pri nett i. 85
At this point the obvious concern of both Barrere and
Prlnettl to make a public declaration of French disinterest In
Tri pol f does raise the question of their specific objectives.

The

motivation underlying Barrere's continuous efforts to secure Del casse's approval for the action appears quite clear:

the French

ambassador hoped in this way to lead Prinetti along a path that
would compel him to harmonize Italy's alliances with her newlyestablished relationship with France.86
Certain ambiguities present themselves, however, in
sideration of Prinetti's objectives.

His

a

con-

recurring admonitions to

Barrere that only a revelation of the Mediterranean accords would
f~cil

itate negotiation of a revised Triple Alliance do not accord

with the evidence contained In the German diplomatic documents. 87
Perennial Ital tan Interest in Tripoli would, of course, have colored
Prlnettf 's thinking.

And Barrere's reports do reveal the enthu-

siasm with which both the Italian and French declarations were received by the Ital Ian press, statesmen and general public. 88 In
this sense the declaration unquestionably consolidated Prtnetti 1 s

'

position in various political circles where he sorely lacked support.89

Yet, objectively, there was no genuine need for publication

85 I b Id., No. 8, 9, 16, 25 •
86 Ibid., Annex .
88ooF 2 , I J No. 565; 11, No. 57.

87Below, pp. 113-15.

891bid.
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of the accord.

In the first place, the Ital Ian government would

never have permitted Prlnettl to launch a Trfpolltan enterprfse.90
Nor can the publication be considered essential as a means of obtaining additional Power support for Ital Ian Mediterranean ambitions.

Diplomatic documents reveal that even before December 14

Prlnettl began divulging the contents of the accord In far more detal 1 than was contained Jn the highly generalized declaration made
before the Ital Ian Chamber.9 1 Furthermore, the pressure Germany
exerted on England to Improve her relations with Italy, in conjunction with the confidential discussions In which Prinetti began to
engage Lord Currie at this time, would appear to have been far more
effective in eliciting the English declaration of disinterest actually obtained In March, 1902.92
Whatever the Ital Ian minister hoped to achieve,

Barr~re's

diplomatic skills were more than adequate In safeguarding his own
objectives from the dangers inherent In Prinett1 1 s dubious tactics.
The developments which led to the conclusion of the Franco-Ital Ian
Neutrality Accord in 1902 reveal the measure of the two diplomats.
90Decleva, Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 159.
- 9l PEA, xx I ~Nos. 5199 l.583~ t 5207 [2s3Zl. 5210 l_284Q] •
5230 [Ss4g-;-5233 l..2849J; so, 1, Nos. 359, 360, 361.
92 PEA, XX, No. 4960 i.2.83.l[ , XX I, No. 5216 1_503..QI ; !Q., I,
Nos. 352, "fil. Included In the "list of sins" German Ambassador
to London Metternich Informed Lord Lansdowne England had committed
against Italy, Lord Salisbury's and British Ambassador Currie's
negligence figured prominently. This position refutes somewhat
the Decleva assumption that Prlnetti's insistence on obtaining a
public statement of the accords derived from his desire to obtain
analogous guarantees from Germany and Great Britain. See Decleva,
Da Adua a SaraJevo, pp. 158-60. See below, p. 113.
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By late December concern over the renewal of the Triple
Allfance had became quite marked, not only In France and Italy but
on the part of Germeny and Austria as well .93

Chancellor von BUiow

drew pub1 tc attention to Germany's Interest In his Refchstag address
on January 8.

Touching on the question of the Trlp11ce and Italy's

role tn the alliance, he Insisted that since the treaty was exclu·
slvely defenslve--the Franco-Ital fan Mediterranean Accord was In
no way contrary to the Triple Alliance.
with his now classic comment:

He emphasized the point

"In a happy marriage the husband

doesn't become overly distraught If his wife has an Innocent waltz
w I th some one e 1se • .,94 Prf vate 1y, Ge nneny was not reg a rd Ing the
mc tter
1

with the same serenity.
Although Visconti Venosta had Indicated France and Italy

were exchanging views with regard to Tripoli In 1900, he had not
Informed Germany of the terms of the actual accord once It was
concluded.95

BUlow, by his own admission. knew only the grandes

1tgnes of the agreement.96 German apprehension mounted when
Prlnettl began to gradually disclose the specific contents of the
Barr~re-Vlscontl

Venosta letters.

Despite an officially benign

attitude, BU1ow considered the agreement extre,,.ly dangerous.97
93ooF2 , 11, Nos. 19, 23. 26, 27.

94.J.lLJ.J!., No. 17.
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In conversation with Barrere during this period, Prlnettl
continued to affirm his intention of adhering to the declarations
he had already given regarding the non-aggressive nature of Italy's
treaty obligations as they pertained to France.9 8 From France's
paint of view It was well

Barr~re

continued to urge Delcass6 to lose

no opportunity of holding the Italian minister to his commltments.99
German Foreign Counsellor Holstein's observation may provide the
most revealing description of the path on which the Italian minister
now set out.

"Italy wants to go In search of booty, 11 Holstein

noted, "and then to make the booty secure and protect it against
anyone--even France--by the canons of the Triple Alllance. 11100
On December 26 Prlnettl Informed German Ambassador Wedel
of his readiness to sacrifice France's friendship to the Triple

Alliance, declaring at the same time he would never sacrifice the
Triple Alliance to the friendship of France! 101

The following week

Wedel reported that Prlnettl had indicated his desire to proceed
to

a

renewal of the Trlpllce as soon as Italy's commercial relations

with her German allies could be satisfactorily regulated.

The

Italian minister confided that he had a completely free hand, having given

Barr~re

no more than a promise the treaty would contain

nothing aggressive against France.

In view of his pacific Inter-

pretation of the treaty's base, Wedel expressed some surpi·ise at
Prinettl's remark.

Prtnettf then went on to say he had only spoken

9 8ooF 2 , 11, No. 99.
991bld., Nos. 28, 99, 133, 143.
lOOPEA, XXI, No. 5219 IJ84~
101 I b Id., No. 521 3

l_2 842\ .
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as he did in order to calm Barrere, whose concern the Italian
minister attributed to a probable knowledge of the military accords.
Although Prinettl himself was unacquainted with the protocols, he
had no Intention of familiarizing himself with them, he explained,
so he could continue declaring he had no knowledge of their contents.

When Wedel then remarked on the superfluousness of the mil-

itary accords in themselves, their application subordinate to the
condi~ion

of a French attack, Prinetti reminded Wedel It was also

true the treaty itself could not be revealed to France!

The Italian

minister then suggested that since he had given Barrere "his word
of honor" the treaty contained nothing aggressive against France,
a preamble might be attached which could be made public and in
which the allies would confirm the purely defensive nature of the
a 11 i ance • 102
It is quite significant, In view of his repeated declarations to France, that Prlnetti himself exhibited no interest in
suppressing Article II of the treaty.

It was Article II of course,

by which an isolated French attack against Germany or Italy sufficed to put the three Triplice allies in action.

Barrere consid-

ered this aspect of the Triple Alliance a sword pointed at France's
heart. 103 However, as BUlow assessed the sltuation--if Article II
were suppressed while Article Ill, pertaining to an attack of
~

several powers against one of the contracting parties, were maintained, Italy would be the loser.
1021bld., No. 5223 [271].
103ooF2 , 11, No. 168.

A guarantee against the isolated

115

aggression, or its threat, by France had far more practical value
to Italy than Germany.104
Germany, of course, had no Intention of playing Prfnettl's
game, and the Ital Ian minister was informed that if Italy undertook any action in Tripoli ft would be in violation of Article IX
of the Tri pl ice treaty whereby she pledged to maintain the status
quo in Tripoli.

Under the circumstances Germany would not recog-

nize the existence of a casus foederls and Italy would find herself
outside the protection of the Triple Alliance. 105
There appears to be little doubt that Barrere•s activities
exercised a decisive influence in shaping the German line that
noticeably hardened In this period.

Barrere figures significantly

in the German diplomatic documents between December, 1901 and
February, 1902.
On December 17 German Foreign Secretary Richthofen made note
of the Influence attributed Barrere by Ital Ian Ambassador Lanza and
British Charg6 d'Affalres Buchanan.106

That same day German Ambas-

sador Wedel was commenting at length on Barrere's tactics in a report to BUlow.

The ambassador's clever manoeuvres to draw France

2nd Italy closely together had been preoccupying the Italian press,
Wedel wrote, and It was said Barrere had assumed his role four years
earlier convinced he would sbon be able to draw Italian policy into
France's current.

Despite this unwarranted optimism, Wedel continued,

104PEA, XX I, No. 5227 j571~ •
105 I b t d • , No . 522 7
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Barrere had not succumbed to discouragement but adopted an attitude of vent, vtdl, vicl and began to court the Italians with
painstaking attention and political affability.
Barr~re's

Wedel considered

termination of the Franco-Italian tariff war to be the

first pillar in the bridge he was erecting to reunite France and
Italy.

And since the visit of the Italian fleet to Toulon, the

German ambassador remarked, France had seized every opportunity to
demon:.>trate consideration and amiability towards Italy.

She sup-

ported her credit, enticed her with more favorable commercial relations, and with the Mediterranean agreement had alleviated much
of the Italian mistrust that originated in Italy's anxiety over
Tripoli. l07
BUlow himself was becoming Increasingly aware of how effectively B2rrere was Influencing Ital Ian foreign pollcy.108

He

wrote Wedel tn early January regarding what he termed "M. Barrere's
campaign to suppress Article II of the Triple Alliance.

This role

of adviser to Prlnetti in the formulation of a new treaty," BUlow
commented, "Is of a nature to Increase our prudence. 11109 Since
BUlow felt Barrere's concern derived less from the possibility of
c: future Franco-German than Franco-Italian confl let, he considered

it imperative to know If and under what circumstances Germany could

count on Italy's support tn case of war.
1071bld., No. 5203 Ll83~ •
5234

l081btd., Nos. 5206 [Sa~, 5209 ~8~, 5227 ~71]1,

Ll71i! ,
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On January 12 BUlow summoned Lanza to a meeting In which
he informed the Italian ambassador that Germany was ready to renew
the Triple Alliance but only on two conditions:

Italy had to de-

clare she had concluded no accords with any other state which, of
their nature, could compromise the defensive efflcocy of the Triple
Alliance; the treaty was to remain unchanged In all aspects relating to Germany.

He could not escape the impression, BUlow added,

that Prinettl was too weak and trusting with regard to Barrere.110
By the end of February Barrere was being referred to as
"our principal adversary. 111 1 l The chancellor wrote Emperor
William II that in Prlnettt's discussions with Wedel on the all Iance renewal the expression recurred on several occasions, stripped
of any pretense, "Barrere wants this or he doesn't want that."
Acceding to Barrere 1 s wishes, BUlow remarked, \\Ould leave the alliance directed solely, or at least principally against Russia.
And from Barrere 1 s point of view, he added, that would probably
be the best way of convincing the Russians that Germany nourished
the darkest designs against her.112
Prinetti, for hts part, had informed Wedel of his readiness
to proceed to imnedlate renewal of the Trlpltce on January 12.

He

was willing to leave the treaty essentially unchanged, although he
did hope to secure the preamble he had requested, a favorable com'
merclal treaty and some modification with regard to the Balkans. 11 3
l lOlbid., No. 5234 [511 s and 585:Q) •
l l l 1bid., No. 5280 ~1271.
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By January 22 Prinetti had not only abandoned the idea of a
pre2mble, the question of France no longer entered 1nto subsequent
negotiations wtth any stgniftcance.114
Barrere, in the meanwhile, continued to assume ft would be
possible for Prinetti to obtain the treaty revisions he considered
essential for France's security.

His convictions In this regard

had been strengthened by the support he bel teved they were also
accorded by Messrs. Rudtnt, Luzzattl, Zanardelll, Glol ittl and
Sann i no. 115
On March 20, as Barrere had urged, Oelcasse again alluded
to the excellence of Franco-Ital tan rapport tn an address before
the French Senate.

Barrere had been Involved in the preparation of

that portion of the text relating to Franco-Italian rapport and
also insisted an article be Inserted in the Journal de Debats to
provoke comment on Delcasse's declaration by the French press. 116
The address was so well received in Italy, Barrere reported, it put
a campaign in motion to continue the consolidation of future Francoltaltan rapport.117

A few days later Prinetti informed Barrere that at BUlow's
request he planned on meeting the chancellor during the
brief vacation in Venice. 1 1 8

l~tter's

According to Wedel it was actually

1141bid., Nos. 5248 l5720J, 5283 /_572~, 5312 1_?73qi,
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Prlnettl who had requested the meeting. 11 9
he

Barrere replied th2t

thought such an encounter was not only indicated but necessary,

since ft would require Prlnettl to examine the new conditions
underlying Italy's ties with Germany.

He would say no more, Bar-

rere added, since he regarded Italy as a friend with whom It was
no longer necessary to take precautions.

At that Prlnettl again

reassured Barrere of his fidelity to the declarations he had previously extended.

There was no agreement between him and BUlow,

the Italian minister stated, and he would "sign nothing tn the
future that France could consider contrary to the bonds of friendship uniting
rfty.11120

us

or as a direct or Indirect threat to her secu-

Although Prlnettl now Indicated It would probably not

be possible to modify the actual text of the Trlpllce treaty, he
told Barrere thClt "what she has the right to preoccupy herself
with and consider hostile Is not in the treaty but tn the acts that
a re annexed to 1t.

These must fa 11 and d 1sappea r • 11 121

In his report of the Prfnettl conversation Barrere Indicated that, In his opinion, the door had been opened for negotiation and an entente.

And as he remarked to Delcasst!, "We at least

119PEA, XXI, No. 5312 l.273~.
120 ooF 2 , 11, No. 168.
121 Ibid., No. 168, ~nnex. Victor Enwnanuel 111 had "been
freed" of the'Obltgatfon of providing Germany with mllttary assistance In the event of war In March, 1901. PEA, XX, No. 4966 ~82~ .
It would appear the King hoped In this way tol>e free to tell
France the Triple Alliance contained no offensive clauses directed against her. By September, 1902, however, Ital Ian Chief of
Staff Saletta spoke with his German colleagues as tho';!9h the military convention was In effect. Ibid., XXI, No. 5426 l_2825].
Ital Ian Foreign Minister Tlttont;-Tn 1908, told the Russian ambassador the military convention had been al}owed to lapse when the
Triple Alliance was renewed In 1902. DDF , XI, No. 560.
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have some th t ng to se 11 . . • st nee I ta 1y accord t ng to the terms of
the Notes [!arrere-Vlscontl Venost~ • • . can try nothing In Tripol I without French consent.122
when

Delcass~

Barrere therefore suggested that

next spoke with Tornlelll he make? point of allud-

ing to Prlnettl's words and indicate that only the execution of the
promises made could assure Franco-Ital Ian relations a long and fecund future. 1 2 3
When Prinettl returned to Rome at the end of March he told
Barrere nothing definitive had been accomplished In Venice, the
conversations centering on the pacific nature of the Triple Alliance and the commercial treaty.

In BUlow's report of the encounter

Prtnettl had asked to discuss the modifications of the treaty he
sought "in an academic manner. 11 124

Prlnetti, on the other hand,

told Austrian Ambassador, Marius Pasettl, he had informed the German chancellor he would refuse any pledges ''of a nature to menace
the tranquil 1 lty and security of France. 1112 5 Barrere's own impression was that the meeting had been indecisive, Prlnettf lacking the
courage to raise the question of modifying the clause France considered objecttonable.126
Despite Prfnettl's repeated misrepresentations to Barrere
of the Tri pl ice's character vis-a-vis France, Barrere still
122ooF2, 11, No. l 6~, Annex.
1231bid., Nos. 168, 180, Annex.
124 PEA, XXI, No. 5326 l27~ ·
125ooF2, No. 1 80) n. 2.
126 I b i d • , Nos • 181 , 19 3 •
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considered modification of the tredty to be lmperative.127 ·He
urged

Delcass~

to remind Tornlelll, on every possible occasion,

that he was most anxious to learn Italy's intent In the matter of
the treaty-renewal • 128 This Delcass~ did on April 24, emphasizing
his concern with a reference to various Berlin and Vienna publications that had begun to affirm the treaty's forthcoming renewal
without modlfication. 129 The admonition proved highly effective.
On April 28 Prlnetti conceded the val ldlty of France's objections
to certain clauses In the Triple Al 1 lance, particularly to that
which had become most disturbing to

Barr~re--provocatlon

a Power not actually declaring it.

Prlnetti told Barrere that

of war by

when the time came for definitive conversations, he would be prepared to leave no doubt on the limits of the obligations binding
Italy.

Barrere thought Prlnettl's remarks might well be the point

of departure for a secret accord and advised

Delcass~

not to mention

the matter to Tornlellt .130
A few days later Prinettl again unequivocally affirmed to
Bsrrere that France was not named in the treaty of the Triple Alliance and that only the annexes were of concern to her.

However

when Barrere again raised the question of Italy's position In a war
against France that had been provoked by one of the Triplice allies,
Prinetti replied that the moment for such discussion had not yet
arrived, although he had every intention of explaining himself to
Barrere and reaching conclusions on this question of provocation.

An actual modification of the treaty text presented lnsunnountable
1271btd., No. 194.

ll81btd., No. 209.

129.1 bid., No. 218.

l30lbld., No. 224.
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difficulties, the Italian minister continued.

Among other interests

to be safeguarded, Italy's commercial needs and her relationship
with Austria precluded her leaving the Triple Allicince.

Neverthe-

less, he anticipated being able to provide solutions which would
completely satisfy France and be compatible with the most intimate
relations between the two countries.131

Prinetti then admitted the

Triple Allicnce was about to be renewed and suggested he and Barrere
arrange for discussions on the future of Franco-Ital tan relations.
It was his Intent, Barrere informed Delcass6, to request
a protocol defining the rapports and reciprocal pacific Intentions
of the two countries.

This protocol:

would engage them to refrain from attacking each other, of
not participating In any aggression on the part of one or
several Powers against one of the contractants, of not considering as ag2_r"esslve on the part of the contractants the
[Jacuna in text.J manifest provocation, the abandonment of
military protocols and other agreements of the same sort
concerning us and envisaging war with us.
Under this form the protocol would be directed towards England as
wel 1 as Germany.

1.n Barrere's judgment It would provide France

with all she hoped for.132
Barrere also thought the moment opportune for encouraging
Russian attentions to Italy and thus offset Austrian inferences
that Influence In the Balkans was a matter of concern to only
Austria-Hungary and Russta.f He thought as well It would be advantageous to encourage a trip by Victor Enrnanuel Ill to Russia.

The

contact with Emperor Nicholas might counter Germanic Influences on
the young monarch.133
131 Ibid • , No • 225 •

132 I b Id., No. 235.

l331bid.
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Although Prtnettl was now encountering considerable difficulties with Austria-Hungary In the negotiation of the Triplice
renewal, responding to a budgetary interpolation in the Italian
Chamber on Hay 23, he finally affirmed its forthcoming renewal . 1 34
In

a

brief declaration he stated that the treaty was pacific and

defensive in nature, containing no protocol or convention directed
against France which could be considered in opposition to the excellent relations Italy enjoyed with her Latin sister and hoped to develop still further.135
On Hay 24

Barr~re

and Prtnetti completed their draft of a

proposed bilateral declaration which Barrere took to Parts for
discussion with Delcass~.136

Delcass~ then wired Charg6 d 1 Affalres

Legrand In Rome that the declaration was basically acceptable and,
as prearranged, Prinettl could instruct Tornielli to proceed to
transmit it to him formally in Parisl37

However, Tornielli consid-

ered the declaration to be so dangerous he refused to submit it before June 4, delaying communication until Prinetti again directed
him to do so.13 8 On June 4 Torniell i read Delcass~ his handwritten

5336

1341btd., Nos. 222, 225, 262; PEA, XXI, Nos. 5332 l_?7~,

I s14]:---

135Prtnetti read the declaration to the German and Austrian
?mbassadors prior to its delivery. PEA, XXI, No. 5369 LS76]J.
According to French Charge d'Affaires Prinet it was well received
in German papers, although the Gazette de Voss conmented that If
the Italians simply wanted'an innocent waltz they had nothing to say;
if they hoped to serve two masters, they would be creating an indecisive situation in ioternational relations of which they would be
the first victims. DOF2, II, N. 267.
136 ODF2, II, Nos. ~35, 263, 269, Annex. The proposed declaration is reproduced in DOF, II, No. 263 and as Appendix I I I.
1371bid., Nos. 269, 271, Annex.
1381btd., Nos. 277, 278, 293, Annex.

Legrand attributed
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copy of the declaration, which the French minister personally
copied and retalned.139
Barrere then returned to Rome and resumed negotiation of
the formal Neutrality Accord that was to follow the presentation
of the declaration.

Before a final text was agreed on, the preli-

minary draft was subjected to a number of revisions.

Direction

Pollttque had objected to a limited duration of time In the document-five years for example-·on the grounds that It would pennlt Italy
to become France's African neighbor regardless of the political relations existing between the two countries at the time of expiration.

They therefore suggested the same duration apply as was ac-

corded under the earlier Mediterranean arrangements.

Slnee Delcass6

feared Italy would object to this change and compromise the negotiations, Direction Polltlque proposed Instead an addition to the
last paragraph.

The statement "confonnlng to the spt rlt of the

letter addressed by H. Barrere In the Visconti Venosta Ministry
December 14, 1900, 11 was to be added after the words "which has a
definitive character."

Such a change would Indicate French conces-

sions with regard to Tripoli were accorded because of the friendly
relations that had been established between France and Italy.

Del-

cass6 subscribed to this view, and asked Barrere to have It Incorporated In the final draft, along with the stipulation that the duration of the accord be at least equal to that of the Trlpllce.140
Tornlelll's resistance to his lack of belief tn France's basic sincerity. Barrere traced the hostility to the ambassador's conviction
that France "was sworn to Imminent revolution." He warned Delcass.!,
as he had In the past, to be on his guard with Tornlelll.
l391bld., No. 277.
1401bld., Nos. 291, 292.
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Delcasse also Insisted on coupling the term

11

honor 11 with "'security"

in the paragraph relating to a declaration of war.

He suggested

another change In wording as well to avoid creating the impression
that prior communication of Intent was given In order to "permit"
the other contractant to assume a judgment of legitimate defense. 141
Prlnettl was willing to accept France's formula on provocation but did insist on giving the declarations the form of a letter
exchange as had been the case with the Mediterranean Accord.

He

told Barrere the King was extremely anxious to avoid any appearance
of having negotiated a counter-treaty.1 42 Barrere acceded to this
request, Insisting, In turn, that the signatures be exchanged before the end of the month; Prlnettl and Victor Emmanuel had both
exhibited a reluctance to simultaneously sign the declaration and
Triple Alliance renewal .143

It was also agreed that Italy would

take the initiative in the letter exchange.

Prinettl, In the name

of the Ital tan government, would Incorporate the declarations In
a letter to

Barr~re.

Its counterpart would be Barrere's letter to

Prtnettl, reproducing the same declaration.144

Oelcasse consented

to the concession on form In exchange for signature of the accord
prior to the end of month.145
Since the accord was to remain in force as long as Italy's
actual International agreements were not modified, Delcasse con-

'

stdered it essential that the accord stipulate France was to be
141 lbtd., No. 291 •
l431bid., Annex.
1451btd., No. 305.

142 1bid., No. 300.
144 1btd., No. 303.
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informed of any modification tn Italy's alliances.

He also wished
further clartflcatton of the phrase relating to provocatlon.1 4 6
Barrere hed foreseen this latter objection and already discussed It
with Prlnettl.

Prlnettl's understanding of provocation, Barrere re-

ported to Delcass6, was that It had to result from direct relations
between the provoked and provoker, such as were Involved tn Fashoda,
the publication of the Ems Dispatch, King William's refusal to receive Benedetti, and the Schnaebe16 Incident.
candidacy, on the other hand, was not.

The Hohenzollern

Since Prlnettl had promised

to send Barrere a letter expressing his full interpretation of the
term, Barrere felt Delcass6's desires in the matter were fully met. 14 7
The Barrere-Prtnettl letters, which were essentially a
neutrality accord, were signed on June 30, 1902, two days after the
renewal of the Triple All iance.148

Barrere's concern in pressing

for the early conclusion was based on his fear of German intervention.

He wrote Delcass6 that he had been under very close observa-

tion and, although unable to divine the truth, German suspicions
were obviously aroused and considerable pressure exerted on Prinetti .149

The observation was accurate.

Wedel, for Instance, had

been Instructed by BUlow to act on Prlnettl and set the tone of the
Ital tan press.

11

0ur gracious Sovereign will be following the mani-

festation of the principal organs of this press with extreme In-

I

terest, 11 the chancellor noted In his dispatch to the Rome ambassador.1sli
1461btd., Nos. 311, 312.

14 71btd., No. 312.

1481bld., Nos. 311, 313.

149tbld., No. 316.

150PEA, XXI, No. 5396 ~7741.
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BUlow had instructed Ambassador Lanza, in turn, to warn Prinetti
to be on guard against France, whose "good conduct marked hidden
motives. 11 151
The Barrere-Prfnettl letters deliberately opened with a
reference to the reciprocal Franco-Italian positions In Morocco
and Tri pol I • 152 As Barrere commented, it was not without reason
Italy associated this question with her interpretation of the Triple
All lance.

She hoped tn that way to justify her Interpretation of

the Trlpl ice, signifying the Importance she attached to a regulation of French and Ital tan Interests in the Mediterranean.

It was

a vital emphasis In her subsequent guarantees to France In the eventual lty of a Franco-German confllct.153
On July 11, Prlnetti responded to

Barr~re•s

written request

for a more precise Interpretation of Italy's understanding of the
term "direct provocation" employed In the declaratlons.154

The

letter confirmed the verbal Interpretation Prlnettl had previously
conveyed.·
Delcass~

took advantage of a Chamber interpolation on July 3

to again allude to the excellent rapport existing between France
and Italy.

Referring to a certain concern France had experienced

151 DD F2 , I I , No • 31 6 •
~

152 1bld., No. 329. The Barrere-Prfnetti letters are reproduced In Appendix IV. On their dating, see below, p. 151, n. 4.
153 I b f d • , Annex •
1541btd., Nos. 329 340. These letters are reproduced fn
Appendix IV---wfth the Barr~re-Prinett1 letters.
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when announcement was made of the Trlpllce renewal, the foreign
minister remarked that the preoccupation had not been of long duration:
• • . the Government of the King having taken care itself
to clarify and settle the situation. And the declarations
which have been given us have permitted us to acquire the
certitude that the policy of Italy, in consequence of its
al 1 lances, ts directed neither directly nor ind I rectly
against France; that It could tn no Instance be construed
as a menace to us, either under a diplomatic form or through
protocols or under International military stipulations; and
that in no event, or under any form, can Italy become either
the lnstf~~nt or the ally to any aggression against our
country.
Barrere reported that the declaration met with great success In
ltaly. 156 Even Tornlelll conveyed Prinettl's fonnal appreclatlon.157
However, Tornlellt was also responsible for what

Barr~re

regarded as the one Jarring Incident surrounding the achievement
of the 1902 accord.

Marcel Hutln published an interview In the

July 13 Echo de Paris entitled "Le Roi d' Ital le et la Tripllce. 11
In this Interview with Tornlelll, the ambassador--whose Identity
was unquestionable although not speclfied--stated that the Triple
Alliance had been renewed unchanged.

Hutin drew the Inevitable

conclusion that there could be no doubt at all If France were to
declare war on Germany, Italy would march against her. 15 8

Prfnettl

attempted to excuse Torniellf on the grounds the ambassador had
been misunderstood or misquoted.

He also justified the indiscretion

on the bas ls of Torn t e 11 i 's' i gno ranee of deve 1opments which had
taken place between France and Italy In recent months.

However the

l55lbid., No. 324, n. l.

1561bid., Nos. 320, 326.

l571bld., No. 324.

15 8 f b id • , No • 332 , n • l .
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Quai d'Orsay considered It highly Improbable Tornlelll was uninfonned~ 159

Despite his dim view of the Echo interview, Barrere was
well satisfied with the 1902 accord.

Prior to its negotiation, he

observed, an access of jealousy or bad humour sufficed to dispose
lt2ly to listen to the suggestions of

Fr~nce's

adversaries and to

interpret or modify her alliances In a sense dangerous to Frcnce.
He felt the Neutrality Accord made that impossible.

Italy's obliga-

tion to notify France of any modification of the Triple Alliance
would appear to make It difficult for her to modify it to France's
detriment.

The accord also supposed, by its wording, that France

was familiar with at least that part of the Tripllce concerning
France.

Italy, in avowing It, would automatically be suspect of

having divulged the tenns of the Triple Alliance.

Barrere consi-

dered, further, that the Italian government would have to look twice
before placing herself in a situation where she would alienate
France's friendship.

To do so would place her under the dominance

of her allies, without France for counterweight, and under conditions worse than they had previously been since Italy no longer
found powerful support from England. 160 It was also Barrere•s
159tbld., No. 349. Visconti Venosta had also Inferred
Tornielli wB"SU"naware of the transaction of the 1900 Mediterranean
accords. Serra's research ln the Visconti Venosta archives prove
this was not the case. C. ffarrere e l'lntesa, p. 134.
160ooF2 , 11, Annex. Italy did receive assurance of British
dlslnterest--rn Tripoli on March 2, 1902. However, Lord Lansdowne
refused to give Prinettt the type of declaration he initially requested, limiting English assurances to 11 • • • no aggresstve_or
ambitious designs • • • maintenance of the status quo . • . ~uch,
if altered to b~ in confonnity with Italian Interests • . . 11
The statement gives no indication of renewed Anglo-Italian rapport,

1 30

conviction that the declarations on Morocco and Tripoli

lo~t

none

of their interest for France as long as she had not definitively
established her dominion over the Cherlfien territory.l6l
Barrere summed up the accomplishments of the accords in a
letter to Delcasse.

In his view they left France ready to attend

to the defense of her national interests in full security and safe
from all men0ce.

She was freed from all possible coalition against

her in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, maktng It possible for her
to develop her legitimate influence in Morocco.
the security of her alpine border.

She was also assured

And in no way to be underesti-

m2ted, he ?dded, there was the psychologic2l lift the new relationship with Italy afforded.

"Yesterdciy, 11 he wrote, "we were con-

demned to Impotence; today we ccn s pe?k and act." l 62
Italy was also content.

Under the terms of the Barrere-

Prinetti letters, prior French initiative in Morocco was no longer
a prerequisite for her own action in Tri pol I.

The accord secured

her more irrmediate benefits as well.
Italy had long sought the entry of her bonds on the Paris
Bourse.

Prior to the signature of the 1902 accord, Barrere h;:1d

2dvised their admission only when Franco-lt2lian pol itlcal relations
comparable to that existing prior to the 1890 1 s. It would appear,
in f?ct, thnt Britain's ~ssurance of disinterest was l~rgely the
result of Prinetti's disclosure of the Barrere-Visconti Venosta
letters of 1900. BO, I, Nos. 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358,
359, 360. For a dTtfering interpretation see Andrew, Th6ophile
Delcasse and the Entente Cordiale, pp. 188-89.

161 ooF 2 , II, Annex.
162camille Barrere,

11

Lettres

a Oelcasse

11

,

p. 753.
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h0d

been definitively concluded.

~hen

Prlnetti had bro?ched this

question on June 26, Bc-irrere informed him there would be no difficulty in the m2tter cfter the decler?tions under negotiation
were signed.

July 1, 1902 Barrere flCcordingly requested announce-

ment to be made that Ital Ian bonds were being admitted to the Paris
Bourse.

Significantly, he wished the announcement to be made through

the Rome

Emb~ssy,

not through

Ant>~ssodor

Tornfellt.

In November

Prlnettt and Ital Ian Treasury Minister di Brogl lo then requested
odmltt~nce
r~re

of new 3 1/2 per cent bonds to the Bourse as well.

Ber·

repl led that the French FlnAnce Ministry would grant authori-

2atlon provided none were entered before the beginning months of
the coming year.

In this way Barrere adhered to the principles he

had previously enunciated to De1cass6:
became~

Italy envisaged with France
prochement

the financial operations

reAllty once a po11tlce1 r?p-

had been effected between the two count des. 163

With the conclusion of the Neutral tty Accord
re2llzed the objective he set out to uccompltsh,
described so prophetlc<"lly to

Delcess~

~s

~1\

had

which he had

in December, 1900.

ye?r and one-h?lf I will h2ve ?ccompltshed here
to me

~nd

B~rrere

th~t

"In.,
rem~tns

Important bust ness, 11 he wrote nfte r the Medi te rraneen Ac-

cord had been concluded.

0

There remflln now only the all t.?nces ."

Eighteen months later he

h~d

lndeed'~xtrlcrted

the t'lllurtng work of great atplomacy It

Ci'n

from hts post all

provlde. 11 164

163Q!>_[2, II, No. 483.
l64 Barrere

n Delcass~,

December 30, 1900, AAE, PB, V.
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CHAPTER V
'
BARRERE
AND THE

FRANCO-ITALIAN RAPPROCHEMENT
When Camille Barrere assumed responsibility as French
Ambassador to Rome In February, 1898 the long-standing antagonism
between the two nations had yet to be resolved.

Although a d6tente

had been reached after Italy's Adowa disaster In 1896, FrancoItal Ian relations remained extremely tenuous. 1 The efforts of
H~notaux

and Billot to terminate the troublesome tariff war had

not been fruitful.

Yet In less than nine months of diplomatic en-

deavor, Barrere succeeded In concluding a conmerclal treaty tn
November, 1898.

He regarded the resumption of conmerctal relations,

however, as no more than a preliminary In effecting an over-all
Frrinco-ltallan reconcll latlon.

In Barrere 1 s estimation the essen-

tial first step towards the attainment of this ultimate objective
lay In the development of mutual Franco-Italian Interests.

He en-

visioned such cooperation as the requisite means of eliminating
sources of friction between the two countrles. 2
The rapprochement rtself was actually accomplished during
the course of Barrere's first four years In Rome, culminating In
the Neutrality Accord of 1902.
1Georges

Its achievement may be considered

Oethan, "Le rapprochement franco-italien, 1896-

1900,11 Revue d'Histol re dfplomatlgue, LXX ( 1956), 323-29.

2ooF2, 1, No. 11 8.

r
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lvrgely due Barrere's efforts and the diplomacy he exercised so
skillfully between 1898 and 1902.

This acknowledgement was ex-

pressed by a number of Barrere 1 s contemporaries, among whom the
Cambons, Charles-Roux, Combarieu, Luzzatti and Dllke figure promtnently.3

Modern historians recently engaged In studying this

area also tend to regard Barrere's role during this period of
Franco-Ital Ian rapprochement to have been lndispensable.4

There

are differing interpretations of course as to precisely where
credit should be laid for the achievement.

Langer, for example,

regards the work of rapproche'llent to be largely due Hanotaux and
Blllot. 5 Yet his interpretation, based so extensively on Bil lot's
writings, is open to question.

More recently Thomas I lams has also

credited Hanotaux with the Franco-Ital Ian rapprocrement, although
Iiams' study Is limited to the period 1894-98 and does not attempt
a comparative evaluation of Hanotaux's achievement In the specific

area of Franco-Ital Ian relations.6
In any attempt at assessing the roles of the individuals
involved tn the Franco-Ital Ian rapprochement, there can be no
3pau1 Cambon, Correspondance: 1870-1924 (Parts, 1940-46),
Ill, 369; Jules Cambon, The Diplomatist, trans. by C. T. Turner
(London, 1931), pp. 67-68; Charles-Roux, Trots ambassades a la veil le
de la guerre, p. 122; A.Combarieu Sept ans ~ l 1Elys~e avec le
Pr~sldent Emile Loubet: 1899-190~ (Parts, 1932), p. 122; Luzzattt,
~, I, 75-77.
See Charles-Roux "L'oeuvre dlplomatlque de Camille
Barrere, 11 Revue des Deux Mondes, 14, LXlll (1941), 176 for the Dtlke
letter regarding Barr~re. "
4The works of Serra and Decleva are among the most recent
studying this period of Franco-Italian relations.
5Langer, The Diplomacy of lmperfalfsm, II, 205.
6Thomas M. Iiams, Dreyfus, Diplomatists and the Dual Al-

l I a nee (Parts, 1962) , pp. 105 -15, 149-52 •

134

question of Gambettz 1 s influence in shaping the fundamental attitudes of his young proteges on La

R~publlque

francalse:

the men

who would fonnulate French foreign policy during the 1890's.
Gambetta's Influence was an indirect one.

Yet

The Triple Alliance,

major source of French antipathy towards Italy, was not concluded
until the year of Gambetta 1 s death.

Moreover, Gambetta's work it··

self was characterized by a highly personalized quality and contained a minimum of doctrine and Ideology.
rather than theoretical policies.

It dealt with actual

It is certainly true that the

spirit of revanche, and basic attitude towards Germany on which an
alliance with England was predicated, are concepts which

Delcass~,

Hanotaux, Barrere and Paul Cambon absorbed during the years of their
association with Gambetta.

Delcass~

himself acknowledged the idea

of a political accord wlth England to be Gambetta 1 s legacy.7
Freycinet also related Gambetta's vision of an alliance between
France, Russia and England.

According to Freyclnet, Gambetta had

spoken to the Prince of Wales In 1880 of a Franco-Russian accord
which could serve as a guarantee against German aggression.a
Not surprisingly then Paul Cambon could write his son in
1904 that "the day a satisfactory entente can be establ I shed beween France, Russia and England, with Italy as an eventual support,
we 1 11 be In a post ti on to ta 1k wI th Germany. 11 9

Cambon had grasped

the Implications of Gambetta's ideas much earlier, however.
7Above 1 p • 43 .
8s. Lee, King Edward VII (London, 1925), I, 452.
9pau1 Cambon, Correspondance:

1870-1924, I, 332-33.

In
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1889 he wrote in a personal letter to Eugene Spuller:
I consider the reconciliation of France and Italy, and
later an entente of these two powers with England as the
obvious goal of French policy--embroilment with Italy
would put a sword in our back the day of the duel with
Germany, it would alienate us with England whom she
considers our counterbalance In the Mediterranean. Accomodation with Italy is equality of forces with Gennany
and England's good will .lu

The same Cambon wrote Barrere in 1919 of the "rapprochement with

I ta 1y that ts your work." 11
Cambon•s theme in 1889 was that which had appeared in
B;:rrere•s writings fully a decade before his appointment to Rome.
The Triple Alliance was a threat to France!

Since the weak spot

in the alliance was Italy, it was essential she be detached from
the menacing coalltion.1 2

Nor as a young diplomat had Barrere

underestimated the difficulties inherent in that task.

He realized

that any Franco-Italian reconciliation would only be achieved after
a long period of preliminary d~tentel3

In a sense, then, If only as a result of the Influence he
exerted on the future architects of French foreign policy, Gambetta's
mark Is apparent on the Franco-Italian rapprochement.

The influence

was indirect, however, and It would be inaccurate to attribute the
specific Idea of a Franco-Ital tan alliance to the ardent republican of the t370's.
A more difficult assessment to make Is the significance of
Hanotaux's role In effecting the rapprocrement.

While It Is true

10 1btd.

l l I b i d • , I I I , 369 •

12ooF1, x, No. 68.

l31bld., No. 486.
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a detente was reached during Hanotaux's ministry, it remained

merely a detente.

There are strong arguments for attributing the

failure of this preliminary thaw to reach fruition to the policies
adopted by Hanotaux and his Rome ambassador, Albert Billot.
Hanotaux gave little indication of Interest in gaining
Italy's good will when negotiating the Tunisian treaty in 1896.
He was adamant in the demands he made of Italy, refusing Visconti
Venosta 1 s requests to prorogue the ltalo-Tunlslan treaty or combine commercial negotiations for new ltalo-Tunisian and FrancoItal ian treaties.1 4 Once the treaty was ratified, he adopted a
fundamentally temporizing attitude in response to Italian entreaties to open negotiations for a conmercial accord.15

His one con-

cession was to agree that discussions might be undertaken if they
were carried on with the utmost secrecy.

Only in Hay of 1897, when

Italian apprehensions over French activity in Tripoli were mounting,
did Hanotaux indicate positive interest in arriving at a more satisfactory relationship with Italy.

However, what he then sought

was a statement of reciprocal disinterest in Tripolitanta.16

Vis-

conti Venosta, despite his desire to improve Franco-Italian relations, was reluctant to enter into a secret accord with France that
might be considered contrary to Italy's good faith with her Trtplice
allles.17

Yet Germany's negative response to Visconti Venosta's

approaches eventually led th~ Italian foreign minister to enter
14serra, La guesttone tunlstna, pp. 406-15.

15 DDF,
1 XIII, Nos. 2,
2 19,
8 360.
16serra, C. Barrera e 1 1 Intesa, p. 53.
1700~, II, Nos. 30, 45, 51; Serra, C. Barr~re e l'intesa,
pp. 53-55.
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willingly into negotiation of the accord Hanotaux was seeklng.18
However Hanotaux's insistence on concluding a formal protocol was
to bring the Franco-Italian discussions to a standstill.

Hanotaux

was unwilling to accede to Visconti Venosta's request that the
mutual Franco-Ital tan pledges be framed in a single declaration.19
Although the separate discussions relating to a commercial
accord were continued, various concessions France demanded of
Italy eventually resulted in another stalemate that was not resolved until December, 1897. 20 Here again Hanotaux proved somewhat lntranstgeant.

Regarding the responsibility for the original

economic rupture In 1886 to be Italy's, he considered France's demands moderate and any further negotiation Impractical tf Italy
was unwilling to recognize them as such. 2 1 The Impasse was only
bridged with Luzzattl's formal notlftcatlon of Italy's desire to
continue negotiating specific points of disagreement.

It appears

highly significant that shortly after the resumption of commercial
discussions, announcement was made of Barrere's nomination as
French Ambassador to Rome. 22
Barrere's predecessor, Albert Billot, has also been credited with the essential achievement of Franco-Ital fan rapprochem~nt.23
18ser_r_a, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, pp. 59-60; PEA, XIV,
No. 3529 j3292_1 •
,
19serra, c. Barrere e 1 'Intesa, pp. 55-56.
20 DoF 1 , XIII, No. 151; Billot, La France et l'ltalle, II,
412-14.
21 Bl11ot, La France et 1' ltalie, II, 420; Luzzattl, Opere, 526.
22rhe announcement was made on December 24, 1897.
2 3see Emory's "The Mission of Albert Billot" for a syn pathetic
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Yet there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Billot, to the
contrary, bears much of the responsibility for Its delay.
Bil lot's personal rapport with his diplomatic colleagues
apparently left a great deal to be desired.

TOl111laso Tittoni wrote

of ht s ambassado rsh t p as "most unfortunate in tone and resu 1ts •11
He found Billot haughty and arrogant and believed he exercised a
negative influence In Rome, both personally and as a result of his
own rapport with the Qual d'Orsay. 24

According to Serra, a good

deal of Bil lot's unpopularity stemmed from his attempts to pressure the king and Rudlni for the text of the Triple Alliance. 25
Serra also relates that rumours circulated as well that Billot had
fomented the French newspaper campaign against Crlspl and ltaly. 2 6
While these considerations remain highly subjective, there is certainly some question as to Hanotaux's own satisfaction with his
ambassador.

Visconti Venosta had knowledge of Bil lot's proposed

substitution as early as January of 1897; Tornielli heard Hanotaux
first refer to Barrere In March. 2 7 Yet Billot officially submitted
his resignation for reasons of health in December, 1897--flrst
broaching the subject with Hvnotaux that surrvner. 2 8
interpretation of Billot and his role in the Franco-Italian rapprochanent. Dethan also treats Bil lot favorably, although acknowledging Barrere's larger role in the over-all rapprochement.
"Le rapprochement franco-ltalten, 1896-1900", pp. 223-29.
24r. Tlttoni, "Vis fte ad ambasciatori," Nuova Antalogia, 4,
CVlll (1903}, 147.
25serra, La guestione tunlstna, p. 133.
26serra, C. Barr~re e 1 1 Intesa, p. 62.
2 7tbld •.

28 Emory, "The Mission of Albert Billot," p. 220.
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In assessing Bil lot's diplomatic activities it becomes
immediately apparent that his fundamental approach towards achieving a Franco-Italian rapprochement differed radically from that
of his successor.

Barrere, of course, regarded the resumption of

economic rapport as the keystone to reconciliation.

He was con-

vinced Italian animosity towards France could be overcome If no
opportunity was lost that might lead to more satisfactory economic
arrangements.

In Barrera's estimation the attainment of political

objectives in Italy would only be possible when an improved economic relationship had been established.

Luzzattl attested to the

wisdom of this approach whereby Barrere demonstrated France's "sincerity and friendship without questioning Italy on the matter of
her all iances. 112 9

Bil lot's preoccupation with Italy's political

alliances, however, appears to have impeded the successful conclusion of the conmercial accord he professedly sought.

Once the

Tunisian treaty had been ratified and Italy pressed for the conclusion of a commercial treaty, Billot repeatedly temporized.

He

was suspicious of Italy's actual motivation in seeking an entente
and expressed reservations about reaching complete economic agreement unless significant advantages for France were involved.30
Barrere was also aware of the leverage to be gained through an
adroit

h~ndling

of financial considerations.

Yet he was acutely

aware, as he constantly reminded the Quai d 1 0rsay, that any rap~

prochement would be secured only when Italy believed it was in her
29Luzzatti, Opere, II, 526.
30Billot himself wrote In January, 1899: 11 lf we were unable
to detach the Italians from the Triple Alliance, we could at least
create opposing interests and, In a certain measure, paralyze their
actlon. 11 Emory, "The Mission of Albert Billot..,'' pp. 221-30.
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best interests to work towards Its achievement.31

The principle

on which Barrere therefore predicated his activities in Rome was
to create that interest.
Perhaps the differing approaches of the two ambassadors
are revealed most clearly in a remark Billot made to H2notaux In
March, 1897.

In the course of a conve rsat I on with Bi 11 ot, Luzzatt l

had discussed hts intention of formally requesting reactivation
of negotiations for a COITl'nercial accord.

He asked Billot to

~ct

as an intermediary, hoping to assure a favorable reception to his
overtures.

11

1 did not accept the engagement of becoming advocate

in the cause the Italian minister pleaded so warmly," Bl 1lot wrote
Hanotaux.

"All I promised was to prepare you to expect it • • •

and conscientiously report the arguments that are believed here to
lend It support. 11 32
Bil lot's rather negative approach ts also apparent in his
attitude towards the Italian statesmen with whom he was in constant contact.

He never appeared entirely sympathetic, for lnstvnce,

to Luzzattt and his aims.

At one point, in 1896, he wrote Hanotaux

that he was certain Luzzatti's concern for haste In opening commercial discussions was rather suspect.

He suggested Luzzatti's

impatience was due the minister's desire to place a financial program before the Italian

According to Billot, that would

pa~liament.

permit Luzzatti to indicate the

me~ns

he planned on using to resolve

Italy's budgetary problems and reestablish its finances on a solid
basls.33

Billot seemed to ignore the fact that this motivation
31ooF1' XIV, No. 253.

32 I b i d • , X I I I , No • 151 •

33stllot, La France et l'ltalie, II, 18.
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was not at all Incompatible with the reestablishment of commercial
peace between the two countries.

Unlike Billot, Barrere tended

to regard Luzzattl's eagerness as an asset.

His reports to Hano-

taux stress the positive aspects of the former Ital Ian minister's
outlook; the transaction of a commercial accord, after all, constituting the "fl rst act of a new era In Franco-Ital fan relations,
the certitude of renewing financial relations with the Paris market that were necessary to free her from the tutelage of others •11 34
A further Incident reinforces the Impression that, far
from having effected the Franco-Ital Ian rapproachment, Billot was
actually Ill-suited for his role In Italy during this critical
period In Franco-Ital Ian relations.

In the January, 1899 Issue of

Revue des Oeux Mandes, Billot published an article which clearly
exposed the efforts of the French Embassy to detach Italy from the
Triple All lance.

In a dispatch to the British Foreign Office at

the time, Ambassador Currie described the piece as "singularly
indiscreet," noting as well that

Barr~re's

success In concluding

the commercial treaty had quite obviously excited the jealousy of
his predecessor.35

Jeopardizing important diplomatic activity

that has just begun to evidence success Implies, at best, a lack
of the fundamental tact essential In one engaged In the delicate
work of reconciliation.
Delcass~'s

signal success In achieving the Triple Entente

Inevitably raises the question of his role In the earlier FrancoItal fan rapprocl-ement.

There ts little documentary evidence of

34ooFl, XIV, No. 120

35eo, 1, No. 347.
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the French foreign minister's initial attitude towards the Ital tan
rapprochement as such.

However, as Barrere, Delcasse shared in the

ideas and aspirations Gambetta had inspired.

Barrere himself also

noted that Delcasse arrived at the Quai d'Orsay when relations between France and Italy were strained.

It was essential an entente

of some sort be found in Rome to preclude the poss lb 111 ty of Franco1tali an confltct.36
As foreign minister Delcasse was absorbed In the complexities of France's over-all foreign policy.

Theoretically, at

least, his ambassadors not only represented his views of French
policy in their respective posts they provided him, In turn, with
an Intimate knowledge of affairs In the countries to which they
were assigned.

In this regard Delcasse was singularly fortunate.

The reputation enjoyed by Paul Cambon as French Ambassador to
London has seldom been surpassed.37

Although less known, the di-

plomatic achievements of Barrere are frequently compared with those
of h Is friend and cwnte rpa rt In London. 38
The working relationship that existed between Barrere and
Delcasse has a decided significance for any assessment of their
achievements.

Their rapport was not one ordinarily established

between an ambassador and his superlor.39

Reflecting the Intimacy

36caml11e Barrere, ~'La chute de Delcasse," pp. 604-05.
37see Keith Eubank, Paul Cambon: Master Diplomatist (Nonnan,
Oklahoma, 1960) for a recent evaluation of Cai11bon and his work.
38Not!l, Camille Barrere, pp. 38, 76; G. P. Gooch, Before
the War: Studies In Diplomacy (New York, 1938), I, 126; Andrew,
Theophlle Delcasse and the Entente Cordiale, p. 287.
39

sar~re was best man at Delcasse's wedding.

Andrew refers
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of their long-standing friendship, it pennftted Barrere a freedom
of suggestion and criticism that emerges throughout his reports
and letters.

Thus, on the one hand, Barrere might complain it had

been too long since he last received any personal word from his
old friend and rather severely chasttze him, on the other, for
a lack of discretion In his dealings with the Ital tan ambassador
In Parls.40

Barrere himself remarked on the complete liberty of

action Delcass4 accorded him In his diplomatic actlvltles.41
Barrere's work In Rome had begun, of course, before De1cass6 assumed his post at the Quat d'Orsay In May, 1898.

It was

then, In Delcass4's unofficial capacity, that Barrere had first
Introduced his friend to Rudlni and Visconti Venosta.42

The infor-

mal discussions Delcass6 subsequently engaged In with these Ital Ian
men of state were probably a significant element In the development
of his later attitude towards France's Ital tan policy.

While

Barrere and Delcass6 were In baste agreement on the necessity of
effecting a closer Franco-Ital tan relationship, a study of the
Barrere-Delcass6 diplomatic and personal correspondence suggests
that Barrere exercised a decisive Influence on the actual development of

Oelcass~'s

Ital Ian policy.

This In no way casts Delcass6

In a negative role; rather, It demonstrates the great confidence
he placed in the judgment and ability of his ambassador.

'

to Barrere as perhaps Oelcasst1's "closest friend In publ le 1 lfe. 11
Th6ophlle Delcass4 and the Entente Cordlale, p. 10, n. 4.
40 earrere a Delcass4, May 5, 1901, AAE, PB, IV; Cami 1le
Barrere, "Lettres a Delcass6, 11 pp. 725-26.
4 1camllle Barrere, "La chute de Delcass4!, 11 p. 607.
42serra, C. Barrere e 1 'Intesa, p. 73.
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Barrere's ultimate diplomatic objective in Rome was the corrosion of Italy's ties to the Triple Alliance, hoping thereby to
empty the Triplice of Its substance.43

Hts program for accomplish-

tng thls mission was twofold, Its most lrrmediate aspect to be
achieved by eliminating the sources of friction and discord that
existed between France and ltaly.44

The work of realizing this

ambition was facilitated by the conclusion of a Franco-Italian commercial treaty in 1898.

The ambition itself was realized in 1900

with the conclusion of the Mediterranean Accord.

This accord suc-

ceeded In resolving one of the most difficult aspects of FrancoItal Ian relations and opened the path to the conclusion of the
Neutrality Accord of 1902, the accord In which Barrl!re's ultimate
objective for Italy was culminated.

It has been the aim of this

dissertation to establish that these accords of 1900 and 1902, and
the rapprocrement they signify, were achieved principally through
the efforts of Camille Barrere and that in his diplomatic endeavors
he received the active cooperation and support of French Foreign
Minister

Th~ophile

Delcasse.

The ft rst direct steps leading to this end were taken after
the conclusion of the Anglo-French African Convention In 1899. 45
Barrere responded to Italy's angry reaction to the agreement by
urging

Delcass~

to offer Italy a declaration of French disinterest

'

43ooF2, 1, Nos. 118, 185, 201, 235, 238, II, Nos. 76, 99,
218; Jules Cambon, The Diplomatist, pp. 67-68; Charles-Roux, Trots
ambassades francaises ~ la vellle de la guerre, p. 12.
44 DDF 2 , I, No. 118.
45The developments leading to the Mediterranean Accord of
1900 are covered in Chapter II, pp. 32-51.
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in Trlpolttanta.

The foreign minister was Initially unwilling to

accede to this request, preferring to alleviate Italian apprehension by means of a generalized reassurance of France's good intentions.

Yet Delcasse gradually succumbed to Barrere's persuasion,

first promising to grant such a declaration lf Visconti Venosta
were returned to power, and then not only responding to the latter's overtures but grafting onto It his own des I re for a reciprocal Ital Ian declaration on Morocco.46
In the interval spanning these concessions, Barrere Increased his efforts to improve Franco-Italian rapport, cultivating
his own personal relationships within the diplomatic orbit and
taking advantage of the opportunity provided at Cagliari to strengthen the sense of Franco-Italian friendship.

The task was not eased

by Ambassador Tornie111 1 s negative reaction to Delcasse's proposal
or Visconti Venosta's hesitation in the face of probable French
activity in Morocco.
Barrere had Initially disapproved Delcasse's suggestion
of a Moroccan declaration, feeling it injected complications that
could easily jeopardize the conclusion of negotiations on the
more urgent issue of Tripolitania.

Yet when it became apparent an

4 6Andrew suggests that Delcass~'s policy towards Italy
changed at the beginning of the Boer War. At thct time he determined to distinguish th~ international question from the FrancoMoroccan question in Moroccan affairs, settling the fonner with
each power separately in order to possess the freedom to settle
the latter directly with Morocco. He fGlt that Barrere, on the
other hand, was'~reoccupied with the desire to wrest Italy from
German domination." At the same tL\1e, Delcasse was reluctant to
seize the Initiative with Italy on a Morocco-Tripoli agreement
because he wanted to avotd giving any impress ton of French pressure on Italy to sanction French ambitions In Morocco. Theophile
Delcass~ and the Entente Cordtale, pp. 138-41.
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Impasse had been reached, Barrere bridged the gulf threatening to
separate the two nations.

He arranged the settlement of a Red Sea

boundary dispute to lta,y•s satisfaction, urging on Oe1cass4' the
necessity of adopting a conciliatory approach during the course of

He then successfully reopened discussions on the

the negotiations.

Morocco-Tripoli declarations.

By February 10, 1900 he had reached

fundamental accord with Visconti Venosta on their contents.

When

quest Ion next arose as to the form the declarations were to assume,
Barrere argued against Oe1cass6 1 s suggestion of a formal convention,
Delcass~

preferring to embody the statements In letters of exchange.
acquiesced, as he also did with regard to

B~rrare•s

objections to

various qualifications the foreign minister would have

lncorpor~ted

Into the documents.
Barr~re's

most significant Initiative In the negotiations,

however, was exercised In Aprll of 1900.

When Visconti Venosta ex-

pressed a desire to extend the proposals still further and gain
French approbation of an Ital Ian move In Tripoli, Barrere Immedi-

ately establ lshed as a !1ne gua

n~n,

engagement against France fn Europe.

the condition of Italy's non-

Despite Delcess6•s subsequent

willingness to accede to Visconti Venosta's request, Barrere continued to reiterate that France would enter Into the larger

arr;~n

ment only to the extent she received pacific assurances as to the
nature of Italy's treaties with her

Tr1p1f~.

allies.

Visconti

Venosta was not willing to meet this demand, and the BarrereVlscontl Venosta 1etter accords remained confined to the Mediterranean.

Yet Barrere•s decision had been decisive, laying the

groundwork for the negotiation of the subsequent Neutrality Accord
of 1902.

Even on Its

O\.'ln

merits, of course, the Mediterranean

Accord was crucial In the developnent of F(c;inco-ltal Jan rapproachment.

As Barrere wrote Delcasst!, Ital Ian Interests were Mediter-

ranean, and they were centered on Trtpol I.

At the same tlrne. Italy

feared a corresponding Interest on the part of

France~

Because

that Interest was non-exlste-it, Barrere had repeatedly argued In

support of suppressing Italian apprehension In writing.

The day

Italy desired more-·a recognition of her right to expand In Trt-

poll--France would be tn a position to demand the guarantee lta11an
alliances were no longer directed against her.
r~re

In the Interim Bar-

had secured ltaly 1 s recognition of France's right to extend

her Influence tn Morocco.

While France. In turn, dlselalmcad any

Intent of expansion In Tripoli, she did not recognize Italy's right
to expand In Tripoli without her prior consent.

De1cass• himself

appreciated all that had been accomplished with the accords.

As

well as thankl ng Barre re for the skll l he had demonstrated 1n their

negotiation, he acknowledged the value he had come to place on
their essentially conservative character.

That this tone ultimately

prevalled \11as primarily due the insight and persistence of his am-

bassador.
Havtng

achieved his Initial objective In Italy,

Barr~re

Intensified his efforts to attain the far more significant "detachment of Italy's offensive ob1 fgatlons" against France.

This work

was successfully culminated wtth the Neutrality Accords of 1902. 4 7

Here again, Barrere•s Initial approach lay In the active encouragement of French collaboration with Italy.
1
J-

The areas In which he

7The developments leading to the conclusion of the Neu-

tral lty Accord of 1902 are covered In Chapter IV,
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promoted Franco-Ital tan cooperation were diverse, ranging from
railroad projects to capital investment and wine Importation.
Barrere also urged Delcasse to enlist the aid of Russia In developing Franco-Ital Ian ties, attempting to draw Italy and Russia Into

a closer relationship himself by means of his own contacts tn Rome.
While engaging In these activities, Barrere also sought to offset
what he regarded as the deleterious effects of French Journal Ism
on Improved Franco-Italian rapport.
The most significant activity In this period, of course,
was thP.t surrounding the visit of the Ital Ian fleet to Toulon.

cause of the great Importance he attached to the event,

Be-

Bar~re

was In close touch with Oelcass4 on a11 arrangements made for the
festivities surrounding the occasion.
Toulon 1 s signal success inaugurated the drive Barrere then
undertook to bring Italy's treaty commitments into harmony with the
new

Franco-ltallan relationship.

Baste

for this task was an Insistence on

to the program he adopted

Delcass~'s

corroboration and re-

inforcement In Parts of his own activities in Rome.
February of 1901 he advised

Delcass~

Thus, tn

how essential It was for Tor-

niel 1 I to have a clear understanding of France•s Ital tan policy.
Similar requests occurrro repeatedly, the specific points
wished emphasized always

cl~arly

Bsrr~re

defined.

The first Indication of the two-pronged campaign's success
came In June, when Prlnettl assured
aggresstve character.

Barr~re

of the Trlpllce 1 s non-

Using Prlnettl's statement as his opening,

Barrere began stressing French concern over the Incompatibility of
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the Triple All lance with Franco-Italian friendship, particularly
in the matter of provocation.

It led to Prinetti's formal assur-

ance that if renewed, the Triple Alliance would not contain any
causes directed against France.

Delcass~,

In accordance with Bar-

rere's program, then advised Torniell i he formally accepted the
Prinetti declaration made in Rome.
Barrere's attention next turned to Prinetti's request for
publication of the Barrere-Vlsconti Venosta letters.

Delcass~

had

opposed such a move, only consenting to a disclosure of the Mediterranean Agreement after France's occupation of Mttylene.

In the

negotiations that then followed, Barrere resolved the differences
of form and content that

Delcass~

and Prinettl initially proposed

for the declaration Prlnettl subsequently made before the Ital Ian
Senate.
Perhaps at no time was the significance of Barrere 1 s crucial role In effecting the Franco-Italian rapprochement more apparent than during the months following Prlnettl's disclosure of
French disinterest In Tripoli and the renewal of the Triple All lance.

More Is Involved than the acknowledgment of Barrere's In-

fluence In diplomatic circles.

In his efforts to safeguard France

against the offensive aspects of Italy's participation In the Triple Alliance, Barrere operatrd under serious disadvantages.

In

the first Instance, not only did he lack precise knowledge of the
Tri pl Ice's terms as they related to France--he was del ibe:rately
misled by Prinetti as to what those terms were.

Throughout the

spri·ng of 1902, Prinetti continued assuring Barrere that nothing
in the treaty itself could be construed as a direct or indirect
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threat to France's security, affirming that her only concern
should be with "the annexed acts."

Even tn a Senate declaration

of May 23, Prinettl stated unequivocally that the treaty contained
no protocols or conventions directed against France.

Yet an appli-

cation of Article II of the treaty specifically engaged Germany
and Italy against France, and as early as January 12 Prlnettl had
infonned German Ambassador Wedel of his willingness to renew the
treaty essentially

unchanged~

According to Wedel's report to BUlow,

Prlnetti had also abandoned his request for a preamble that would
publicly affirm the alliance's defensive nature by January 22.
was only April 28 that Prlnettl conceded to

Barr~re

It

the validity

I

of France's objections to certain clauses in the treaty.
Barr~re's

Without

perspicacity, as well as the skill he demonstrated in

negotiating with Prlnettt, It would appear highly Improbable the
Neutrality Accord of 1902 could have been concluded.48
Barr~re

It was

who successfully led Prtnettl to the point of desiring to

formally harmonize Franco-ltaltan relations.

It was

Barr~re

who

then seized the opportunity presented by Prlnettt's desire to
4 8As well ~s Barr~re's difficulties in dealing with Prinettl, there remained the additional problem he encountered wtth
Ital tan Ambassador to Paris Tornlellt. Their antagonisms have already been cited. As Direction Polltlque noted after Torntelll's
alleged Interview In l'Echo de Parts, July 13, 1902,
A government that does not have enough confidence in its agent
to keep him Informed of all that concerns its relations with
the country where he i~ accredited, recalls him, no longer permitting him to speak and act In Its behalf. If, however, such
a situation actually exists, it should not be pennitted to
continue. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not
be deprived In this way of a direct means of communication
with the Ital Ian government.
DDF2, II, No. 349, Annotation du Departement.
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request a protocol defining the rapports and pacific Intents of
the two countries.

In the negotiation of the fonnal accord that

ensued, It was again Barrere who assumed the role of intermediary
between the two foreign ministers, winning acceptance of the various revisions demanded or, on his own Initiative, suggesting
others In order to hasten the accord to a conclusion.

This Neu-

tral tty Accord, signed June 30, 1902, put a definitive seal on the
Franco-lta11an rapprochement that began developing with the conclusion of a commercial treaty In 1898. 49 Its achievement was Barre re 1 s accompl Ishment.

In terms of h Is object Ives It demonstrated

considerable success In dlmtntshtng long-standing Franco-Ital Ian
antagonisms and In emptying the Triple Alliance of Its substance
as a political Instrument directed against France.
A total evaluation of Franco-Ital Ian rapprochement as It
evolved between 1898 and 1902 cannot be attempted within the confines of this dissertation; the full significance of Barrere's
achievement ts only revealed In the events of succeeding years.
The more outstanding effects of the work Barrere began In these
49Although signed June 30, 1902, the letters were dated
November 1 and 2, 1902 to comply with the desires of Prtnettf
and Victor Enmanuel Ill. Both objected to signing them at the
time of the Trlplice renewal. As a precaution, however, It was
prearranged that a duplicate set of letters were also signed,
dated July 11 and 12, 1902. These duplicates were then destroyed,
November 2 • 1902. Th ts pos~ed no problem for Barre re. As he remarked, Prlnettl had always affirmed It was essential any FrancoItal Ian accord be In hannony with Italy's alllances--understood
to mean Ital tan alliances as they were renewed, without the military protocols. France had never asked Italy to enter Into an
engagement contradictory to her alliances. In Barr~re's judgment,
"that would have raised an entl re different order of questions,
and what faith could we have had ln a government capable of vlolat1ng the conml tments she had made to others?" Ibid. , Annex,
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years occur in a later period.

They are discernible in the influ-

ence of Franco-Ital Ian rapport on:

the Algeclras Conference of

1905, the ltalo-Turktsh War of 1911 -12 and, ultimately, Italy's
emergence as an ally of France tn 1915.50

Although Paul Cambon

signed the secret Anglo-French-Russian-Italian Convention against
Germany, it was Barrere who negotiated Italy's Inclusion tn the
alliance against the Central Powers.

As his associate Charles-Roux

remarked, "the act was only accomplished because he had sewn and
maintained in the Triple Alliance a germ of dissolution, the principle of its disintegration. 11 51
Perhaps the extent of Barrere's personal role In the
Franco-Italian rapprochement ts most appropriately expressed tn
the tribute accorded him by the Ital Ian statesman-financier Luigi
Luzzatt:I who wrote:
When our illustrious Ambassador Barrere, as far In the
future as possible, retires from public ltfe, I would hope
he might write with me a book of memoirs--ln which we would
recount all that Mephistopheles In the course of thirty
years has attemo~ed to divide France from Italy ••• nor
Is he yet dead~!>
501t was largely through Barrere's efforts that the offices
of Visconti Venosta were secured as Italy's representative at the
Algeciras Conference. There, the Italian statesman decidedly
exercised his influence in France's behalf. On Algeclras and the
ltalo-Turkish war see Laroche, Qutnze ans ~ Rome avec Camille Barrere, pp. 261-66 and Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism:
1]10'-1925, pp. 338-41, 366-81.
5lcharles-Roux, SoLvenirs diplomatigues
52Luzzatti, Opere, I, 75-77.

(Paris, 1958), I, 12.
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APPENDIX I
THE FRANCO-ITALIAN
COMMERCIAL ACCORD:

1898

A

Hts Excellency Count Torntelll, Ital Ian Ambassador to
Parts, to His Excellency H.

Delcass~,

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Parts, November 21, 1898
With the objective of establishing a commercial modus
vivendi between Italy and France, and as a result of negotiations
undertaken for this purpose between H. Luigi Luzzattl, Ital tan
Parliament Deputy, and myself and HM. Bompard, Director In the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Chandeze, Director of Commerce, and G. Bousquet, State Counsellor and General Director of
Customs in October and November, 1898, I have the honor of presenting Your Excellency with the table of tartff reductions on
certain articles for which my Government Intends to seek Italian
Parliamentary approval as well as the modification of certain
regulations which will govirn the application of certain articles
of the tariff.
The Government of the King, noting the declaration which
has been made by the Government of the Republic that, when the
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Ital tan tariff is adjusted according to the conditions indicated
In the aforementioned table the most-favored-nation customs treatment will apply to Italian products in France, with the exception
of silk and silk goods, has authorized me to notify Your Excellency
that

cognlz~nt

of the modification of regulations that will govern

the application of certain articles of the French customs tariff,
it engages, on its side, to propose in exchange to its Parliament
the application of most-favored-nation customs treatment on French
products, with the exception of silk and silk goods.
B

His Excellency H. Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
to His Excellency Count Tornlellt, Italian Ambassador to Parts.
Parts, November 21, 1898
I have the honor of acknowledging receipt of the letter
Your Excellency addressed me today, transmitting the table of reductions and regulations governing the application of certain
articles of the Italian customs tariff that the Royal Government
proposes submitting to Parliamentary approbation or to prescribe
to the customs administration at the same time it requests Parliamentary authorization to apply to French

product~

other than silk

and silk goods, the most-favored-nation customs treatment.
~

In response to this communication, I have the honor of
confirming to Your Excellency that, on its part, the Government
of the Republic will request Parliamentary authorization to apply
to Ital tan products, other than silk and silk goods, the most-

favored-nation customs treatment, at the same time this treatment
wi11 be applied in Italy to French products, after the Italian
tariff has been modified according to the conditions indicated on
the table attached to your letter of today.
Your Excellency will also find attached the modification
of regulations which will be followed by French customs in the
application of certain articles of the tariff and which, you
informed me in your letter of today, you have duly noted.

c
Verbal Note
The Italian Ambassador to Paris to the French Minister
of Foreign Affairs.
The Italian Government agrees that most-favored-nation
treatment will be applied to the products of French colonies, upon
their entry into Italy, and to Ital Ian products upon their entry
into French colonies, with the exception of the colony of Erythema
as regards exportation to, as well as importation from, France.
Paris, November 21, 1898
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APPENDIX II
THE FRANCO-ITALIAN
MEDITERRANEAN ACCORD:

1900

A
His Excellency M. Barrere, French Ambassador to Rome,
to Hts Excellency M. le Marquis Visconti Venosta.
Rome, December 14, 1900
Following the conclusion between France and Great Britain
of the Convention of March 21, 1899 my government, replying to
your honorable predecessor, had the occasion to give to him,
through me, explanations of a nature to dissipate all equivocation on the significance of this instrument.
Since then Your Excellency has expressed the opinion that
these assurances, reiterated in a more explicit manner, would
contribute to strengthening the good relations between our two
countries.
I have been authorited, in consequence, by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, to make known to Your Excellency, because of
the friendly relations which have been established between France
and Italy and with the thought that this explanation will improve
them further, that the Convention of March 21, 1899, In leaving
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the vllayet of Tripoli outside of the partition of Influence
that it sanctions, marks for the French sphere of influence In
relation to Trlpolitania-Cyrenalca a limit that the Government
of the Republic has no intention of surpassing and that It does
not enter Into Its p1ans to Intercept the caravan communications
of Tripoli with the regions envisioned by the aforesaid convention.
These explanations, which we have agreed to keep secret,
will contribute, I have no doubt, to the consolidation on this
point, as on others, of the friendly relations between our two
countries.

B
Hts Excellency M. le Marquis Visconti Venosta, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency M. Barrere, Ambassador of
France.
Rome, December 16, 1900
The current situation In the Mediterranean and the eventual ltles which could occur In that area have formed between us
the object of a friendly exchange of Ideas, our governments being
equally animated by the desire of eliminating, In this regard,
everything which would be

c~pable

of compromising, in the present

and in the future, mutually good understanding.
In that which more particularly concerns Morocco, It has
resulted from our conversations that the action of France has the
objective of exercizlng and of safeguarding the rights which
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result for her from the proxlmlty of her territory with that
Emp f re.
Thus defined, I have recognized that such an action is
not, In our eyes, of a nature to injure the Interests of Italy
as a Mediterranean Power.
It has been equally understood that if a modification
of the political or territorial status of Morocco were to occur,
Italy would reserve to herself, as a measure of reciprocity, the
right eventually to develop her influence in relation to Tripo1 itania-Cyrenaica.
These explanations, which we have agreed to keep secret,
will contribute, I have no doubt, to the consolidation of
friendly relations between our two countries.
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APPENDIX Ill

'

BARRERE-PRINETTI PROPOSED
BILATERAL DECLARATION:

HAY 24, 1902

The undersigned, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the King
and Ambassador of France to Hts Majesty, duly authorized by their
respective governments, have exchanged the following declarations:
In reference to the letters exchanged on December 14 and
16, 1900 between the Marquis Visconti Venosta and M.

Barr~re

re-

garding the reciprocal situation of their two countries In the
Mediterranean basin, and more especially on their respective Interests In Tripoli and Morocco, they consider ft proper to render the
engagements that resulted more precise, In the sense that each of
the two Powers will be able freely to develop Its sphere of influence In the aforementioned regions at the moment It judges opportune, without the action of one of them being necessarily subordinated to that of the other.
The undersigned declare that this interpretation leaves
no divergence between their governments regarding their respective

'

interests in the Mediterranean.

And this declaration has led them

to formulate the following arrangements relative to their general
relations, which the two governments engage to observe.
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The two Powers will not engage themselves against each
other In any direct or Indirect aggression; they will not associate themselves, directly or Indirectly, with any aggression
directed against one of them by one or more Powers and, in case
of aggression, they will observe a strict neutrality towards
each other.
It would be the same If one of the two Powers were constrained to declare war for the defense of Its security.

For the

case to be considered as legitimate defense, they must previously
notify each other.
In order to remain faithful to the spirit of friendship
which has Inspired the present declarations, the undersigned state
that there does not exist on either side and that there will not
be concluded by the two Powers, any protocol or military agreement
of an International contractual nature which would be In conflict
with the present declarations.
It Is understood that, save for the Interpretation of
the Mediterranean Interests of the two Powers, which has a definitive character, the above declarations will be valid for . • •
years and will remain secret.
Hade In two coples,fthe

...
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APPENDIX IV
THE FRANCO-ITALIAN
NEUTRALITY ACCORD:

1902

A

M. Prinettt, Ital tan Minister of Foreign Affairs to
M. Barrere, French Ambassador to Rome.
Rome, Ju 1y · 10, 1902
As a result of the conversations we have had touching the
reciprocal situation of Italy and France in the Mediterranean basin, and touching more especially the respective interests of the
two nations in Trlpolitania-Cyrenaica and Morocco, It appeared
opportune to us to make more precise the engagements which result
from the letters exchanged on this subject between Your Excellency
and the Marquis Visconti Venosta, December 14 and 16, 1900, in
the sense that each of the two Powers will be able freely to develop its sphere of influence f n the aforementioned regions at the
moment it will judge opportune, and without the action of one of
them being necessarily subordinated to that of the other.

It was

explained on this occasion that by the limit of French expansion
fn North Africa, alluded to in the letter cited above of Your
Excellency of December 14, 1900, is understood the frontier of
Trlpolitanfa indicated by the map annexed to the declaration of
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March 21, 1899, additional to the Anglo-French Convention of
June 14, 1898.
We have ascertained that this interpretation leaves actual 1 y no divergence between our two Governments on their respective
interests in the Mediterranean.
On the occasion of these conversations, and in order to
eliminate in a definitive manner all possible misunderstanding
between our two countries, I do not hesitate, In order to make
their general relations more precise, to make spontaneously to
Your Excellency, in the name of the Government of His Majesty the
King, the following declarations:
Should France be the object of a direct or Indirect aggression on the part of one or more Powers, Italy would maintain
a strict neutrality.
It would be the same were France, as the result of a direct
provocation, to find herself compelled, for the defense of her
honor or of her security, to take the initiative of a declaration
of war.

In this eventual lty, the Government of the Republic must

previously communicate Its intention to the Royal Government, enabling the latter to determine that It ts Indeed a case of direct
provocation.
In order to remain faithful to the spirit of friendship
which has Inspired the present declarations, I am authorized, further, to confirm to you that there does not exist on the part of
Italy, and that there will not be concluded by her, any protocol
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or military arrangement of an International contractual order
which would be In conflict with the present declarations.
I have to add that, save for the Interpretation of the
Mediterranean interests of the two Powers, to which a definitive
character has been given, in conformity with the spirit of the
correspondence exchanged December 14 and 16, 1900 between Your
Excellency and the Marquis Visconti Venosta, the declarations
which precede being In harmony with the actual international engagements of Italy, the Royal Government understands that they
will have their full value as long as It has not Informed the
Government of the Re pub 1 t c that these engagements have been
i

mod-

fled.
I would be grateful were Your Excellency to acknowledge

receipt of this corrmuntcatlon, which must remain secret, In the
name of the Government of the Republic.
B

M.

Barr~re,

Ambassador of the French Republic to Rome,

to M. Prtnetti, Ital tan Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Rome, July 10, 1902
In your letter of \Oday, Your Excellency has desired to
remind me that following our conversations with respect to the
reciprocal situation of France and Italy in the Mediterranean
basin, and more especially on the respective Interests of the two
countries in Tripolitania--Cyrenaica and Morocco--it appeared opportune to us to make more precise the engagements which result
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from the letters exchanged on this subject December 14 and 16, 1900
between the Marquis Visconti Venosta and me, tn the sense that each
of the two Powers will be able freely to develop its shere of Influence ln the aforementioned regions at the moment tt will judge
opportune and without the action of one of them being necessarily
subordinated to that of the other.
It was explained on that occasion that by the limit of
French expansion in North Africa, alluded to in my letter cited
above of December 14, 1900, is understood the frontier of Tripol 1tania indicated by the map annexed to the declaration of March 21,
1899, additional to the Anglo-French Convention of June 14, 1898.
This interpretation leaves, as we have stated, no actual
divergence between our two Governments in their respective interests in the Mediterranean, and with the objective of eliminating,
In a definitive manner, all possible misunderstanding between our

two countries, you have been authorized by the Government of His
Majesty to make spontaneously certain declarations Intended to
make more precise the general rapport of Italy

vis-~-vts

France.

have the honor of presenting Your Excellency with these
declarations in the name of my Government.
I am authorized, in return, to formulate In the following
~

manner the conditions by which France understands, on her part,
and In the same friendly spirit, to govern her general rapport
vis-a-vis Italy.
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Should Italy be the object of a direct or indirect aggression on the part of one or more Powers, France would maintain a
strict neutrality.
It would be the same were Italy, as the result of a direct
provocation, to find herself compelled, for the defense of her
honor or of her security, to take the initiative of a declaration
of war.

In this eventuality, the Royal Government must previously

communicate Its intention to the Government of the Republic, enabling the latter to determine that it is indeed a case of direct

provocation.
am authorized to declare to you as well that there does
not exist on the part of France, and that there will be concluded,
no protocol or military arrangement of an international contractual order which would be in conflict with the present declarations.
It

ts

understood, of course, that save for the interpreta-

tion of the Mediterranean interests of the two Powers, to which a
definitive character has been given, In conformity with the spirit
of the correspondence exchanged December 14 and 16, 1900 between
the Marquis Visconti Venosta and me, the preceding declarations,
which are to remain secret, being in harmony with the active international engagements of Italy, will have their full value as long
as the Royal Government hasfnot Informed the Government of the
Republic these engagements have been modified.
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c
H. Barrere, French Ambassador to Rome, to H. Prinetti,
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Rome, July 11, 1902
Regarding the declarations we have exchanged by our letters
of yesterday on the general relations of France and Italy, it seems
necessary to me, to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, to
make more precise the meaning and intent which should be attributed to the word, direct, In the expression, direct provocation.
I would be grateful to receive confirmation of precisely

what, In your opinion, the term signifies.

D

M. Prlnetti, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to
M. Barrere, French Ambassador to Rome.
Rome, July 11, 1902
In your letter of today you have expressed the desire
that, in order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, I
make more precise for you the meaning and intent to be attributed
to the word, direct, in

the~expression,

direct provocation used

in the declarations I made in my letter to you of yesterday.
I hasten to confirm for you In the matter what I have had
the occasion to express to you verbally.

The word, direct, has
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this meaning and intent, in understanding that an action could
be considered eventually as constituting provocation tf it concerned the direct relations between the provoking Power and the
Power provoked.
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